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The last decade or so, many literary critics hold, has witnessed a substantial shift 
in African fiction: nationalist commitments, integral to older African writers’ work, have 
faded from younger Africans’ literary visions, which often engage wide transnational 
networks instead. In contrast to this dominant critical narrative, however, the dissertation 
contends that younger writers have not rejected nationalism, but have revised it in myriad 
ways to meet contemporary needs. Moreover, I argue not against the existence of a 
transnational turn, but rather that there is an additional, local dimension, which has 
received little attention. In the texts I examine, withdrawals into smaller networks 
function hand in hand with reconfigurations of nationalism, ultimately resulting in what I 
term “narrow nationalisms.”  
To make this case, the dissertation focuses on a selection of novels by third 
generation Nigerian authors—those born after the country’s 1960 independence—about 
three interrelated areas of crisis: oil conflict in southern Nigeria, the rise of cybercrime, 
and the so-called “brain drain.” I analyze how narrow nationalisms operate in Kaine 
Agary’s Yellow-Yellow (2006), Helon Habila’s Oil on Water (2010), Adaobi Tricia 
Nwaubani’s I Do Not Come to You by Chance (2009), Sefi Atta’s A Bit of Difference 
(2012), and Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie’s Americanah (2013). Whether they are more 
about sovereignty, ideology, or belonging, the narrow nationalisms of the primary texts 
 vii 
all contest longstanding wisdom that nationalism is about imposing ideology from above, 
especially as characters retreat into smaller communities from which they attempt to 
catalyze bottom-up, grassroots change.  
What, then, are the implications of Nigerian fiction’s continued engagement with 
nationalism for the study of contemporary African literature? Further, in a country that is 
already fractured in terms of political control and allegiances, and in an era in which the 
role of the nation-state remains uncertain, what might narrow nationalisms suggest about 
Nigerian sovereignty? Examining narrow nationalist spaces in third generation Nigerian 
writing not only complicates literary critical conversations but also reveals new insight 
into challenges for the present-day Nigerian state—and for Africa and the global south 
more widely.  
 viii 
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 1 
Introduction 
 
This generation incorporated in their literary imaginations  
disdain for colonialism and distrust of nationalism that had  
animated earlier generations of writers who bemoaned the  
cultural agonies of colonialism and the aborted dreams of  
uhuru. The new generation had decidedly more cosmopolitan  
visions of the African condition, cultural production, and the  
subjectivities of gender, class, and sexuality.  
  
      —Paul Tiyambe Zeleza  
 
   
 
 In 2007, Malawian scholar of history and literature Paul Tiyambe Zeleza became 
one of the first critics to describe the departure of “third generation” African writers—
those “born after 1960”—from some of the thematic concerns of previous generations 
(“Colonial Fictions” 13). One reading of Zeleza’s analysis suggests that younger writers 
have traded out their predecessors’ commitment to nationalism in favor of wider 
“cosmopolitan visions,” a notion that many critics have embraced (13). Third generation 
Nigerian author Helon Habila, for example, understands Zeleza’s argument in this way: 
“Taking my cue from Zeleza’s phrase ‘distrust of nationalism,’ I call this generation of 
writers the ‘post-nationalist’ generation” (“Introduction” viii). Habila thus casts his own 
generation as writing after the era of nationalism, which implies a significant break from 
the decidedly nationalist emphasis of previous generations’ writing.1  
 In addition to the reading that Habila puts forth—and not, I hold, at odds with it—
is a second possible interpretation of Zeleza’s analysis, and by extension third generation 
African writing. Habila calls attention to the phrase “distrust of nationalism,” but 
                                                 
1 Habila notes that his use of “post-nationalist” is “aspirational”—a desirable and reachable goal, if not a 
precise reflection of current circumstances (“Introduction” viii).  
 2 
Zeleza’s sentence does not end there. Rather, he elaborates on the nationalism(s) of 
which young writers are suspicious: “nationalism that had animated earlier generations of 
writers who bemoaned the cultural agonies of colonialism and the aborted dreams of 
uhuru” (“Colonial Fictions” 13). As Habila reads it, the words that follow “nationalism” 
comprise only a rehearsal of what constitutes nationalism, but what if instead these 
additional phrases are identifying specific forms of nationalism that younger writers 
reject? That is, if we read “cultural agonies of colonialism” as a reference to the oft-cited 
cultural nationalism embodied by first generation writers like Chinua Achebe, and 
“aborted dreams of uhuru”2 as a nod to the “Marxist-Nationalist” leanings of the second 
generation, then Zeleza’s claim leaves room for another form of nationalism to emerge 
alongside or in conjunction with growing cosmopolitan perspectives (Coker 38; Garuba 
“The Unbearable Lightness” 60). And indeed, my dissertation argues this very point: that 
younger writers’ distrust of earlier iterations of African nationalisms has brought about 
not the rejection of nationalism wholesale, but rather a revised—and as I contend, a 
highly localized—approach to nationalism.  
More specifically, I focus on recent Nigerian writing to make this case. Due to 
Nigeria’s vast population—with over 180 million people—and diversity—with 
approximately two hundred and fifty ethnic groups represented and over five hundred 
indigenous languages spoken—the country’s literatures offer numerous and varied 
perspectives (“Nigeria”). In addition, Nigerian writing has occupied a prominent position 
in the global literary scene since African literature was first published overseas in the 
1950s, amidst the final years of the formal colonial era, and it remains especially 
                                                 
2 “Uhuru,” the Swahili word for “freedom,” has long been associated with international socialism, and it 
continues to serve as the name for the movement embodied by the international African People’s Socialist 
Party (Page xviii; “Omali Yeshitela Speaks”).  
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prominent in the current global literary moment, enabling me to situate my readings 
within various ongoing critical conversations. A focus on Nigerian literature therefore 
keeps the dissertation focused without limiting it excessively; thorough contextualization 
of my readings is more manageable with a single-country concentration.  
 Nigeria’s contemporary diversity and population, of course, have their roots in a 
long colonial history, as is the case for much of the global south. The borders that 
demarcate today’s Nigeria, like almost all of those throughout Africa, are products of late 
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century European imperialism. European territorial 
claims in Africa mushroomed during the nineteenth century during the so-called 
“Scramble for Africa.” At the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885, leaders from thirteen 
European countries3 and the United States gathered in Berlin—in the absence of any 
Africans—to draw arbitrary boundaries across the African continent, dividing it up for 
rule by European powers, without any regard for African peoples or their political 
realities (Shepperson 37; Reader 551). As a result, each new colony’s borders clustered 
together a variety of disparate—and sometimes antagonistic—ethnic groups under a 
single administration, and every boundary divided at least one ethno-cultural area into 
multiple administrations (Mutua 1136; Reader 575). As a result of this process, Britain’s 
longtime presence in the region that now comprises Nigeria was formalized 
(Chamberlain 51). Then, in 1914, British colonial administrator Lord Frederick Lugard 
merged the protectorates then known as Northern and Southern Nigeria, creating the 
geopolitical area that constitutes today’s Nigeria—the most populous and ethnically 
                                                 
3 Britain, France, Belgium, Germany, Portugal, Italy, and Spain walked away with agreed-upon colonial 
claims on the African continent (Chamberlain 82). Also in attendance at the Berlin Conference were 
Austria-Hungary, Denmark, the Netherlands, the Ottoman Empire, Russia, and Sweden-Norway 
(Shepperson 37).  
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diverse of any African country, with over two hundred and fifty ethnic groups (Nwankwo 
and Ifejika 21-22; Nayar 324; Olusanya 1). These groups had long “had trading, cultural, 
religious and other links,” but they had not previously been bound under a single 
administration, let alone one imposed by a foreign power for its own advantage 
(Olusanya 6, 7). The diversity of each colony resulted partly from colonizers’ disregard 
of African peoples as they strategized in their power struggle amongst each other, and 
partly from their conscious effort to “divide and rule” (Mutua 1136). For the latter reason, 
European administrators also purposely solidified ethnic distinctions within each colony, 
even though African ethnic categories had historically not been so rigidly defined 
(Ranger 260).  
Given Nigeria’s large population and exceptional diversity, the consequences for 
rising interethnic conflict were especially high. The most populous of Nigeria’s ethnic 
groups had long been the Hausa, Yoruba, and Igbo peoples, but their large numbers did 
not necessarily lead to political domination, especially since approximately 40% of the 
colony’s population belonged to minority ethnic groups (Ekeh 95, 96). This dynamic 
changed, however, in 1946 with the Richards Constitution. In a British effort to constrain 
burgeoning Nigerian nationalism following World War II, the colony’s previously 
unitary administration took on a federal structure with three regions, each of which was 
dominated by one of the three majority ethnic groups: the Hausa in the North, the Yoruba 
in the West, and the Igbo in the East (O. Lawal 42; Forsyth 18). The borders that defined 
the new regions had no more historical precedent than did those drawn during the Berlin 
Conference, but with this administrative change, the three majority ethnic groups 
suddenly “emerged as the ruling groups” (Ekeh 94-95). Subsequent constitutions in 1951 
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and 1954 solidified their political power (Amoda 50; J. Lawal 266). Although members 
of the majority groups lived throughout Nigeria, their ethnic identities became 
increasingly associated with the regions where each was most populous, and calls for 
ethnic solidarity became more and more politically expedient (Osaghae 240). 
Dissatisfaction with regional borders escalated such that the North and the West each 
threatened succession, in 1953 and 1954, respectively (Amoda 54, 55; Ekeh 100). Ethnic 
nationalisms thus came to compete with wider Nigerian nationalism. As a result of the 
same processes, minority groups rapidly lost political sway, to the point that British 
administrators convened the 1958 Willink Commission of Inquiry into Minority Fears 
and Means of Allaying Them, which acknowledged serious interethnic ethnic tensions 
but resulted in little action (Nwajiaku-Dahou 52). The same year, exacerbating ongoing 
problems, Shell began retrieving and exporting oil from the eastern Niger Delta, a region 
predominantly populated by ethnic minorities and that would soon, due to its natural oil 
wealth, become a hot spot for domestic and international conflict (Peel 23).   
These local challenges developed within the context of growing international 
agitation for decolonization. A high point of the pan-African movement that had begun 
around the turn of the century, the 1945 Pan-African Congress, for example, brought 
together delegates from Britain, the Caribbean, and Africa—including prominent African 
nationalists like Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah, Kenya’s Jomo Kenyatta, Sierra Leone’s 
I.T.A. Wallace-Johnson, and Nigeria’s Obafemi Awolowo—in conversation about formal 
decolonization, the role of the nation-state, and the struggles of working peoples 
internationally (Adi 89, 81, 90, 92). India’s independence in 19474 and Ghana’s 
                                                 
4 Despite India’s geographic distance, its independence was a watershed moment for those living under 
British colonial rule. The reasoning went that, “If the deadlock in India could be successfully resolved by 
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becoming the first decolonized West African nation in 1957 heightened anticipation of 
Nigeria’s independence, as activists demanded control over their own “full parliamentary 
democracy” (Cohn 209; Achebe There Was a Country 41; O. Lawal 43). International 
networks thus provided ideological and political support for Nigerian nationalism, even 
while interethnic and regional conflict threatened to divide the soon-to-be independent 
nation.  
Forming a crucial part of the nationalist movement, Anglophone Nigerian novels 
were published and widely read overseas for the first time in the 1950s.5 Amos Tutuola 
(1920-1997) became “arguably modern African literature’s first internationally celebrated 
novelist” with the publication of his controversial and foundational first novel, The Palm-
Wine Drinkard (1952), acclaimed by the likes of Dylan Thomas (Whittaker x; Gikandi 
“Tutuola” 752; Low 15). While Tutuola, who drew from Yoruba folk tales in his work, 
was hailed as a representative “folk writer,” the novelist Cyprian Ekwensi (1921-2007), 
and slightly later Chinua Achebe (1930-2013), were soon recognized as prominent realist 
“foils” to Tutuola’s work (Low 17; Akinbajo; Adichie “Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie on 
the Joy”). Indeed, the 1958 publication of Chinua Achebe’s seminal Things Fall Apart 
would indelibly shape Nigerian and African literature. As Nigerian independence 
approached, Achebe’s project of asserting that “we had a past,” in contrast to historian 
Hugh Trevor-Roper’s infamous 1963 denial of any African history without Europeans’ 
                                                                                                                                                 
the British Government after these many years, then a new era had dawned in British colonial policy” 
(West African Pilot qtd. in Olusanya 34). Moreover, as Nigerian historian G.O. Olusanya has argued, 
Nigerians felt especially connected to the Indian cause, given their vast populations (Nigeria’s ranked 
second only to India in the Commonwealth) (34).  
5 As scholars have emphasized, “scribal African literature is at least 5000 years old,” and Nigerian 
publishing in English began as early as the 1930s, with short form Nigerian writing published in local 
newspapers (Adesanmi; Low 17). My discussion begins with the 1950s, however, since the focus of the 
dissertation is on developments in the Anglophone Nigerian novel.  
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presence, gained tremendous traction, making cultural nationalism a key priority in this 
phase of Nigerian writing (Achebe There Was a Country 58; Wheatcroft 12).  
 Tutuola, Ekwensi, and Achebe were among the earliest members of the group 
now known as “first generation Nigerian authors.” Mostly born in the 1920s and 1930s, 
these writers first published6 in the years right before and after Nigeria’s independence on 
October 1, 1960 (Hewett 76; Guseh and Oritsejafor 140). Today, the generation’s most 
internationally recognized authors are the late Achebe and the playwright, critic, and poet 
Wole Soyinka (b. 1934), who in 1986 became the first African to win the Nobel Prize in 
Literature (N. Clark; Flood). Other influential first generation Anglophone Nigerian 
writers include the satirical novelist T. M. Aluko (1918-2010); poet and children’s author 
Mabel Segun (b. 1930); novelist Chukwuemeka Ike (b. 1931); the “mother of African 
literature,” Flora Nwapa (1931-1993); “the leading poet” of the first generation, 
Christopher Okigbo (1932-1967), who died fighting for Biafra in the Nigeria-Biafra War; 
playwright and novelist Elechi Amadi (b. 1934); and poet and playwright John Pepper 
Clark-Bekederemo (b. 1935) (“T. M. Aluko”; “Mabel Segun”; Gikandi “Ike” 329; 
Quadri; Garuba “Okigbo” 568; Gikandi “Amadi” 26; Gikandi “Clark-Bekederemo” 162-
163). They prioritized in their work an “anticolonial defense of national culture” in order 
to “write back against empire,” as Things Fall Apart so famously did, and often they 
critiqued various obstacles to national success like corruption, as Achebe does in his 
second novel, No Longer at Ease (1960) (Dalley 17; Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin 96). 
                                                 
6 To be sure, many of these authors have published since the 1960s. As recently as 2012, for example, 
Achebe published his memoir There Was a Country: A Personal History of Biafra and Wole Soyinka 
published his essay collection Of Africa. The “generational” designation does not mean to encompass the 
years of an author’s entire corpus, but rather to highlight the contexts of the authors’ formative years.   
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Having grown up under colonial rule, these writers embraced burgeoning nationalism and 
were optimistic about what formal independence would bring. 
 Despite such optimism, though, as the 1960s wore on in Nigeria, escalating 
interethnic tensions turned into interethnic violence and culminated in war. Events came 
to a head in January 1966 with a coup in which mostly Northerners lost their lives, and an 
Easterner, the ethnically Igbo Major General Johnson Aguiyi-Ironsi, became the new 
Head of State (Forsyth 37, 47). As a result, many Northern Nigerians viewed the coup as 
an “Igbo conspiracy,” while most Eastern Nigerians understood it as an indication that 
Northerners had occupied the most prominent government positions (Reader 669). 
Shortly thereafter, in May, Ironsi restructured the federal government, replacing the 
regional system with a centralized unitary system, a move that again resulted in disparate 
reactions from disparate regions: where Northerners mainly saw a push for an Igbo-
dominated government, Easterners largely supported what Ironsi’s effort to “remove the 
last vestiges of the intense regionalism” (Forsyth 52, 49; Ironsi qtd. in Prescott 133). This 
conflict brought about yet another coup in July, at which time an ethnically Ngas 
Northerner named General Yakubu Gowon became the country’s new Head of State 
(Forsyth 52; Reader 669). Gowon restored the federal system, but none of his efforts 
deterred the ensuing violence (Prescott 133). Estimates indicate that, among Easterners of 
Igbo and minority ethnic backgrounds, as many as 30,000 lost their lives, over 50,000 
were injured, and approximately two million had to flee the North for the East, including 
many who had never lived in the East—a consequence that further strengthened the 
association between ethnic and territorial identities (Nwankwo and Ifejika 207-208; J. 
Lawal 273). Dangers to Northern Nigerian residents of the East intensified to the point 
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that, in October 1966, then-Governor of the Eastern Region Chukwuemeka Odumegwu 
Ojukwu declared that his government could no longer ensure the safety of Northerners 
and mandated their departure from the region (Amadi 21). Efforts at negotiating peace 
failed, and in May 1967, Governor Ojukwu declared the secession of the East as the 
independent Republic of Biafra (Brandler 230). In July, the federal Nigerian government, 
led by Gowon, declared war to reclaim Biafra (Nwankwo and Ifejika 6).  
 The ensuing Biafran War, also called the Nigeria-Biafra War and the Nigerian 
Civil War, would cost two to three million lives, on battlefields, from air bombings, and 
from starvation in refugee camps (D. Jacobs 4). Photographic images of starving Biafran 
children pervaded international media, provoking sympathy and horror.7 The economic 
stakes were heightened by the presence of oil in southern Nigeria, a Biafran territory 
populated primarily by ethnic minorities, whose allegiances were “sharply divided” 
(National Security Council). Britain and the Soviet Union agreed that federal Nigeria was 
more likely to cooperate with international oil interests, leading them to put aside their 
differences in the ongoing Cold War to support the federal Nigerian government (Achebe 
There Was a Country 154). With limited access to food and arms, Biafra conceded defeat 
in January 1970 (Falola and Oyeniyi 54). An amnesty policy helped the country rebuild 
but did not resolve underlying ethnic and regional tensions (Siollun 167).  
 The decades following the Biafran War saw the boom and bust of the oil industry, 
as well as the rise of centralized dictatorships. In the early 1970s, as the price of oil rose 
worldwide, Gowon’s government took advantage of growing revenues by raising the 
federal government’s share of the profits, marking the starting point of the increasingly 
                                                 
7 For more on the work of photojournalists in raising international awareness of the conflict, see journalism 
scholar Claude Cookman’s article “Gilles Caron’s Coverage of the Crisis in Biafra” (2008).  
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centralized government’s growing control over the oil industry (Okonta and Douglas 25). 
The country’s sudden prosperity enabled a sharp rise in spending by Gowon’s 
government, a trend emblematized by the Head of State’s now-infamous remark to an 
international journalist: “The only problem Nigeria has is how to spend the money she 
has” (qtd. in Akinola 26). The tides soon turned, however, and the global oil industry’s 
collapse in the early 1980s, coupled with destructive IMF and World Bank policies, led 
the once prosperous country into serious debt (Soremekun 99). At the same time, other 
related domestic problems, including an alarming increase in armed robberies and a 
deadly religious riot that cost over four thousand lives, created anxieties that led the 
Nigerian government to scapegoat the country’s undocumented immigrants and in 
January 1983 to demand their immediate expulsion. Then-President Shehu Shagari’s 
government’s decision to give between two and three million people only two weeks to 
leave the country solved no real problems and instead created probably “the worst 
international crisis for Nigeria since the end of the Civil War” (O. Aluko 540-541).  
For the most part, average Nigerians fared no better during the rest of the decade, 
which saw only further centralization, escalating corruption, and inflation, most clearly 
embodied by the 1985-1993 regime of Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida, or “IBB” 
(Adebanwi Authority Stealing 35). Frustration with opportunities available in Nigeria led 
to increased emigration from the country, especially on the part of the most educated, to 
the extent that the government launched a campaign to discourage its youth from leaving 
the country to seek better opportunities elsewhere (Oberabor). This series of short 
propaganda films for television encouraged young Nigerians not to follow the lead of 
their protagonist, Andrew, who declared his plan to “check out”—that is, to leave Nigeria 
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to escape unemployment, declining infrastructure, and growing crime (Oberabor). The 
propaganda campaign did not turn the tides, however, and Afropessimism began take 
hold. Observers from within and beyond Africa worried that, given decreasing standards 
of living throughout the continent, Africa’s future “was likely to be far worse than its 
past” (Rieff 10).8  
 Into this pessimistic post-Biafran context of increasingly centralized and 
increasingly corrupt dictatorships emerged Nigeria’s “second generation” writers. Born in 
the 1940s and 1950s, these writers were the primary contributors to the new genre of 
Biafran War literature, and elsewhere they reckoned with a corrupt and repressive 
government. Perhaps the most internationally recognized second generation author was 
the environmental activist and writer Ken Saro-Wiwa (1941-1995), who was later 
executed based only on a sham trial and to the world’s horror by the notorious Sani 
Abacha dictatorship, with the covert support of Shell Oil (O. Okome ix; Boyd xiii; 
Okonta and Douglas 35). The generation’s writers in English also include such figures as 
novelist and critic Isidore Okpewho (b. 1941); Buchi Emecheta (b. 1944), a prolific 
novelist known especially for her critiques of gender inequalities; Soyinka protégé and 
playwright Femi Osofisan (b. 1946); Niyi Osundare (b. 1947), widely viewed as “the 
leading poet” after the Biafran War; Marxist novelist Festus Iyayi (1947-2013); the 
prolific poet Tanure Ojaide (b. 1948), who has in the last decade begun also to write 
novels; and internationally acclaimed novelist and poet Ben Okri (b. 1959) (Gikandi 
                                                 
8 The Afropessimism to which I refer here and throughout the dissertation encompasses the ideas that 
developed in the 1980s and 1990s that offered a bleak prognosis for the future of the African continent. 
These Afropessimists noted how standards of living throughout Africa had improved in the 1960s 
following independence, and lamented the decline of those standards since the 1970s, worrying that quality 
of life for average African people would only continue to deteriorate (Rieff 10). This version of 
Afropessimism is not to be confused with the more recent phenomenon that goes by the same name, which 
condemns all people of African descent to “ontological death”; for this group of Afropessimists, structures 
of racial oppression cannot ever be altered or defeated (Wilderson).  
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“Okpewho” 568; Eke 239-241; Gikandi “Osofisan” 587-588; Garuba “Osundare” 590; 
Gikandi “Iyayi” 343; Garuba “Ojaide” 566; B. Cooper “Okri” 574). These authors, 
whose perspectives were shaped by the “disillusionment and stasis” of the postwar, post-
oil boom years, nonetheless continue to engage questions of nation and nationalism, often 
through a Marxist lens (Adesanmi and Dunton 14 “Nigeria’s Third Generation Writing”; 
Krishnan 75; Garuba “The Unbearable Lightness” 60).  
 Despite hopes for a transition to democracy, the period of disillusionment 
continued when Babangida declared the annulment of the June 1993 elections aimed at 
selecting his successor; the subsequent power vacuum enabled Sani Abacha to seize 
power that November, soon becoming Nigeria’s most notorious dictator. Abacha’s five-
year rule dramatically exacerbated the country’s existing corruption, economic, 
environmental, educational, and human rights problems. As noted, the oppressive 
dictatorship’s possibly most infamous act was to silence environmentalist Ken Saro-
Wiwa and eight other activists by murdering them—an atrocity that inspired such 
international outrage that Nigeria was suspended from the Commonwealth and became a 
global pariah state (Peel 7). The murders became representative of the Abacha regime’s 
unprecedented assault on Nigerians’ freedom of speech and its atrocious human rights 
record, as well as the alarming results of growing dependence on oil (which, under 
Abacha, climbed such that the industry comprised 90% of export earnings (Falola 198)). 
Other consequences of Abacha’s rule included the wrongful detention or assassination of 
dissidents (or even those within his own government whom Abacha deemed a threat), 
extreme censorship, tremendous national debt, crumbling infrastructure, unprecedented 
acquiescence to exploitation by multinational corporations, the closure of many 
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publishing houses, and extremely poor funding of the university system—a problem that 
caused extensive faculty strikes and stalled higher education, which in turn inspired 
Abacha only to ban national university unions (Falola 202; Ogbondah 231; Olukotun 60; 
Falola 65, 198; Habila “Introduction” x; Mittelman 47). Nigerians celebrated in the 
streets when the “regime of terror” came to an end with Abacha’s sudden death on June 
8, 1998 (Falola 202, 204).9 
 Following Abacha’s demise, many Nigerians felt optimistic about the return to 
civilian government in 1999. The first democratically elected leader after Abacha, 
Olusegun Obasanjo, abandoned a tentative plan to modify the constitution to permit 
himself a third term, instead following the will of the National Assembly and leaving 
office peacefully in 2007; just last year, departing president Goodluck Jonathan became 
the first incumbent Nigerian leader to step down peacefully after losing an election 
(Nathaniel; Okeowo). Yet, the shift to democracy has not been as much of a turnaround 
as many had hoped. The recently elected Muhammadu Buhari—sworn off the violence 
and extremist strategies of his 1983-1985 administration—has embarked on a prominent 
anti-corruption campaign, but so far, corruption persists in many arenas (Kazeem); the 
oil-rich, environmentally devastated Niger Delta has become a hotbed for violent conflict 
between militant extremists, the army, and oil interests; many educated Nigerians 
continue to move overseas; and perhaps most notoriously, religiously based conflict, 
from growing Pentecostalism in the south to Islamic extremism in the north, as embodied 
by Boko Haram, continues to threaten Nigerian lives and national stability.  
                                                 
9 In an obvious effort to hide the cause of death, Abacha’s body was buried promptly and without autopsy. 
The official government story attributed his death to a heart attack, but many suspect he was poisoned 
(Weiner A4).  
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 Producing their first work in this context are Nigeria’s third generation writers. 
Born after Nigerian independence, with little to no memory of the Biafran War, they 
grew up witnessing a series of military coups, the institutionalization of corruption, the 
aftermath of the oil bust and destructive World Bank and IMF policies, flourishing 
Afropessimism, and finally, the atrocities of the Abacha regime. Anglophone authors of 
this generation include novelist Okey Ndibe (b. 1960); novelist and short story writer Sefi 
Atta (b. 1964); novelist Chris Abani (b. 1966); novelist and filmmaker Biyi Bandele-
Thomas (b. 1967); novelist, poet, and critic Helon Habila (b. 1967); Jesuit priest and 
short story writer Uwem Akpan (b. 1971); activist and creative writer Kaine Agary (born 
c. 1973); humorous novelist and poet Lola Shoneyin (b. 1974); novelist and public 
intellectual Teju Cole (b. 1975); poet and short story author Uche Peter Umez (b. 1975); 
author and medical doctor Eghosa Imasuen (b. 1976); satirical essayist and novelist 
Adaobi Tricia Nwaubani (b. 1976); novelist, short story writer, and public intellectual 
Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie (b. 1977); A. Igoni Barrett (b. 1979), most famous for his 
short stories; author and medical doctor Uzondinma Iweala (b. 1982), whose novel Beasts 
of No Nation (2005) was made into a film released last year, starring Golden Globe 
winner Idris Elba; novelist and playwright Helen Oyeyemi (b. 1984), who published both 
a novel and a play before the age of twenty-one; and attorney, right-wing social 
commentator, and short story author Ayo Sogunro (b. 1984) (Ndibe “Q&A”; Nkem-
Eneanya; Hartwiger 236; Bandele-Thomas 91; Tenshak 55; Akpan “Interview”; Dike; 
Shoneyin; Kassel; “Umez”; “Eghosa Imasuen”; Dada; Tunca “Biography”; Barrett 
“Interview”; Hawley 18; Harris; Wicks; Ness; Adebare).  
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To be sure, the generational framework for Nigerian literature has its 
shortcomings. It is useful in that it enables critics to draw out patterns and shifts in 
literary productive over time, and because my argument directly engages existing 
scholarship that uses this model. Nonetheless, as with almost any system of 
categorization, it risks simplifying complex historical realities by placing them in tidy, 
either/or boxes. I have placed Okey Ndibe among third generation writers, for example, 
even though his birth in the year of Nigeria’s independence was only one year after the 
birth of Ben Okri, whom I have listed with second generation writers. Nonetheless, I 
stand by my association of Ndibe with the younger generation, not simply because Ndibe 
was born in the year of Nigeria’s independence, but also because he did not begin to 
publish until much later. Okri’s first novel, Flowers and Shadows, appeared in 1980, and 
his most famous novel, The Famished Road, came out in 1991. Ndibe, by contrast, did 
not publish his first novel, Arrows of Rain, until 2000. Though both authors continue to 
write, their most prominent literary moments stand about two decades apart.  Not only an 
author’s age, then, but also the history of their literary production, plays a role in such a 
framework. 
Moreover, unlike previous generations, for whom Nigerian independence and the 
Biafran War are, respectively, often considered definitive, the so-called “children of the 
postcolony”10 have no single major event viewed as representative, but rather a range of 
interrelated areas of ongoing crisis. If independence fostered nationalist optimism, and 
civil war fractured those dreams, today’s various crises result in third generation 
                                                 
10 Originally coined by Djiboutian writer Abdourahman Ali Waberi to describe the parallel third generation 
of African Francophone writers (“les enfants de la postcolonie”), the term has found widespread currency 
(Adesanmi and Dunton “Nigeria’s Third Generation Writing” 15; see also Hartwiger 236, Hewett 76, 
Krishnan 74, etc.).  
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Nigerians’ sometimes disparate and fragmentary responses to received notions of 
nationalism—an ideology itself in crisis. In the way that the second generation often 
wrote about the Biafran War, which they witnessed in their youth, some third generation 
writers have depicted the excesses of the Abacha regime, in novels like Helon Habila’s 
Waiting for an Angel (2002) and Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie’s Purple Hibiscus (2003). 
In other cases, the nickname “Yahooze generation” links Nigerians in this age range to 
cybercrime, since the moniker refers to the “yahoo-yahoo boys,” or the notorious email 
scammers who frequently use Yahoo! email addresses (Adebanwi Authority Stealing 36). 
Elsewhere, others focus on the role of the oil boom and crash, an event that offered 
different experiences to different subgroups of the third generation. In her novel A Bit of 
Difference (2012), for example, Sefi Atta suggests the term “oil boomers” to describe 
those born in the 1960s, “because they came of age during the oil boom and benefited 
from it […] dancing through dictatorships” (62-63). In contrast, Adaobi Tricia Nwaubani 
depicts the experience of only slightly younger third generation Nigerians, who were 
born in the 1970s and came of age only to witness a decline in their standard of living; in 
I Do Not Come to You by Chance (2009), her narrator Kingsley—born, like his creator, 
around 1976—laments of the late 1990s: “When we were children, my father usually 
returned from work with […] imported treats. Gradually, they had gone out of reach of 
the common man. I could not remember the last time I had eaten any McVitie’s biscuits” 
(146). In this way, the oil industry’s trajectory holds a different, though no lesser, 
significance even among members considered part of the same generation. From the 
physical landscape of the Niger Delta to cyberspace, these areas of crisis shape young 
Nigerians’ visions of nation and national possibilities.  
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In addition, as I noted at the beginning of the introduction, the third generation’s 
move away from its predecessors’ nationalism has become a major focal point of 
scholarship on third generation Nigerian and African literature; this aspect provides the 
argumentative thread that guides this dissertation. In contradistinction to the first 
generation’s cultural nationalism and the second’s Marxist-Nationalism, many critics 
hold, third generation writers have distanced themselves from potentially “restrictive and 
confining” nationalist engagements (Habila “Introduction” viii). According to this line of 
thinking, after decades of insistence on the need for literature to contribute to nationalist 
projects, coming from both older Africans and international audiences, younger writers 
have the flexibility to write about a wider range of topics, political or otherwise.  
Many of those who celebrate a deemphasis on the nation call attention to a trend 
in negotiating among multiple specific localities. Perhaps the most famous of the thinkers 
in this camp is the London-born Taiye Selasi (b. 1979), a writer of Nigerian and 
Ghanaian descent (“Taiye Selasi”). In 2005, her seminal and controversial essay “Bye 
Bye Babar” brought widespread attention to the term “Afropolitan,” which she applies to 
people of African descent—mostly those whose parents moved overseas in the 1960s, 
’70s and ’80s—who were brought up in multiple contexts and now readily navigate 
between (mostly urban) settings in Africa, Europe, and/or the US, without viewing any 
one place as “home.” Selasi’s 2014 TED Talk furthers this idea, as she emphasizes the 
irrelevance of nationality to her experience and asks to be identified as “multi-local,” 
rather than “multinational”; that is, she identifies with “New York, Rome and Accra,” but 
not the United States, Italy, and Ghana (“Don’t Ask”). Though this vision of 
Afropolitanism has come under fire for its socioeconomic privilege, reductive potential, 
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and tendency toward consumerism,11 it remains influential in ongoing conversations 
about contemporary African writing.  
 Others have celebrated some form of multi-locality as a means of moving beyond 
the nation without explicitly discussing Afropolitanism. South Africa-based literary 
scholar Brenda Cooper, for example, reiterates the claim that third generation African 
writers have demonstrated a “rejection of the quest for nation” and argues that their work 
offers a type of “transnational” guidance and “broker[s] translation between cultures” 
(165, 7). In this reading, young African writers not only negotiate among different 
specific contexts in their own experiences, but also construct at least partial roadmaps for 
others to do the same. Service as a “cultural broker,” in this line of reasoning, precludes 
national engagement.  
 For still others, a shift away from nationalism means not necessarily a complete 
replacement of national filiation with other types of affiliation, but rather an opportunity 
to explore the circulation of ideas and people throughout and beyond the African 
continent. Eminent Cameroonian public intellectual Achille Mbembe, for instance, has 
favored Afropolitanism for its transcendence of national boundaries. In a 2010 essay, 
Mbembe links the concept to what he calls “l’esprit du large,” suggesting a far-reaching 
mindset uniquely enabled by Afropolitanism (Mbembe Sortir 233). In other words, for 
Mbembe, Afropolitanism is not so much a matter of “multi-locality” as it is an 
opportunity to move away from ideas of Africa as a site of stasis and to analyze ongoing 
migration and exchange.  
                                                 
11 For more critiques of Afropolitanism, see Stephanie Bosch Santana’s “Exorcising Afropolitanism: 
Binyavanga Wainaina Explains Why ‘I Am a Pan-Africanist, Not an Afropolitan’ at ASAUK 2012” 
(2013), Marta Tveit’s “The Afropolitan Must Go” (2013), and Emma Dabiri’s “Why I’m Not an 
Afropolitan” (2014).  
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 Quite recently, some scholars have called attention to African literature’s 
“transnational turn” as bringing out a relationship between the highly localized and the 
global. In 2014, literary scholars Oluwole Coker and Alexander Greer Hartwiger each 
published arguments along these lines in the same special issue of African Studies series 
Matatu. Coker contends that recent Nigerian novels display a “transnational humanistic 
agenda” by focusing on a specific national issue—in his case study, underdevelopment—
with an eye toward provoking global “change” in similar arenas (50). That is, for Coker, 
novels by Ndibe and Nwaubani explore underdevelopment in specific contexts in order to 
comment on underdevelopment throughout the global south. Hartwiger offers a similar 
argument, arguing that the “singular experience” of Elvis Oke, the Elvis Presley-
impersonating, slum-residing protagonist of Chris Abani’s GraceLand (2004), calls for 
greater attention to those Hartwiger calls “spectral populations”—individuals or groups 
rarely at the center of literary or political analyses (249). These arguments thus 
foreground connections between the highly local and the global, a tension I examine in 
this dissertation. 
 Despite the numerous claims of departures from nationalism, a few critics have 
argued that third generation African writing offers a revision to earlier understandings of 
nationalism, rather than a rejection of the concept wholesale. My argument will fall into 
this camp, though, as I will show, it diverges from others’ in key ways. In 2008, literature 
scholar Adélékè Adéèkó identified one specific way in which recent Nigerian novels 
offer a more flexible understanding of national identity. In earlier writings, Adéèkó 
explains, Nigerians were compelled to remain within national boundaries at all costs, 
committed to “dying for the nation” if necessary (20). Recent fictional works, in contrast, 
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allow their characters to move overseas without becoming any less Nigerian or 
committed to the Nigerian nation (20). Further expanding understandings of Nigerian 
nationalism, African literature expert Madhu Krishnan identifies nationalism in recent 
texts as one of a network of affiliations, which in her readings can include immediate 
family, one’s city, or the African continent (86, 91). For her, a multiplicity of affiliations 
does not mean a rejection of nationalism, but rather the “ongoing evolution of national 
commitment” (76). In this way, Krishnan, like Adéèkó, makes the case that while recent 
Nigerian fiction may indeed exhibit transnational tendencies, it does not necessarily 
constitute the post-national turning point that Habila seeks.  
 My argument builds from Krishnan’s assertion that third generation writing 
portrays different, shifting national commitments, rather than an abandonment of 
nationalism altogether. In contrast with Krishnan’s and others’ focus on broad, 
transnational linkages, however, I identify and analyze in third generation Nigerian texts 
a turn to highly localized commitments to family, neighborhood, and city. I argue not 
against the existence of a transnational shift, but rather that there is another, local 
dimension, that has so far received little attention amidst the vocal claims of 
transnationalism. These narrow nationalisms, as I term them, are shaped by global 
contexts and do not necessarily signify the malicious exclusion of others, but they can 
reveal a disinterest in forging broader connections. Our era of interconnectivity can thus 
contribute to the construction of newly narrow networks.  
To construct this overarching argument, the dissertation examines several recent 
Nigerian novels that explore three key interrelated areas of crisis in the country today, 
each of which forms the focal point of a chapter: the conflict over oil in the Niger Delta, 
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the rise of cybercrime, and the so-called “brain drain.” These ongoing issues all create 
serious challenges for Nigeria, whether they are administrative, military, environmental, 
financial, legal, or educational. Despite these texts’ cynicism about possibilities for 
effecting large-scale change, they nonetheless depict characters committed to survival 
and resistance via narrow nationalisms. Each of the authors whose work I discuss is 
writing back against international media narratives of Nigeria as chaotic and unlivable. 
The chapters are ordered such that they analyze the primary texts in roughly their 
chronological order of publication—all within the last ten years—and the relative 
socioeconomic privilege of the characters on which I focus increases with each essay. In 
terms of setting, they also forge a general movement outward; although global factors 
shape all three contexts, their focal points shift from insular networks in the Niger Delta, 
to Lagos cybercafés that enable characters to connect to scam victims all over the world, 
to diasporic migrations among continents.  
The first chapter, “Niger Delta Women’s Resistance in Kaine Agary’s Yellow-
Yellow and Helon Habila’s Oil on Water,” examines two novels about Nigeria’s 
notorious environmental and political crisis in the Niger Delta. In the early 1990s, Saro-
Wiwa’s ethnic solidarity-based movement gathered a lot of momentum, marking the 
Niger Delta as a site for broad solidarity and international coalitions of support. The 
execution of Saro-Wiwa and his colleagues fractured the movement, however, and 
Agary’s and Habila’s novels reflect a pessimism about possibilities for solidarity and 
resistance in the aftermath of Abacha’s regime. Utilizing political scientist and 
anthropologist James C. Scott’s ideas of “everyday forms of resistance,” my analysis 
focuses on female characters’ attempts at resistance, since women—both in reality and 
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within the novels—are most affected by the crisis but receive little attention in media 
narratives.  
I read the protagonist of Kaine Agary’s Yellow-Yellow (2006), a teenager named 
Zilayefa, and her relationships with wealthy older men as an allegory both for gendered 
exploitation in and beyond the region, and for the Niger Delta’s exploitation by both 
international and domestic political and economic forces. Trying to leave behind her 
unnamed Niger Delta village and improve her economic standing, Zilayefa earnestly 
pursues affairs with these men, but she eventually determines that they cannot offer a real 
escape, pursuing instead a narrow feminist nationalism centered around emotional and 
financial support networks. Her refusal to participate in the exploitative systems 
represented by these older men indicates that she is willing to “die for the nation” if doing 
so is the only escape (Adéèkó 20). By concluding with the teenaged Zilayefa breaking 
free of her cycle of emotional and financial dependence on men, the novel makes the case 
that individual personal acts of resistance can make a larger impact in larger structures of 
exploitation, and that the peoples of the Niger Delta must find a way to remove the region 
from the exploitative relationships bringing about environmental and political chaos. As I 
show, the novel also argues that, because exploitation of the environment goes hand in 
hand with the exploitation of women, political sovereignty for the Niger Delta becomes 
inextricable from women’s rights. Taking the allegory to its logical conclusion, however, 
raises several serious questions. The fact that Zilayefa is able to rely on and commit to a 
small network of women who can provide emotional and financial support invites the 
question as to how the Niger Delta might separate itself from centuries of subjection to 
imperialism. Especially if those who exploit the Niger Delta’s oil wealth are as 
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incorrigible as the characters who seduce the teenaged Zilayefa without a second thought, 
then to what extent does the novel problematically place responsibility on the peoples of 
the Niger Delta to end the crisis? And, given the novel’s publication near the end of the 
presidency of Olusegun Obasanjo, the first democratically elected leader after Abacha, in 
what ways is Yellow-Yellow’s conclusion a lament for opportunities lost in the 
immediately post-Abacha moment, rather than an expression of hope for real possibilities 
for change? 
In contrast with Yellow-Yellow, Helon Habila’s Oil on Water (2010), less overtly 
demands that its readers attend to its female characters, as the two main characters are 
men. Set amidst the peak of Niger Delta militants’ violence in 2009, the plot is driven by 
two main events—an oil industry-related fire in a fictional Niger Delta town, and the 
kidnapping of a British petroleum engineer’s wife by militants—each of which has a 
female character’s victimization at its heart. As I argue, the novel juxtaposes white 
British kidnapping victim Isabel Poole and the substantial press coverage her story 
receives, with the fire victim Boma and her relative invisibility within any sort of media 
narrative. Boma’s peripheral narrative position is underscored by the fact that her own 
brother, a journalist and the novel’s protagonist, appears disinterested in understanding 
her as a multifaceted personality and makes assumptions about her helplessness and 
victimhood. Though a minor character in the novel, Boma becomes the novel’s only 
participant in meaningful resistance when she joins a small, eco-spiritual community 
committed to protecting its island, Irikefe, from the advancement of oil interests. Like 
Zilayefa, Boma turns for support to a small network committed to survival, at least within 
the small geographic space they can occupy, despite the chaos around them. The location 
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of Boma’s chosen community on a small island in the rural Niger Delta, though, 
emphasizes its separation from other efforts, suggesting the continuing futility of broad 
coalitions like those that Saro-Wiwa led. Despite such isolation, however, I argue that 
Boma finds on Irikefe a nationalism that offers her belonging and emotional support and 
enables her to work with others to resist environmental and political violations of the 
island.  
Ultimately, the chapter contends, both Yellow-Yellow and Oil on Water reflect an 
inclination to revert to narrow networks of alliance, given a relative dearth of pragmatic 
options due to domestic failures and factors of globalization alike. Both Zilayefa’s 
personal network and Boma’s religious group on Irikefe function as a microcosm of the 
nation; Zilayefa’s assertion of control over her body and Boma’s defense of the island, 
both at the risk of their own safety, indicate that these narrow nationalisms are still about 
political sovereignty. But to what extent, the chapter inquires, are the characters’ 
strategies effective modes of resistance, and to what extent are they about bare survival? 
Are their narrow nationalisms indicative of a resignation to the status quo, or can they 
reveal new ways to challenges the fragmentary political situation in the Niger Delta?  
Shifting focus to another arena of apparent lawlessness, the second chapter takes 
on the only Nigerian novel to date about cybercrime. In “‘Family Always Came First’: 
The Yahooze Generation in Adaobi Tricia Nwaubani’s I Do Not Come to You by 
Chance,” I examine Nwaubani’s protagonist Kingsley’s multiple alliances as he defies 
his ardently first generation nationalist, devotedly law-abiding father Paulinus’s wishes 
by pursuing professional email scamming. As in Agary’s and Habila’s novels, this shift is 
partly borne out of a feeling of limited options in post-Abacha Nigeria. Economic 
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collapse, caused largely by corruption and the oil bust, prohibits the recent university 
graduate Kingsley from obtaining his dream job as a petroleum engineer, which in turn 
brings about his resort to criminal activity. He is also particularly desperate to earn 
money, though, out of devotion to his family—an ideological commitment that he 
inherited from his father, Paulinus. As a result, pragmatic (financial), ideological 
(prioritization of family), and personal (pride) reasons drive Kingsley’s engagement with 
a narrow nationalism characterized by inherent criminality. I Do Not Come to You casts 
its protagonist as representative of at least some part of his generation, implying that his 
attitudes are characteristic among a frustrated subset of highly educated, underemployed 
young Nigerians. Concurrently, a technology of globalization—the internet—comes to 
support a traditional and local network in the family.  
The 2009 novel emphasizes Kingsley’s and by extension his (and Nwaubani’s) 
generation’s shift away from earlier versions of Nigerian nationalism. Where Paulinus 
sacrifices his and his family’s well-being to his nationalistic ideals, Kingsley engages a 
form of nationalism that retains his father’s patriotism but also adapts to evolving 
realities. Risking one’s life or even denying oneself creature comforts become 
unnecessary in Kingsley’s formulation. I investigate to what extent the novel implies that 
earlier generations’ idealism—which an increasingly cynical Kingsley comes to view as 
simply a lack of pragmatism—is responsible for Nigeria’s current economic challenges. 
Especially given its satirical tone, does I Do Not Come to You condemn such idealism, 
pity it, or do something else?  
Further, in pursuit of substantive solutions to his real financial obstacles, Kingsley 
embraces the prevalent and often damaging stereotype of pervasive Nigerian criminality, 
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where Zilayefa and Boma aim to combat the oppressive status quo, at least in some small 
way. In the 1980s, Achebe famously lamented, “Corruption in Nigeria has passed the 
alarming and entered the fatal stage; and Nigeria will die if we keep pretending that she is 
only slightly indisposed” (Achebe The Trouble 47-48). In keeping with Achebe’s call to 
recognize the spread of corruption, Nwaubani’s 2009 novel ceases to “pretend” that it is 
merely a “slight” problem—but instead of offering a corrective, it proceeds to embrace 
and advance the trend, casting it as a mode of national survival, rather than a threat. In 
what ways, though, is the text’s satire of Nigeria without concern for repercussions 
liberatory (by enabling writers to work beyond certain ideological and political 
boundaries) and in what ways might it prove harmful (by promoting a stereotype that 
costs financial, educational, and emotional damage to many Nigerians and others around 
the world)?  
Finally, the dissertation’s third chapter examines texts about young, educated 
Nigerians who have moved overseas, seemingly contributing to the “brain drain.” 
“Diasporic Networks and Return Migration in Sefi Atta’s A Bit of Difference and 
Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie’s Americanah” argues that the primary texts use their 
protagonists’ migration as a starting point for analysis of global networks like 
international aid, internet discourse, and enduring global inequalities and racism. I reveal 
how these novels suggest both that pan-African alliances have become outdated and that 
the internet can replicate global imbalances—factors that work together to foster highly 
localized communities. Though the socioeconomic advantages of the protagonists of 
Atta’s and Adichie’s endow them with more options and opportunities than are available 
to residents of the Niger Delta or even the struggling middle-class Kingsley, I argue that 
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they still make the case that even privileged Nigerians remain structurally disadvantaged 
in global intellectual and humanitarian conversations. Further, while Atta, Adichie, and 
many critics have depicted these novels as pushing back against the demand for African 
literature to be about nationalism—a pressure that comes both from earlier generations of 
African writers and from international literary audience—I contend that these texts 
nonetheless offer models for localized nationalisms, despite and in some ways because of 
their protagonists’ global trajectories.  
A Bit of Difference (2012) tells the story of “Nigerian expatriate in London” 
Deola, who becomes increasingly frustrated with the ways that her employer, an 
international aid organization, perpetuates rather than combats systemic global 
inequalities (5). As a result, she decides to devote herself instead to helping “the people 
she loves” and concurrently, to return to Nigeria to live among those who have a “share 
history” with her (106, 44). Even if the “shared history” of Nigerians is in some ways a 
colonial invention, as Terence Ranger would suggest, Deola’s newly embraced 
community is narrow—limited to her handful of friends and family members—and 
nationalist—as least as she imagines it, as she frequently emphasizes the precedence of 
“Nigerian” identity over ethnic identities. Where Benedict Anderson has (somewhat 
idealistically) argued that nations inspire love, A Bit of Difference suggests that love can 
inspire or renew national commitment. To what extent, the chapter asks, is the novel’s 
attitude overly optimistic or idealistic, or a problematic abdication of responsibility? In 
what ways is the novel distancing itself from earlier generations’ overtly political 
nationalist commitments within and beyond literature, and in what ways is it critiquing 
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this inclination in Deola? How else does this “reorientation”—to borrow an oft-repeated 
term in the novel—reconfigure nationalism for a younger generation?  
Another diaspora novel from an acclaimed Nigerian-born author living in the 
United States, Adichie’s Americanah (2013), narrates protagonist Ifemelu’s thirteen years 
in the US and eventual decision to return to Nigeria. Like Deola, Ifemelu grows 
exhausted by structural inequalities, which in her case limit her participation in 
intellectual conversation as well as her professional opportunities. Her increasing sense 
that she “should” be in Nigeria, and her later work to foster political and cultural 
conversations there, factor into what I argue might look like localism, but is ultimately a 
form of narrow nationalism. Arguably the least “nationalist” of the dissertation’s five 
primary texts, Americanah serves to test the bounds between localism and narrow 
nationalism.  
To be sure I do not intend to argue that narrow nationalisms appear in all third 
generation Nigerian writing, but I do hold that it is a widespread event. In part to make 
this point, the dissertation draws on work from writers with a diverse range of 
backgrounds. Kaine Agary, whose parents came from two different southern minority 
ethnic groups (Ijaw and Isoko), spent her childhood in Port Harcourt, the largest city in 
southern Nigeria; Adaobi Tricia Nwaubani and Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie, both Igbo, 
grew up in Igbo-majority southeastern Nigeria; Helon Habila’s southern Christian 
Tangale family raised him in the Muslim-majority north; and Sefi Atta, whose father was 
Ebira, a northern Muslim minority group, and whose mother was Christian and Yoruba, 
lived in Lagos until she moved to the UK for boarding school (Aminu; Agary “In an 
Interview with Nigerian Writer”; Dada; Tunca “Biography”; Cowley; Owomoyela 81). 
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Agary and Nwaubani live in Nigeria today, while Habila, Atta, and Adichie divide their 
time between Nigeria and the US (Agary “In an Interview with Nigerian Writer”; Dada; 
Tunca “Biography”; “Bio”; Owomoyela 81). They range in age from Atta, born in 1964, 
to Adichie as the youngest, born in 1977 (Owomoyela 81; Tunca “Biography”). The 
dissertation will attend to the specificities of each author’s background, but in sum, 
engaging this range of writers will also enable me to illustrate that the third generation’s 
portrayal of narrow national frameworks is not limited to any particular geopolitical, 
ethnic, religious, or other perspective.  
The fact that five of the six writers of my primary texts are women reflects the 
unprecedented prominence of Nigerian women writers today. While earlier generations’ 
most famous authors were almost always men—with only “Flora Nwapa and Mabel 
Segun as lone voices” in the first generation—women writers have come to the fore in 
recent decades (Adesanmi and Dunton “Everything Good” xii). An additional 
implication, then, is that women writers have played a primary role in shaping the literary 
narrow nationalisms I trace. Though nationalism is often viewed as “a male 
phenomenon,” and women have historically served only as sexualized and/or domestic 
“supporting players”—often as wives, daughters, mistresses, and/or victims—my 
selection of novels, both in their majority-female authorship and their majority-female 
protagonist lineup, place women at the forefront of these adaptive approaches to 
nationalism (Özkırımlı 204; Eley and Suny 27). 
In addition, partly because the texts I write about are recent—all published after 
Pius Adesanmi and Chris Dunton first laid out the concept of “third generation Nigerian 
writing” in 2005—few of them have received extended scholarly attention. They also 
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open up disparate and interdisciplinary academic conversations. Yellow-Yellow, for 
example, has been fairly popular in Nigeria but has received little international attention, 
whereas Americanah will soon become a movie produced by Brad Pitt (Child). The 
dissertation makes the case for this particular set of texts to be read alongside one 
another.  
My primary texts are less diverse, however, with regard to their genre and 
language, as they are all novels originally written in English. I focus on Anglophone 
authors chiefly due to my own linguistic limitations. I add, though, that even though 
critics have not yet placed this set of novels in conversation with one another, they 
nonetheless participate in similar literary conversations because of their shared language. 
As Anglophone novels, they target at least a pan-Nigerian audience, if not always an 
international one, as English is the most widely spoken language in Nigeria (“U.S. 
English Foundation Research”). Among possible English-language texts, the dissertation 
focuses on novels because they have been the focus of much of the dominant literary 
critical conversation surrounding third generation Nigerian writing, and in fact 
Anglophone African writing since the 1950s. Moreover, following Benedict Anderson, 
novels have long enabled readers to imagine national communities. 
As Anderson also shows, however, nationalism is “modular,” adaptable to 
different contexts, and as even this relatively small subset of third generation Nigerian 
novels shows, nationalism takes on a variety of forms to meet the variety of needs and 
contexts in the face of multiple twenty-first-century areas of crisis in Nigeria (Anderson 
4). As historian Prasenjit Duara has argued, “Nationalism is rarely the nationalism of the 
nation, but rather represents the site where very different views of the nation contest and 
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negotiate with each other” (2). Indeed, as I show, third generation Nigerian writing has 
become a site for such contestation; many third generation texts, rather than locating 
nationalism in the past, work to piece together various shifting and contingent 
nationalisms. Each of the chapters’ primary texts offer some possibilities for different 
nationalisms: for the novels of Chapter 1, nationalism is largely about political 
sovereignty; in Chapter 2, nationalism emerges tied to both personal dignity and political 
ideology; and for the fictional return migrants of the last chapter, nationalism has to do 
with dignity and belonging. Throughout the dissertation, narrow nationalism functions as 
an umbrella term in that it can encapsulate both what might be legible as civic 
engagement—for example, Ifemelu’s aim to increase awareness of key political issues—
but it can also describe Kingsley’s efforts to improve life for his family while furthering 
stereotypes of Nigerian criminality—hardly an instance of civic engagement. In each of 
these cases, though, nationalism entails a withdrawal into smaller networks to help make 
sense of ongoing crisis—including crisis in the inherited notion of nationalism.  
Another key similarity among all the primary texts is that they each make the case 
that nationalism in the twenty-first century is not “constructed essentially from above,” as 
Eric Hobsbawm has argued of earlier nationalisms, nor is it fading out of public 
consciousness so much as it is fracturing and evolving as the relationship of people to the 
nation-state is doing in the current moment of unprecedented global migration and 
technologically enabled interconnection (Hobsbawm 10). Seizing or maintaining control 
of the state, at least among these Nigerian writers, is no longer the central facet of 
nationalism that it once was (Breuilly 381). 
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The dissertation therefore invites various questions about the state of Nigerian and 
African literatures. In what ways, it inquires, does the continued engagement with 
nationalism—even rapidly adapting nationalisms—contest narratives of Afropolitanism, 
and in what ways might a nationally specific focus serve to supplement such 
cosmopolitan visions? Given African literature’s growing popularity in the global literary 
market, in what ways might reiterating a specifically Nigerian literary identity carry 
special cultural capital? How do novels aimed at primarily Nigerian audiences, African 
audiences, and international readerships negotiate these issues differently, and to what 
effect? And how might new and quickly evolving technologies affects these dynamics?  
In addition to an intervention in the conversation about contemporary Nigerian 
literature, the dissertation also carries larger implications for the nation and the continent. 
In a country that is already fractured in terms of political control and allegiances, and in 
an era in which the role of the nation-state remains uncertain, what are the implications of 
narrow nationalism for Nigerian sovereignty? That is, concerns about the government’s 
effectiveness largely fuelled the results of last year’s presidential election, in which 
Muhammadu Buhari, a former military head of state, defeated sitting president Goodluck 
Jonathan—widely perceived as a weak leader in the face of national security threats like 
Boko Haram. To what extent might these novels’ narrow nationalisms enable strategies 
for effecting change from the bottom up, and in what ways might they potentially be 
destructive? Do narrow nationalist alliances have the capacity to expand or combine with 
one another, or will they entrench existing divisions? Do they preclude or complement 
possibilities for broader alliances? With the loss of faith in state-led or other top-down 
solutions, what remains as the role for broader organizations? Can narrow nationalisms 
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leave room for optimistic narratives, such as the “social pan-African” possibilities of 
social media, recently highlighted by the young Botswana-born writer Siyanda 
Mohutsiwa (“Is Africa’s Future Online?”)? Indeed, an attitude of resignation runs 
through all the primary texts I discuss, whether it is resignation to exploitation by the oil 
industry, to criminal behavior, to racism and global inequalities, or to the apparent 
impossibility of effecting top-down change either globally or nationally. In what ways is 
this resignation a matter of cynicism, and when is it a matter of pragmatism? Might it 
constitute a twenty-first-century variation on the Afropessimism of the 1980s and 1990s, 
and if so, why is it behaving that way? Examining understandings of narrow nationalist 
spaces in the work of third generation Nigerian writers has the potential to reveal 
alternative routes for political organization or new insight into challenges for the present-
day Nigerian state—and for Africa and the global south more widely. With the various 
challenges Nigeria faces, it is urgent to consider what the youngest writers of the 
youngest continent have to say about the so-called Giant of Africa. 
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Chapter 1: “Keep This Island Free”: Niger Delta Women’s Resistance 
in Kaine Agary’s Yellow-Yellow and Helon Habila’s Oil on Water  
 
In July 2002, two thousand women gathered at the Escravos Tank Farm, the 
largest Chevron oil terminal in Nigeria, and demanded that the multinational company 
listen to the voices of those most harmed by its profiteering: ethnic minority women from 
the oil-rich Niger Delta. Predominantly ethnically Itsekiri, and ranging in age from their 
thirties to their nineties, the women refused to let anyone in or out of the facility, sang 
solidarity songs, and threatened to break taboo to “shame” oil companies by taking off 
their clothes if anyone interfered with their demonstration (Mukoro 91; Daniel; “Deal 
Reached”). In so doing, the women were participating in a longstanding tradition of 
visible women’s protests in southern Nigeria, most famously emblematized by the 1929 
women’s war. At that time, tens of thousands of women destroyed property symbolic of 
men’s power, demonstrated in little or no clothing to upend gender expectations and 
thereby shame (male) witnesses into addressing to their grievances, and repeatedly 
marched en masse to protest the actions of those behind women’s declining social and 
political standings: local chiefs, “the colonial government and the European businesses” 
(Matera, Bastian, and Kent 143, 145, 132). Like their predecessors in 1929 and on other 
occasions, the Escravos protestors of 2002 succeeded in many of their goals: they 
(temporarily) halted Chevron’s business operations and obtained key concessions, 
including more jobs for women and more funding for community infrastructure from the 
company (Mukoro 91; Daniel). The success of the Escravos demonstration soon inspired 
thousands of other Niger Delta women from various ethnic backgrounds to take action. 
 35 
Making similar demands—typically for jobs, potable water, and improved access to 
education—women occupied a total of eight regional oil facilities that summer (Daniel; 
Ekine “Women’s Responses” 78). The largest of these demonstrations took place in 
August, when three thousand Itsekiri, Ijaw, and Ilaje women occupied the headquarters of 
Shell and Chevron in Warri (Mukoro 92).  
 This recent series of events rightly received substantial attention in both scholarly 
articles and the mainstream media, which otherwise suffered from “an obvious gender 
gap” in their approaches to the Niger Delta crisis (Omotola “Women” 39). For decades, 
oil companies like Chevron and most notoriously Shell have wreaked environmental, 
economic, political, and social havoc on the Niger Delta. Almost all members of the 
region’s oil-producing communities have suffered as a result, but women have been 
disproportionately affected, financially, medically, and socially. Yet, the Escravos 
protests marked the first time that women clearly took center stage in media narratives 
about the ongoing conflict, as most scholarly and activist work on the Niger Delta crisis 
focuses on the roles of men—whether they are leaders in the Big Oil projects devastating 
the region; workers on oil rigs; activists or militants rising up against Big Oil, from famed 
nonviolent environmentalist Ken Saro-Wiwa the early 1990s to Asari, the leader of the 
extremist Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF); or soldiers combating the so-
called rebels (Saro-Wiwa A Month 13; “Leader”). In contrast to these male-dominated 
narratives of the conflict, then, the Escravos protests offered a very visible instance of 
women’s successful collective action, and they received the substantive coverage they 
deserved.  
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Unfortunately, many media and scholarly narratives have cast the women’s 
demonstrations of Summer 2002 as largely isolated incidents, rarely discussing women’s 
coalitions before of after that cluster of highly visible events. Journalist Michael Peel, for 
example, writes of the relationship between the 1929 and the 2002 protests: “More than 
70 years later, the women of the oil-rich delta are stirring once more”—as if women had 
taken no meaningful action between these two major events (Peel “Peacefully”). 
Similarly, an Associated Press piece asserts, “The women’s blockade marks a departure 
in the Niger Delta, where armed men frequently resort to kidnapping and sabotage to 
demand jobs, protection money and compensation for alleged environmental damage” 
(Doran 14). Here, the author sets up the women’s protest in contrast to male-dominated 
militancy to dub it a “departure,” rather than acknowledging its context within other 
moments and forms of women’s resistance. In these ways, media accounts have cast the 
Escravos protests as anomalous. Some scholarly treatments have been more nuanced, but 
they still tend to focus on the same series of specific, relatively visible historical events. 
International relations scholar Charles Ukeje, for example, focuses on particular 
“significant social protests by women,” while legal expert Iyenemi Norman Wokoma 
examines a series of women’s uprisings from 1929 to 2002, and international studies 
scholar Iwebunor Okwechime analyzes moments of direct “confrontation” between 
women and oil companies (Ukeje “From Aba” 609; Wokoma 173, 175; Okwechime 87). 
These and other writers’ attention to these historical instances of Niger Delta women’s 
protests against Big Oil are much needed and commendable, but they tend to rehearse the 
same particular events, thereby implicitly forging a narrative in which certain key 
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years—1929, 1984, 1986, and 2002, most often—witnessed Niger Delta’s women’s brief 
emergence from a general state of passive victimhood.  
A few researchers have gone beyond these seminal events to investigate other 
aspects of women’s solidarity in the Niger Delta. Political scientist Augustine Ikelegbe, 
as well as labor studies expert Edlyne Ezenongaya Anugwom and social work scholar 
Kenechukwu Anugwom, have drawn attention to the role of women’s community 
organizations not only in their backing of formal protests, but also in the everyday 
financial and social support for their members (Ikelegbe 251, 252; Anugwom and 
Anugwom 343). Through extended interviews with individual women in several Niger 
Delta communities, social justice activist Sokari Ekine has explored both mass protests 
and individual women’s acts of resistance, which she argues can even include acts like 
participating in interviews to spread awareness of their hardships (“Women’s Responses” 
27). In this way, this handful of scholars goes beyond the major visible events to explore 
other ways in which the most disproportionately affected group of people in the Niger 
Delta crisis work to survive amidst and to resist environmental and political devastation.  
The reasons for the focus on major events like the Escravos protests lie partly in 
the political realities of the region. With the exception of activists like Sokari Ekine, who 
works in the area full-time, most researchers cannot safely travel into the violence-ridden 
Niger Delta, where the army, various militant groups, and local governments are 
variously at odds and in alliances with one another. Consequently, fiction offers a mode 
for writers to explore spaces where journalists or academics cannot get funding to visit 
due to safety concerns—and novels, in particular, can do so at length. Fiction can also go 
beyond numbers or “newsworthy” stories to investigate what political scientist and 
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anthropologist James C. Scott has called “everyday forms of resistance,” which “make no 
headlines” but nonetheless play essential roles in shaping the ongoing conflict—perhaps, 
as Scott has suggested in a Malaysian context, even more influential roles than the 
numerically fewer but more sensational events that make headlines (xvii). In addition, 
neither those engaged in the everyday acts of resistance nor those at the receiving end of 
these actions may want them reported; for the former, “Their safety [often] lies in their 
anonymity,” and for the latter, public attention to these actions might undermine their 
perceived authority or dominance (Scott 36).  
With these factors in mind, I argue in this chapter that two recent Nigerian novels 
about the Niger Delta crisis, Kaine Agary’s Yellow-Yellow (2006) and Helon Habila’s Oil 
on Water (2010) call attention to possibilities for women’s resistance beyond large scale, 
highly visible events like the Escravos protests. Beyond these two novels, the significant 
body of creative writing on the region’s crisis—while it does much commendable work—
remains overall lacking in attention to women’s issues. Poetry by second generation 
authors Tanure Ojaide and Ibiwari Ikiriko and third generation authors Ogaga Ifowodo 
and Uche Peter Umez, for example, offers varied and nuanced approaches to the crisis in 
mourning damage to oil-producing communities and asserting Nigerians’ rights to control 
their own resources, but so far Nigerian poetry has not directly addressed the unique 
challenges Niger Delta women face.12 In theater, John Pepper Clark-Bekederemo (b. 
1935) has written the most prominent plays about the Niger Delta: The Wives’ Revolt 
(1985) and All for Oil (2000). Notably, The Wives’ Revolt portrays a successful example 
                                                 
12 For more, see Ojaide’s Labyrinths of the Delta (1986), one of the earliest literary works commenting on 
the region’s condition; Ojaide’s Delta Blues and Home Songs (1997); Ikiriko’s Oily Tears of the Delta 
(1999); Umez’s Dark through the Delta (2004); Ifowodo’s The Oil Lamp (2005); and Umez’s Aridity of 
Feelings (2006).  
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of women’s collective action, narrating a fictional revolt against the men of their oil-
producing village because of the sexist distribution of their oil revenues. Though the 
women characters are protesting local men’s misogyny—rather than, for example, the oil 
company’s policies—the play nevertheless stands out in its focus on Niger Delta 
women’s agency. Short stories by A. Igoni Barrett (b. 1979) and Uche Peter Umez (b. 
1975) are among the first works to depict twenty-first century militant activity in the 
region, making them groundbreaking in that sense, but they remain male-dominated. 
Barrett’s story features no female characters at all, and the only woman in Umez’s text is 
the narrator’s mother, who worries about his safety but otherwise contributes little to the 
story.  
Finally, Yellow-Yellow and Oil on Water join a small group of novels commenting 
on the crisis. Tides (1993), by Isidore Okpewho (b. 1941), investigates ethnic alliances 
and laments environmental damage but does not touch on gender dynamics. In contrast, 
Ojaide’s The Activist (2006), second generation writer Vincent Egbuson’s Love My 
Planet (2008), British author Christie Watson’s Tiny Sunbirds, Far Away (2011), and 
second generation writer May Ifeoma Nwoye’s Oil Cemetery (2013) clearly call attention 
to women’s issues. Of these texts, all but Love My Planet specifically feature major 
women’s demonstrations that evoke the 1929 and 2002 protests, as the characters sing 
and remove their clothes in collective protest. While the women of The Activist are tear 
gassed and raped in retaliation for their actions,13 those in Tiny Sunbirds14 and Oil 
                                                 
13 The conclusion of The Activist is troubling in that, despite the novel’s seemingly positive depiction of 
Niger Delta women engaging in substantive collective action, it ultimately denies them the ability to impact 
company or government policies. Worse, where they are brutally punished for their activist efforts, the 
novel’s highly educated male protagonist soars ahead with his successes, achieving many concessions 
through his apparently skillful negotiations and eventually winning the governorship of Niger Delta State in 
a landslide election (318). The novel’s depiction of women’s resistance thus proves pessimistic at best and 
dangerously misogynistic at worst.  
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Cemetery successfully obtain concessions, like their real-life counterparts in Escravos. By 
doing so, these novels successfully portray women’s collective agency in response to the 
Niger Delta crisis. Aside from Yellow-Yellow and Oil on Water, though, these depictions 
have been limited to reiterations of the Escravos events—which, while important, do not 
tell the full story. Especially in an era of growing cynicism about the possibilities for 
mass resistance in the Niger Delta—a shift I discuss below—other possibilities for 
solidarity and other strategies for resistance have become increasingly important to 
consider.  
In this chapter, I draw out the ways in which Agary’s and Habila’s female 
characters not only face tremendous hardships as members of oil-producing communities, 
but also grow empowered to take action in response to their circumstances, often in 
subtle, yet no less meaningful, ways. Each text also offers a narrative of Niger Delta 
women’s resistance during key historical moments that bookend the 2002 Escravos 
protests. Yellow-Yellow, the coming of age story of a teenager named Zilayefa, takes 
place from 1996 to 1998, approximately the time frame between the Nigerian state’s 
notorious murder of nine environmental activists in November 1995 and the death of 
dictator Sani Abacha in June 1998 (Yellow-Yellow 34, 175). Tremendous governmental 
suppression of political opposition occurred during this period, and in response, formerly 
nonviolent activist movements became increasingly militant. Set about a decade later, 
most of Oil on Water occurs during August 2009, near the peak of militant insurgencies, 
which entailed attention-grabbing tactics like kidnappings (Oil on Water 236). With its 
plot catalyst drawn from the period’s sensationalism, the novel’s protagonist Rufus, a 
                                                                                                                                                 
14 While Tiny Sunbirds’s position representation of Niger Delta women’s knowledge and agency is 
commendable, the novel depicts Nigerian men in highly problematic ways, as male characters are either 
abusive abandoners, like the protagonist Blessing’s father, or violent school dropouts, like her brother.  
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journalist, travels through the Niger Delta searching for the kidnapped wife of an oil 
executive. These two historical moments—the post-Saro-Wiwa phase of Abacha’s 
dictatorship and the 2009 military insurgencies—are critical to understanding today’s 
situation. Both novels convey some pessimism about possibilities for resistance after 
Saro-Wiwa’s death; Yellow-Yellow laments that the end of Abacha’s military dictatorship 
in 1998 did not bring about greater change in the Niger Delta, while Oil on Water calls 
attention to the necessarily fragmentary nature of resistance amidst the militant 
insurgency. As I show, though, both also continue to offer some hope through narrow 
nationalisms, whether through Zilayefa’s feminist commitment to her local network or 
through Rufus’s sister Boma’s participation in an eco-spiritual community devoted to 
combating environmental damage.  
My reading brings together the novels to advance conversation about women’s 
resistance within the conflict, but the two texts arose out of distinct authorial contexts. 
For her part, Nigeria-based public policy expert Kaine Agary pursued a specific political 
project to make Niger Delta women’s struggles more visible. Born in the 1970s in the 
United States to Nigerian parents from different southern ethnic minorities (Ijaw and 
Isoko), Agary grew up in Port Harcourt, the Niger Delta’s largest city (Aminu). She 
moved to the US to earn her BA in Sociology and Economics at the all women’s Mount 
Holyoke College and her MPA with an emphasis on public policy at New York 
University (“Interview with Kaine Agary”). After completing her degrees, Agary 
returned to Lagos, where she is currently studying law, writing her second novel, and 
working as managing director of Dtalkshop, a Nigerian company that “aims to increase 
legal literacy and awareness in Nigeria” through print and digital publications—including 
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Yellow-Yellow (Feghabo 315; Njoku; Agary “In an Interview with Nigerian Writer”). Her 
other published fiction includes short stories about the Niger Delta, such as “My 
Blessing, My Curse” (2008), narrated as a memoir from the perspective of the region 
personified as a long-suffering mother. This story makes explicit the type of linkage 
between environmental damage and women’s bodies that I draw out in Yellow-Yellow. 
Agary’s only novel to date, Yellow-Yellow was published by Dtalkshop as part of 
its mission to build awareness of the situation in the Niger Delta. Inspired by Ken Saro-
Wiwa’s posthumously published prison memoir A Month and a Day (1995), the novel 
pays tribute to the late activist by critiquing both international and domestic forces at play 
in the exploitation of the Niger Delta (Agary Yellow-Yellow 179). Further, as Agary has 
explained of her decision to produce a work of fiction:  
Yellow-Yellow was my response to the frustration I felt from meeting many 
Nigerians who were ignorant of the issues in the Niger-Delta and why there was 
so much agitation in the late 1990s. What most people, even Nigerians, knew was 
based on media propaganda, which highlighted the youth violence and portrayed 
everyone talking about the Niger-Delta as militants or rabble rousers. (“In an 
Interview”) 
With the publication of Yellow-Yellow, Agary was self-consciously contributing to a 
more complex, nuanced narrative of the crisis, aiming at a primarily Nigerian readership. 
In addition, she also prioritized her work in calling attention both to women’s issues in a 
context where she believed “women’s issues were rarely in contemplation” and to the 
situation of biracial children like Zilayefa since, in the author’s words, it “is a reality of 
the Niger Delta that we rarely speak about” (“In an Interview”).  
 43 
Indeed, Yellow-Yellow departs from its predecessors in its unprecedented focus on 
women’s issues in the Niger Delta crisis—an aspect of the novel of which scholarship has 
rightly taken note. Literary critic E. D. Simon, for example, has argued that Agary’s 
novel fills a substantial narratological gap by depicting the crisis through a feminist lens 
(158). Similarly, literature professor Sunny Awhefeada shows how Yellow-Yellow aligns 
the exploitation of women with the devastation of the Niger Delta environment, while 
creative writer and world literature expert Ngozi Chuma-Udeh observes how the novel 
casts girls and women as most victimized by the oil industry’s effects (Awhefeada 98; 
Chuma-Udeh 110). In addition, ecocriticism scholar Charles Cliff Feghabo has shown 
how Agary’s novel casts Zilayefa’s experience as representative of the distinct plight of 
single women in the Niger Delta (323, 325). In these ways, literary criticism has 
embraced Yellow-Yellow as a much-needed corrective to depictions of the Niger Delta 
crisis as a male-dominated space.  
The novel immediately received high praise in Nigeria and has won several 
notable prizes, including the 2007 ANA/Chevron Prize for Environmental Writing and 
the 2008 NLNG Prize for Nigerian Literature, one of the most prestigious literary awards 
in Africa (“In an Interview”; Feghabo 315). Strikingly, these lucrative prizes are both 
sponsored by major oil companies: the first, sponsored by Chevron, is the most profitable 
of the Association of Nigerian Authors’ awards at US$2,000, and the second, sponsored 
by Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas Limited, was worth an impressive US$50,000 at the 
time of Agary’s win (Olantunbosun; “The Nigeria Prize”). On one hand, these awards 
seem to constitute a commendable and “substantial investment in literature” (Wenzel 
“Petro-Magic-Realism” 461). On the other hand, however, the funds spring from the 
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exploitation of Nigerian peoples and resources, and they go toward not just literary 
patronage, but also the shaping of the intellectual conversation around Big Oil (Wenzel 
“Petro-Magic-Realism” 460). While the texts eligible for the NLNG Prize portray 
environmental devastation and other negative effects of the oil industry, writers have 
stayed quiet about various bribery scandals, for example (Wenzel “Petro-Magic-Realism” 
461). Yellow-Yellow, then, is both a novel critical of Big Oil’s activity in the Niger Delta 
and a text that steers clear of naming names or directly assigning blame. Indeed, as I will 
argue, the novel’s conclusion assigns greater responsibility for change to Niger Delta 
people than it does to the multinational corporations or corrupt government officials who 
perpetuate environmental and other damage in the region.  
In contrast with Agary’s novel’s (perhaps partly oil-tainted) domestic acclaim, 
Habila’s Oil on Water has become an international bestseller, aided by its author’s global 
fame. Unlike Agary, Habila is not from oil-rich southern Nigeria, but rather the 
northeastern region of the country, where he was born in 1967 and where his Christian 
Tangale family was both a religious and an ethnic minority (Cowley). As a young adult, 
Habila completed a degree in English at the University of Jos, located in central Nigeria 
(Habila Interview with Ramonu Sanusi). He soon began to win prestigious awards and 
fellowships for his creative writing,15 and he now resides primarily in Virginia, where he 
teaches creative writing at George Mason University, though he travels often to Nigeria. 
He has published three novels, edited several anthologies, served in administrative roles 
                                                 
15 Habila’s most notable honors include the 2001 Caine Prize for African Writing, awarded to African short 
stories; the first African Writer Fellowship at the University of East Anglia in 2002; the 2003 
Commonwealth Writers Prize for Best First Novel; the first Chinua Achebe Fellowship at Bard College, 
offered to him in 2005 by none other than Achebe himself; and one of the 2015 Windham-Campbell Prizes, 
for which Anglophone writers in fiction, nonfiction, and drama are all qualified—and which grants an 
astonishing $150,000 to its recipients (“Helon Habila”; “Bio”; “Yale Announces 2015 Prizewinners”). 
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for African writers’ organizations, and co-created Cordite Books, a publishing company 
for African crime and spy novels (“Bio”).  
Shortly after Habila’s move to the US in 2005, a UK-based film company invited 
him to write a script about the Niger Delta conflict. While the author had not shied away 
from political writing before—his first novel, Waiting for an Angel (2002), depicts the 
oppressive Abacha regime—Habila has acknowledged that he had previously “never 
thought of” writing about the ongoing environmental disaster (Habila “Bookshelf”). The 
invitation piqued his interest, and he drafted a script. Ultimately, however, the company 
rejected the script, and thus the author’s third novel, Oil on Water, was “accidentally” 
born (Habila “Rivers of Oil”; Habila “Bookshelf”). Where Agary aimed in her novel to 
disrupt the focus on male actors in the Niger Delta conflict, Habila was concerned that 
media depictions had concentrated overly on the roles of oil companies and the 
government. He explains of his goals for Oil on Water, “I wanted to draw attention to the 
environment and the people who are living on that land and who are really suffering” 
(“Rivers of Oil”). Like Yellow-Yellow, then, Oil on Water was at least partially conceived 
as an effort to bring greater public awareness of those profoundly impacted by the 
conflict but who have received little media attention.16  
The work of these two novels is only a start in complicating popular 
understandings of the multifaceted Niger Delta crisis, where oil-producing communities 
face a variety of environmental, social, political, and economic problems throughout the 
vast, diverse, and ecologically fragile region. Almost the size of South Dakota at just 
under 29,000 square miles, the Niger Delta encompasses nine of Nigeria’s thirty-six 
                                                 
16 Curiously, Habila claims he wanted to avoid writing “too much of a political novel” with Oil on Water 
(“Rivers of Oil”). Whether such a goal is desirable or even possible is debatable, but as my argument will 
show, I read Oil on Water as decidedly political.  
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states and is the largest wetland in Africa (Obi and Rustad “Introduction” 3; Oluduro and 
Durojaye 772). The region is also home to “one of the highest concentrations of 
biodiversity in the world” (Okonta and Douglas 69). As a consequence of oil companies’ 
activities, however, many of the region’s ecosystems have been disrupted, damaging land 
beyond repair and driving certain animal and plant species to extinction (Okonta and 
Douglas 69). As mangroves are torn up, for example, the soil underneath them erodes, 
further disrupting the ecological system (Okonta and Douglas 69). Given that about 70% 
of federal revenue comes from the sale of crude oil, though, neither oil companies nor the 
Nigerian government has indicated serious interest in restricting oil-producing activities 
(Gallucci).  
The ecologically unique, predominantly rural setting is home to almost a fifth of 
Nigerians: approximately thirty-one million people, almost all of whom belong to ethnic 
minority groups, a factor that further shapes and complicates the crisis (Iaccino). Some of 
these ethnic groups are quite large—the most populous group, the Ijaw, number about 
twelve million—but due to the structure of Nigeria’s government, the country’s political 
power remains primarily in the hands of the three largest ethnic groups, whose 
populations are geographically concentrated outside the Niger Delta region (Ekine Blood 
and Oil 23). Despite the relatively large number of Ijaw people, for example, state 
boundaries divide up their population such that they become minorities within each state 
(Ibaba 73). In addition to the Ijaw, the approximately forty ethnic minority groups of the 
Niger Delta include the Ogoni, Etche, Urhobo, Efik, Ibibio, Ikwerre, Abua, Isoko, 
Itsekiri, Ndokwa, Andoni, and Edo (Watts “Sweet and Sour” 40; Ibaba 73; Okonta and 
Douglas 5). Even within these ethnic groups, people sometimes speak different 
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languages; in fact, about a hundred of Nigeria’s approximately four hundred languages 
are spoken in the region (Okonta and Douglas 5; Darah 102).  
Almost all of these diverse peoples are adversely affected by oil production in 
their region, receiving few benefits but facing horrific, preventable hardships. Despite 
deceptive “greenwashing” narratives—or, to borrow a term from the late Saro-Wiwa, 
“shellspeak”—the numerous major, preventable environmental problems caused directly 
by oil production include oil spills, fires, and poisoned mudbanks and bodies of water. 
Oil spills can cause, among other dangers, difficult-to-control fires that destroy 
farmlands, homes, and other property (Ekine “Women’s Responses” 68). Water for 
drinking and washing is often unsafe, in some places clocking in at over 900 times the 
safe level of benzene, a chemical that can cause a range of health problems that include 
nausea, convulsions, irregular heart beats, fertility problems in women, anemia, and 
cancer (Oluduro and Durojaye 773; Centers for Disease Control and Prevention). Even 
rainwater, once a convenient source of fresh water during the rainy season, is too polluted 
for use, to the point that it will leave black stains on clothes or dishes left outside 
(Daughters 29:59-30:29).  
While the lack of safe drinking and washing water affects all residents of oil-
producing communities, it presents women with additional risks to their health and 
safety. First, interaction with oil-polluted water can affect women’s reproductive systems 
and ability to breastfeed safely (Oluduro and Durojaye 780). Prescribed gender roles 
make women primarily responsible for retrieving water for the household; when they 
have to travel further to obtain clean water, they lose valuable hours that could have been 
spent toward earning money and are at greater risk for sexual assault (Daughters 29:15-
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29:19; Oluduro and Durojaye 779). Rape is alarmingly common in the region, sometimes 
perpetuated by oil workers passing through the area, and sometimes even by soldiers 
assigned to guard oil stations (Oluduro and Durojaye 781). In some areas of the Niger 
Delta, as many as ninety percent of women have been sexually assaulted (Ijorogu-Reed).  
Like its land and water, the region’s air is also severely polluted by oil 
companies’ practices. In a procedure called gas flaring, oil workers burn off undesired 
natural gas byproduct from local stations into the air (Okonta and Douglas 73). The 
ensuing air pollution leads to health risks like dehydration and harm to reproductive 
organs; damage to land and homes from scattered oil droplets; and constant light in some 
communities, severely disrupting residents’ sleep cycles (Oluduro and Durojaye 779; 
Jones). An instance of what critic Rob Nixon has termed “slow violence”—the “long 
dyings” of the poor—the damages caused by gas flaring appear gradually but are no less 
devastating for Niger Delta communities than more “spectacular” events like massive oil 
spills (2). Again, women of the Niger Delta often face greater health risks due to gas 
flaring: the pollution damages women’s reproductive systems and puts post-menopausal 
women, whose bodies cannot regulate their internal temperatures as well, especially at 
risk for dehydration (Oluduro and Durojaye 780).  
The oil industry’s societal impacts are similarly alarming. Many people from oil-
producing communities see little future for themselves in these exploited, rural towns, so 
they have migrated en masse to urban centers, especially nearby Port Harcourt. As a 
result, competition for limited jobs has escalated in cities, while Niger Delta communities 
become increasingly unstable due to shrinking populations (Ahonsi 30). Even more 
people will eventually have to leave their homes in the Niger Delta as rising sea levels 
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cover more and more land (Okonta and Douglas 111). Moreover, due to the high numbers 
of transient workers and subsequent increases in both sex work and rape, the Niger Delta 
has one of the country’s highest HIV/AIDS rates (Akubor 28). 
Environmental devastation has also led to the collapse of many Niger Delta 
people’s traditional sources of livelihood, like farming and fishing. These industries 
produce diminishing returns not only for the perhaps obvious reason of frequent oil spills, 
but also because companies like Shell build pipelines and canals right through otherwise 
usable farmland and indiscriminately dump waste in communities (Saro-Wiwa Genocide 
81-82; Okonta and Douglas 2). These problems are almost entirely avoidable, as policy 
analyst Ike Okonta and the late attorney Oronto Douglas have emphasized: “Whereas 
Shell takes great pains to bury its oil pipelines out of sight in other countries, [in Nigeria] 
the company simply lays them right across farmland and people’s homes” (77).  
While all residents of the Niger Delta’s oil-producing communities suffer from 
the loss of viable farmland and fishing waters, women often bear the brunt of the 
financial cost. Historically, women in the region have been primarily responsible for 
farming and fishing, and among fishers of both genders, women are more likely to fish in 
the more polluted rivers and creeks, whereas men are also deep sea fishers—out where 
pollution is more diluted. In addition, Niger Delta men have also worked with lumber, 
and as builders and welders—jobs that pollution does not make obsolete, and skills that 
are transferable to more urban areas as well (Daughters 31:38-32:16; Oluduro and 
Durojaye 774). Exacerbating these problems, local elites and oil companies sometimes 
work together to exclude women from receiving oil revenue (Oluwaniyi 150).  
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While communities suffer from collapsing infrastructure, oil revenues go into the 
pockets of industry executives and corrupt politicians. Tragically, pervasive corruption is 
a major factor that prevents funds from reaching the infrastructure projects that oil-
producing communities are promised (Peel A Swamp 167). Rather than supporting the 
peoples whose historical homelands produce the oil, in fact, this money has instead gone 
to costly international efforts like the 1990s ECOMOG wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone, 
as well as urban domestic projects such as the development of Lagos and more recently, 
Abuja (Darah 114).  
With so much at stake, advancing the conversation surrounding the diverse 
experiences and the modes of resistance of the peoples of the Niger Delta is more urgent 
than ever. Consequently, this chapter analyzes how Yellow-Yellow and Oil on Water 
portray their female characters’ varying responses to their circumstances. As literary 
scholar Charles Cliff Feghabo has lamented of literary representations of the crisis, much 
like in in scholarly and activist writings, “in most of the body of writing that has emerged 
from the Niger Delta, female characters are shadows of or mere adjuncts to male 
characters” (319). While neither Yellow-Yellow nor Oil on Water depicts women’s 
collective action as visible as the Escravos demonstrations, both texts depict female 
characters who exercise agency to survive and even improve their circumstances against 
the odds. In so doing, I hold, they make the case that, although their characters’ modes of 
resistance do not occur on the scale of the Escravos protests, they still play an important 
role in shaping the ongoing crisis. In other words, while these novels’ characters do not 
have access to the option to participate in mass demonstrations, they continue to pursue 
modes of resistance that are available to them, even if as individual acts, they do not 
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make a massive impact on their own—but, perhaps over time and “multiplied many 
thousand-fold,” they forge an element to the story that risks being overlooked (Scott 
xvii). Yellow-Yellow’s Zilayefa insists on self care and eventually risks her life to avoid 
participation in the patriarchal system that would, in the short term, benefit her. Reading 
Zilayefa’s individual struggles and acts of resistance as an allegory, I argue that Agary’s 
novel links women’s reproductive and other rights to the Niger Delta’s political 
sovereignty. The localized feminist nationalism Yellow-Yellow promotes seems in some 
ways liberatory, but it also places responsibility for change with average Niger Delta 
residents, rather than the political and economic powers that have created the crisis. In 
Oil on Water, Boma joins an eco-spiritual community that refuses to give up its tiny 
island. Again, though their territorial claims are small, their willingness to risk their lives 
for at least the sovereignty of their island helps make legible a nationalism that prioritizes 
sovereignty. Through Boma’s group and in other ways, Habila’s novel argues that the 
most visible forms of resistance are often not the most effective. That said, I wish to 
avoid exaggerating the impact of these acts, as they fact that they are taking place on such 
a small scale also serves as a reminder that possibilities for resistance are indeed very 
limited for many people in the Niger Delta. I thus read the novels against the popular 
media and critical narratives that focus almost exclusively on a set of major and visible 
events, and instead, following James Scott, I draw out the “everyday forms of resistance” 
that the novels suggest are available on a day-to-day basis to women in the Niger Delta. 
Before doing so, I first offer an overview of the historical and political context essential 
to understanding the cases that these novels make.17  
                                                 
17 My overview often relies on key dates, which risks reiterating the pattern of the existing scholarship I 
hold that Yellow-Yellow and Oil on Water are arguing against in their emphasis on less visible acts of 
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IMPERIALISM AND OIL IN THE NIGER DELTA 
 Since the fifteenth century, the Niger Delta has been a particularly significant site 
for European, and later Euro-American, exploitation of people and resources. The 
region’s people came into contact with Europeans as early as 1444, when early 
Portuguese imperialists first arrived to steal human beings to sell as slaves (Okonta and 
Douglas 6). As Okonta and Douglas have shown, this history was only the first phase of a 
system of exploitation that has culminated with today’s oil economy (6). After the slave 
trade’s abolition in 1807, European merchants pursued the palm oil trade instead (Okonta 
and Douglas 7). The superficially legitimate business, however, involved systematic 
scamming and even outright robbery of African traders—not unlike today’s oil industry, 
though with less environmentally devastating consequences (Okonta and Douglas 8).18  
 In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, British imperialists lay the 
formal groundwork for the exploitative economic structures in place today. Britain 
granted a series of royal charters starting in 1881, abandoning previous treaty agreements 
and enabling British commercial interests to strengthen their economic hold over the area 
(Falola and Oyeniyi 44-45). As Kaine Agary’s novel suggests, this period led to the birth 
of an early generation of so-called “yellow-yellows”: children whose European fathers 
traveled to Nigeria for financial profit and along the way took advantage of young 
Nigerian women, who found themselves pregnant and abandoned (74). From early on, 
then, the European exploitation of Nigeria’s land and resources went hand in hand with 
the exploitation of young women—a trend that would continue, as Agary’s protagonist 
                                                                                                                                                 
resistance, but in so doing I hope to orient my reader.  
18 For more on the relationship between the palm oil trade, the oil industry, and Nigerian literature, see 
Jennifer Wenzel’s “Petro-Magic-Realism: Toward a Political Ecology of Nigerian Literature” (2006).  
 53 
Zilayefa is a younger “yellow-yellow,” a product of the 1970s oil boom. In 1914, the 
same year that then-Governor-General of Nigeria Lord Frederick Lugard officially 
merged North and South Nigeria, he also enacted Nigeria’s “first oil-related legislation”: 
the Colonial Mineral Ordinance, which gave exclusive oil prospecting rights to Britain 
(Okonta and Douglas 23). Lugard, the same figure often blamed for much of the 
country’s ethnic conflict (often seen as a consequence of his unification of Nigeria) thus 
also initiated a century of Euro-American exploitation of oil resources in Nigeria. Many 
years later, first generation Nigerian writer John Pepper Clark (b. 1935) would portray 
this seminal, tumultuous moment in his play All for Oil (2000). Two decades after 
Lugard’s Colonial Mineral Ordinance, as World War II approached, British leaders 
realized the unprecedented urgency of access to oil. In 1937 and again in 1938, new 
regulations granted all “exploration and prospecting rights” in Nigeria to Shell and to 
BP’s predecessor, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (Peel A Swamp 41; Okonta and 
Douglas 23).   
 In the Niger Delta, the late 1950s witnessed the first discovery of oil—the highly 
coveted resource that has remained at the heart of conflict in the region—and, 
simultaneously, the first of many lackluster official efforts to assuage minorities’ 
concerns about political underrepresentation. In 1956, Shell discovered oil in Oloibiri, 
located in the eastern Niger Delta; by 1958, the company was retrieving and exporting 
the region’s oil (Okonta and Douglas 49; Peel A Swamp 23). Also in 1958, British 
administrators convened the Willink Commission of Inquiry into Minority Fears and 
Means of Allaying Them (Nwajiaku-Dahou 52). Among its few responses were to 
declare the Niger Delta a “Special Federal Territory”—a formal designation with little 
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practical consequence—and to form the Niger Delta Development Board, which would 
disintegrate by 1960 (Oboreh 22). Several minority-led political parties emerged,19 but 
majority parties’ interests often determined their successes (or failures). Sometimes a 
majority party from another region would support a minority group to disrupt the balance 
of power in that region, and in other cases a majority party might threaten to withhold 
basic resources, like water, if a minority group in their region did not support them (Okpu 
139; Jervis 16). Meanwhile, the British administration, aware its formal colonial reign 
was coming to an end, passed the 1959 Petroleum Profits Tax Ordinance, which 
guaranteed that all oil profits from the Niger Delta would be split fifty-fifty between the 
federal Nigerian government and the oil companies (Okonta and Douglas 23).  
By the mid-1960s, the newly independent Nigeria faced major challenges, and the 
Niger Delta was a hotbed for conflict over ethnic differences and oil resources. The 
January 1966 coup was the next month followed by Ijaw activist Isaac Adaka Boro, with 
his group the Niger Delta Volunteer Service, declaring the Niger Delta Republic in a 
secession that would last for twelve days (Rowell, Marriott, and Stockman 71; Ako 45). 
Other movements in the Niger Delta, including the Calabar Ogoja Rivers State 
Movement (CORM) and the Conference of Rivers Chiefs and Peoples, also increased 
their activities around this time (Ukiwo 22). Amidst a context of escalating interethnic 
violence throughout Nigeria, including the July 1966 coup, the Igbo-dominated Eastern 
region increased its threats of secession (Achebe 82-83). In May 1967, the Eastern region 
                                                 
19 Ijaw-led groups during this era, for example, included the Ijaw Rivers Peoples League, the Ijaw Union, 
the Rivers State Congress, the Rivers Chiefs and Peoples Conference, and the Niger Delta Congress (Ibaba 
75). 
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declared its independence as the Republic of Biafra, and federal Nigeria soon went to war 
to reclaim the region (Brandler 230; Nwankwo and Ifejika 6).20 
Along with interethnic conflict, desire to control the Niger Delta’s oil resources 
shaped the course of the Biafran War. The federal government prioritized resecuring its 
access to oil, and both Britain and Shell-BP—sometimes overtly, sometimes covertly—
supported the federal government in the war, seeing it as more conducive to their 
business interests than an independent Biafra would have been (Okonta and Douglas 21, 
23; Peel A Swamp 54).21 Before the war began, Shell-BP had produced on average 
487,200 barrels of crude oil a day in Nigeria, and Britain received close to forty percent 
of the oil produced in Nigeria, so the stakes were high; elevating Britain’s energy needs, 
the June 1967 Six Day War “extensively disrupted” the transport of Middle Eastern oil to 
Europe, making access to the Niger Delta’s resources all the more pressing for British 
interests (Uche 122, 113). Throughout the three-year war, the federal government 
increasingly tightened its control over the Niger Delta’s oil resources as it reclaimed the 
valuable land. Beginning in 1968, all oil companies active in Nigeria were required to 
have their head offices in Lagos, then the country’s capital (Darah 113). The next year, a 
new Petroleum Act mandated that all oil revenue would go directly to the federal 
government, which was to redistribute the money to states largely at its own discretion—
which meant that much of this money went into politicians’ pockets (Okonta and Douglas 
19, 21). Throughout this time, minorities in the Niger Delta were between a rock and a 
                                                 
20 In January 1967, federal and Eastern leaders almost reached a compromise through the Aburi Accord, 
but for reasons that are still highly debated, the agreement fell through at the eleventh hour (Nwankwo and 
Ifejika 220). Notably, some scholars have speculated that the Aburi Accord’s collapse was due to the 
federal government’s concern that an independent Eastern region would control the Niger Delta’s oil fields, 
thereby decreasing or even eliminating its access to oil profits (Okonta and Douglas 22). 
21 For a thorough history of the role of Shell-BP in the Biafran War, see Chibuike Uche’s “Oil, British 
Interests and the Nigerian Civil War” (2008).  
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hard place: their choices were to face domination in the new Biafran state or in the old 
Nigerian one. Obtaining minority groups’ support became crucial for each side; the 
federal government even pardoned onetime secessionist Isaac Boro so that he would help 
lead its forces through the difficult-to-navigate rivers of the Niger Delta (Darah 113). 
Like two to three million other Nigerians from all ethnic backgrounds, Boro eventually 
lost his life in the conflict (D. Jacobs 4; Darah 113).  
In January 1970, the war ended, reuniting Nigeria at the start of the decade that 
would see a tremendous oil boom—and corresponding damage to the communities of the 
Niger Delta. The same year, the first major oil spill in the increasingly exploited region 
occurred in Bori, the birthplace of Ken Saro-Wiwa. The spill lasted three weeks, and it 
would mark the first of many times that Shell blamed local Nigerians’ “sabotage” for a 
spill, despite the lack of evidence for such accusations (Okonta and Douglas 76). In 1971, 
Nigeria joined OPEC, and in 1973, a worldwide increase in the cost of crude oil benefited 
the oil companies and Nigerians at the center of government (Ayadi 203; El-Gamal and 
Jaffe 1; Okonta and Douglas 24). Taking advantage of these tremendous profits, a 1975 
decree “increased the federal government’s share of the oil proceeds from 50 to 80 
percent, leaving the states with only 20 percent” (Okonta and Douglas 25). Despite 
growing demands from some communities, the government made few efforts to mitigate 
the increasing environmental, economic, and social damage to the Niger Delta (Ayuba 
132).22  
                                                 
22 In 1979, the government seemed to take action on behalf of communities by decreeing that oil 
companies had to end the environmentally and medically dangerous practice of gas flaring by 1984, but 
with few mechanisms to ensure compliance, companies continued to flare gas and simply paid some 
minimal penalty fines (Okonta and Douglas 73). 
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The Niger Delta’s problems escalated in the 1980s. IMF and World Bank policies, 
in conjunction with dropping global oil prices, led to growing expenses for the Nigerian 
government, such that by the middle of the decade, 44% of the country’s export earnings 
went to pay off international debts (Soremekun 99; Okonta and Douglas 31). Meanwhile, 
between 1986 and 1996, 2.5 million barrels of oil were spilled in the Niger Delta—a 
horrifying number that, as one researcher has pointed out, is “equivalent to 10 Exxon 
Valdez disasters” (Ekine Blood and Oil 19). Gradually, under President Ibrahim 
Babangida’s administration (1985-1993), people from oil-producing communities began 
to organize demonstrations, including the occupation of oil facilities (Ayuba 132). Major 
women’s protests against the American oil corporation Pan Ocean, for example, occurred 
in 1984 and 1986, using strategies including the mass occupation of Pan Ocean’s 
production site while chanting, dancing, and during the 1984 event, removing their 
clothes, utilizing the shaming device made famous in the 1929 protests (Ukeje “From 
Aba” 610; Okwechime 73). Despite these significant efforts—the 1986 women’s protest 
mobilized 10,000 participants—the federal government maintained its longstanding 
disinterest in alleviating the suffering of the peoples whose land it so eagerly exploited 
(Okwechime 73). In August 1990, the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People 
(MOSOP), led by Ken Saro-Wiwa, presented the Ogoni Bill of Rights, which demanded 
the recognition of greater territorial, political, cultural, and social rights (Saro-Wiwa A 
Month 66, 69). Despite the government’s lackluster response,23 Saro-Wiwa’s successful 
mobilization along ethnic lines—combating what he and many others understood as a 
                                                 
23 One concession was the 1992 creation of the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission 
(OMPADEC), which increased the amount of revenue the oil-producing communities received and gave 
them slightly more political power, but like the ill-fated Niger Delta Development Board decades earlier, 
few stakeholders considered OMPADEC a sincere effort to improve the lot of the oil-producing 
communities (Okonta and Douglas 32, 33).  
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gradual genocide against the Ogoni and other ethnic minorities in the region—would 
remain a key strategy for the region’s activists (Saro-Wiwa A Month 75-76; Genocide 
43). Outside Nigerian borders, the First Gulf War (1990-1991) raised the prices of oil and 
therefore the stakes for the faceoff between MOSOP and the Babangida administration 
(Okonta and Douglas 36).  
Exacerbating the situation, and despite the protest movements’ emphasis on 
nonviolent resistance, the government—with Shell’s support—responded to increasing 
dissidence with increasing force and brutality. From 1993 to 1994, as many as two 
thousand Ogoni lost their lives, and another thirty thousand lost their homes—not to 
mention southern Nigerians of other ethnic backgrounds (Rowell, Marriott, and 
Stockman 89). Exemplary of this state-sponsored violence was the tragedy that occurred 
at Biara in April 1993 (Saro-Wiwa A Month 156). Many villagers—the majority of whom 
were women—appeared in peaceful protest, bearing twigs to signal the nonviolence of 
their demonstration (Saro-Wiwa A Month 156). In response, Nigerian soldiers sent to 
protect oil workers fired at the protesters, killing one person and wounding eleven more 
(Okonta and Douglas 120; Saro-Wiwa A Month 156).  
The rest of 1993 was momentous and tragic for Nigerian history. Many 
communities in the Niger Delta, especially the Ogoni, continued to protest the destruction 
of their land; the women’s branch of MOSOP not only demonstrated alongside the men 
who dominated the organization but also staged their own protest by refusing to perform 
their traditional roles, going on strike from their market stalls and farms and also 
prevented their children from attending school (Mukoro 91). In response, as part of a 
state project called “Operation Fire for Fire,” Nigerian police killed over three thousand 
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people affiliated with agitation on behalf of the Niger Delta; Shell continued its activities 
unabated, and that June, oil spilled for forty days in Korokoro; and the same month saw 
the failure of an election that would eventually lead to Sani Abacha, the most notorious 
dictator in independent Nigeria’s history, seizing power that November (Peel A Swamp 
161; Okonta and Douglas 77, 39). Centralizing control over oil revenue to an even more 
extreme extent than his predecessors, Abacha promptly brought both the Central Bank of 
Nigeria and the Nigerian National Petroleum Company firmly under his own direction 
(Okonta and Douglas 39).  
Under Abacha’s dictatorship, the conflict escalated and rose to global 
prominence, especially with the tragic case of Saro-Wiwa. In May 1994, four Ogoni 
elders, all of whom were former MOSOP allies, were brutally murdered by a mob of 
MOSOP supporters (Orage 47). Despite the facts that Saro-Wiwa had always stressed the 
importance of nonviolence and that he was nowhere near this atrocity, the government—
eager to suppress the protests that Saro-Wiwa so effectively led—accused him of plotting 
the murders (Rowell, Marriott, and Stockman 3). In February and April 1995, Saro-Wiwa 
and eight other Ogoni leaders were arrested for the crimes (Rowell, Marriott, and 
Stockman 4). Despite outrage from the international coalition Saro-Wiwa had built, all 
nine activists—known as the Ogoni Nine—were executed in November 1995 (Huggan 
and Tiffan 35). Shell was complicit in these atrocities; the company would, only years 
later, pay $15.5 million to settle legal action surrounding the murders (Pilkington). 
The state’s murder of Saro-Wiwa and his colleagues catalyzed a new era of 
protest in and on behalf of the Niger Delta, as oil-producing communities grew frustrated 
with the lack of results brought about by peaceful protest. Resistance movements became 
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increasingly violent in their activities, and militant groups mushroomed as power shifted 
“from local chiefs and elites to younger people” (Obi and Rustad “Introduction” 3). 
Correspondingly, the movements’ goals changed. Demands were increasingly for control 
of resources, rather than assistance with the development of local infrastructure (Ayuba 
133). This tumultuous period provides the setting for Zilayefa’s coming of age in Yellow-
Yellow. Upon Abacha’s death in June 1998, many Nigerians believed that the return to 
democracy would improve the situation. Sadly, such views turned out to be overly 
optimistic. While later regimes were not as blatantly brutal as Abacha’s, they still looked 
the other way as Shell and other companies ravaged the Niger Delta—as when the Jesse 
fire of October 1998 killed over a thousand people and injured many more—and 
sometimes perpetuated violence themselves—like when soldiers violently attacked a 
peaceful Ijaw Youth Council Protest in December of the same year (Ekine “Women’s 
Responses” 68; Okonta and Douglas 147-153). Despite these dangers, women’s 
demonstrations continued throughout the 1990s, although by the end of the decade, they 
increasingly focused on the sexual abuse of women in oil-producing communities (Ukeje 
“From Aba” 611; Omotola “Women” 45).  
Complicating any potential effort at ameliorating the situation, the Nigerian 
government, Shell, and various militant groups sometimes strategically allied with one 
another. In the late 1990s—and possibly more recently—politicians paid militant groups 
and other gangs for their political support (Ukiwo 25). Shell has sometimes paid off the 
military to suppress dissidence, and in other cases paid armed militants to keep fighting 
with one another, as recently as 2010 (Vidal; Amunwa 6). As a result, some militant 
groups have become primarily profit-seeking entities, rather than genuine protesters of 
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the status quo (Bøås 116). As a result, as researchers Cyril Obi and Siri Aas Rustad have 
argued, “the lines between militancy and criminality have become blurred or fluid” 
(“Introduction” 3). Oil on Water illustrates this complex web of alliances, as Rufus and 
Zaq travel through the Niger Delta and encounter militants and soldiers who murder 
arbitrarily with impunity, local chiefs whose power has diminished, and struggling 
villagers desperate to survive.  
Out of this environment emerged the Movement for the Emancipation of the 
Niger Delta (MEND), one of the largest and most militant Niger Delta-based movements, 
known for activities like the destruction of offshore oilfields and kidnappings of family 
members of people powerful in the oil industry (Peel A Swamp 21; Ukeje “Changing the 
Paradigm” 96; Bøås 119). In 2006—the year of Yellow-Yellow’s publication—MEND 
initiated an insurgency that would, according to a report by the nonprofit International 
Crisis Group, “claim[] an estimated 1,000 lives a year,” “cut Nigeria’s oil output by over 
50 per cent,” and “cost[] the government close to four billion naira (nearly $19 million) 
per day in counterinsurgency operations” (Curbing Violence 1, ii). The insurgency’s peak 
in 2009 provides the context for Oil on Water, whose plot is driven by the kidnapping of 
Isabel Poole, the wife of a British oil executive.  
 In what many hoped would be a turning point, the Yar’Adua government—with 
its credibility strengthened by then-Vice President Goodluck Jonathan, from the Niger 
Delta and ethnically Ijaw—offered amnesty to the region’s militants in June 2009 
(Maiangwa and Uzodike 3). The deal included “presidential pardon, a rehabilitation 
programme, education and training” (Ayuba 141). Overall, amnesty successfully saved 
lives and money, as fifteen thousand militants accepted the plan (Obi and Rustad 
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“Conclusion” 204). An unanticipated result, however, was that some former militant 
leaders became local leaders thanks to government “sponsorship,” and even so, MEND 
officially rejected the deal (Curbing Violence 4; Ayuba 141).24 Clearly, more than one 
policy change would be necessary to do more than temporarily quell the violence; yet, 
President Buhari has extended the program until December 2017, in the hope that it will 
continue to ameliorate the situation (Odunsi).  
 Since amnesty, legal, military, and political efforts to address the Niger Delta’s 
crisis have had mixed results. In 2009, Ken Saro-Wiwa, Jr., led an effort to prosecute 
Shell for culpability in his father’s death in a US court (Peel A Swamp 204). The 
company continued to deny any wrongdoing on its part but still agreed to a $15.5 million 
settlement (Mouawad B1).25 The next year, Habila published Oil on Water, and after 
President Yar’Adua’s death from heart disease, Goodluck Jonathan assumed the 
presidency, becoming the country’s first leader from the Niger Delta—a fact that pleased 
many Nigerians from the region (Curbing Violence 1). Despite the apparent failure of 
Jonathan’s administration to improve life for oil-producing communities in the Niger 
Delta, militants in the region largely supported his bid for reelection in early 2015, even 
threatening further violence if he lost (Curbing Violence 14-15). The full consequences of 
Jonathan’s loss to Northerner Muhammadu Buhari are yet to be seen, but so far, the 
military has increased its arrests of “regrouping” militants, while the new president has 
                                                 
24 Among amnesty’s harshest critics is the Port Harcourt-born third generation Nigerian author A. Igoni 
Barrett, who wrote about the deal in a piece memorializing the twentieth anniversary of Saro-Wiwa’s 
death: “What Nigerians got from the brokered peace was increased piracy in our waters, continuing 
abductions of citizens for ransom payouts, disastrous oil spillages from vandalised pipelines, and security 
forces that had grown even deadlier from years of pillaging with impunity. As the Saro-Wiwa story had 
already shown, nonviolent activism could get you killed in Nigeria. All the government proved with its 
amnesty deal was that violence pays” (Barrett “‘We All Stand’”).  
25 Tellingly, even Yar’Adua, despite his willingness to negotiate with militants on many key issues, 
continued to defend the state’s murder of Saro-Wiwa and the rest of the Ogoni Nine (Obi and Rustad 
“Conclusion” 200).  
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declared the Niger Delta crisis a priority for his administration, along with the battle 
against the similarly “lawless” chaos created by Boko Haram (Iaccino; Curbing Violence 
I; Agba). With more than six hundred oil fields in the Niger Delta today, and with 
“Shell’s continuing dominance,” the stakes for addressing the crisis are higher than 
ever—and certainly higher than when Buhari was previously Nigeria’s Head of State, 
from 1983 to 1985 (Mukoro 86; Rowell, Marriott, and Stockman 60).  
For now, militant groups’ activities remain the most visible form of resistance in 
the media. In addition to MOSOP, the IYC, and MEND, numerous other activist and 
militant organizations have formed, sometimes serving as allies to one another and in 
other cases finding themselves in political or even physical conflict with one another. 
Today, one especially notable group is the predominantly Ijaw, notoriously violent Niger 
Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF), founded in 2004 as a revival of the late Isaac 
Boro’s Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force of 1966 (Iaccino; Darah 101). Led by 
Alhaji Mujahid Dokubo-Asari, usually known as Asari, the organization is notorious for 
its clashes with members of other ethnic groups, like the Itsekiri; stealing oil and selling it 
to outsiders under the pretense of delivering profits more directly to oil-producing 
communities; and in early 2015, threatening to increase violence if Goodluck Jonathan 
were not reelected (Peel A Swamp 3; Iaccino). Other prominent, highly militant groups 
have included the Niger Delta Liberation Front (NDLF), weakened by a power vacuum 
after the death of its founder in 2011, and Niger Delta Vigilante (NDV), which clashed 
with the NDPVF and resigned to accept the amnesty deal in 2009 (Iaccino). These and 
many other groups—such as the Movement for the Survival of the Ijaw Ethnic 
Nationality in the Niger Delta (MOSIEND), the Movement for the Restoration of Ogbia, 
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the Isoko Development Union, and the Urhobo Progressive Union—have mobilized 
primarily along ethnic lines (Mukoro 92; Ibaba 71). The Movement for the Survival of 
the Ethnic Nationalities in the Niger Delta (MOSEND) began as an Ijaw movement but is 
now pan-ethnic (Peel A Swamp 181). Still other groups have organized primarily 
according to age, like the youth-led Chikoko Movement, or gender, like the Bayelsa 
Women Forum (Okonta and Douglas 143; Mukoro 92). Nonetheless, the majority of the 
militant organizations run along ethnic boundaries, following Saro-Wiwa’s lead.  
In contrast with male-dominated militant groups, women have continued to 
engage in primarily peaceful acts of protest. Many local women’s community 
associations throughout the region meet regularly to help members with farming 
strategies, family conflict, and other issues (Oluwaniyi 154). Among larger organizations, 
the most prominent are the Niger Delta Women for Justice (NDWJ), an NGO based 
locally in the Niger Delta, and the Federation of Ogoni Women’s Associations (FOWA) 
(Ekine Blood and Oil back matter). The latter brings together women from many 
generations and, in keeping with Saro-Wiwa’s legacy, combines fights for cultural 
survival and environmental justice (Oluwaniyi 151; Barikor-Wiwa). Branching out to 
develop solidarity among women from beyond the Niger Delta, Elsie Ijorogu-Reed 
founded the NGO Deltawomen in 2010 (Ijorogu-Reed). The most successful of these 
organizations are pan-ethnic and pan-regional (Omotola “Women” 48). While, as Yellow-
Yellow notes, not all women in the Niger Delta have access to these types of networks, 
these developments still indicate the growth of various formal alliances among the 
region’s women.  
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ZILAYEFA’S STRUGGLES AS ALLEGORY 
 Opening shortly after Saro-Wiwa’s execution, still very much under the brutal 
Abacha regime, Yellow-Yellow takes place before the formation of organizations like 
Deltawomen, so seventeen-year-old protagonist Zilayefa has little access to resources 
beyond what her mother, Bibi, can provide. Although Zilayefa hears about oil company-
sponsored scholarships on the radio, for example, she explains, “they were useless to us 
because no one in my village knew how to get them”—a fact that casts the scholarships 
as only a token gesture by Big Oil (11). Despite minimal access to opportunities like 
financial aid or women’s community organizations, Zilayefa becomes increasingly 
determined to explore the world beyond her isolated, unnamed village. When she finishes 
secondary school, her mother’s acquaintance connects her to Sisi, a seventy-something 
woman who has earned her own wealth as a businessperson and landlord. Zilayefa moves 
in with Sisi, who often sponsors young women like Zilayefa, by giving them a place to 
live, a temporary job, and funding for university education. Despite both Bibi’s and Sisi’s 
cautions against sexual activity, however, Zilayefa’s romantic interests throughout the 
novel create obstacles to achieving her emotional, academic, and professional goals. The 
teenager sees relationships with older men as the solution to her emotional and her 
financial obstacles: the void she feels by growing up without a father—since her own 
father, a Greek sailor, abandoned Bibi before Zilayefa’s birth—and the ecological 
impossibility of following in her mother’s footsteps as a farmer, after years of damage to 
their property by Big Oil. Focusing on Zilayefa’s two affairs, I read her relationships to 
wealthy men as allegories for the Niger Delta’s relationships to exploitative international 
and domestic economic and political forces, from oil companies to local activists who 
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have Niger Delta peoples’ best interests at heart in name only. Although, in contrast with 
Fredric Jameson, I do not hold that all “third-world texts” necessarily entail national 
allegory, I do contend that in the case of Yellow-Yellow, drawing out an allegory from 
Zilayefa’s private life helps make the novel legible as a commentary on the “embattled 
situation” of the peoples of the Niger Delta (Jameson 69).  
In fact, Zilayefa’s individual story operates on two additional levels: it comments 
on wider gender-based exploitation, and it makes an argument about the Niger Delta’s 
exploitation by international and domestic economic forces. Her birth during Nigeria’s 
1970s oil boom resulted from a short-lived affair between Bibi, her Ijaw mother, and 
Plato Papadopoulos, a Greek sailor who takes advantage of Bibi’s naïve assumption of 
their mutual affection (7, 108). In this backstory, Bibi stands in for earlier generations of 
Niger Delta women—dating back to the first mothers of “yellow-yellows” in the 
nineteenth century—as well as for the Niger Delta region during the 1970s; 
correspondingly, Plato represents decades of colonizers and European oil interests. After 
an affair of a few months, Plato departs without warning, leaving Bibi to care for their 
daughter with minimal resources, as she has insufficient time to complete her education 
prior to her pregnancy, much as oil companies abandon sites of production and leave 
Niger Delta communities to deal with the environmental consequences. Bibi’s 
relationship with Plato barely affects his life—before ever meeting his daughter, he 
returns home and never contacts Bibi again—but it is life-altering for Bibi, who loses 
professional and financial opportunities and must care for an unplanned child. The power 
imbalance between these two characters is representative of a common dynamic between 
men in the oil industry traveling through the region, taking advantage of much younger 
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women, and leaving the women with unwanted pregnancies, STIs, and other burdens. 
Indeed, throughout Africa, and especially since the outbreak of HIV/AIDS around the 
time of Zilayefa’s birth, migrant labor and its consequences—including disruptions to 
social structure and increases in sex work in resource-rich areas with transient 
populations—led to an “explosion” of STIs (Hunt 356). As the product of Bibi’s and 
Plato’s affair, then, Zilayefa represents the struggling peoples of the Niger Delta in the 
1990s, whose condition was the consequence of gendered, environmental, and economic 
exploitation. As Zilayefa reflects at one point, further inviting a reading as allegory, 
“Inside me was my personal turmoil over Plato and outside was the turmoil of a nation” 
(109). Within Zilayefa (the Niger Delta), she suffers anxiety over her unknown father (in 
the way that the Niger Delta experiences “turmoil” due partly to European oil interests); 
beyond her personal case, she witnesses Nigeria’s turmoil under Abacha’s dictatorship, 
much as the peoples of the Niger Delta in the 1990s had to cope with both immediate 
environmental crises and the range of political catastrophes throughout Nigeria.  
The two levels of allegory—one about gender, and one about geopolitics—work 
especially well together because Yellow-Yellow casts Niger Delta women’s struggles as 
inextricable from the region’s environmental challenges, as Sunny Awhefeada has noted 
(98). Specifically, the text directly links the degradation of the water and land to the 
degradation of women’s status in Zilayefa’s village. Bibi explains to Zilayefa how much 
local gender dynamics have changed since her childhood, or “the days” prior to such 
extreme environmental devastation, “when the Ijaw woman […] had a means of earning a 
living and providing the needs of her children” from farming and fishing profits (40). In 
those years, Bibi furthers, the village’s men supported women’s work, for instance by 
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crafting special canoes for their wives. Indeed, when “the rivers were teeming with fish,” 
women could prepare “a fresh pot of soup every day,” and when the plantain trees were 
“so fertile that there was more plantain than anyone knew what to do with—roasted, 
boiled, mashed, green, and yellow, the possibilities were endless” (40). Here, the word 
“possibilities” in an immediate sense refers to the different options for cooking the 
plantains, but it also suggests that the possibilities for women were also once “endless,” 
when they had a real means of economic independence and mobility. “Nowadays,” 
however, as Bibi laments, “the men were even more oppressive than the women alive 
could remember,” demanding control over all household decisions and physically 
abusing their wives (40). As the landscape suffers from Big Oil, Yellow-Yellow suggests, 
so women suffer from male domination.  
Nonetheless, Zilayefa’s upbringing provides the groundwork for a feminist 
nationalism that she later embraces. As historians Geoff Eley and Ronald Grigor Suny 
have noted, “the nation has invariably been imagined via metaphors of family, and has 
accordingly replicated the patriarchy of conventional familial forms” (26). Instead of a 
“conventional” patriarchal family, Bibi and Zilayefa belong to a decided matriarchy. On 
multiple occasions, Zilayefa asks about her father, but Bibi always responds: “‘Have I not 
taken good care of you? Why are you asking of your father?’” (19). To Bibi, Plato’s 
biography is not even pertinent, as she was the one who shouldered the full responsibility 
for rearing Zilayefa. Similarly, when Zilayefa discusses her family’s historical reliance 
on fishing, she highlights a strictly matriarchal lineage: “the occupations that had 
sustained my mother, her mother, and her mother’s mother.” Even though Zilayefa does 
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not remember her grandmother or great-grandmother any more than she remembers her 
father, men are nonetheless conspicuously absent from this family tree. 
 Though the most conspicuous absence is Plato, he elsewhere continues to pervade 
Zilayefa’s narration and functions as a predecessor to her lovers in abandoning her. In 
particular, Plato’s name deserves attention. His first name, of course, alludes to the 
philosopher credited with many ideas considered foundational to Euro-American thought 
(Chroust 26). The historical Plato was also the founder of the Academy, considered the 
first institution of higher learning in that tradition and designed to groom future political 
leaders (Chroust 26). By linking the protagonist’s absent father to this figure, the novel 
suggests that exploitative sexual and economic behaviors are inherent in Euro-American 
thought. Zilayefa’s father’s surname, Papadopoulos, is the most common Greek last 
name, which further underscores the pervasiveness of his sort of behavior—as if he is 
only one of a type (“Greek Surnames”). Indeed, in the last half of the twentieth century, 
Nigeria had a substantial Greek population, many of whom were involved in shipping oil 
and gas, as Plato most likely was (“Political Relations”). By emphasizing his Greek-ness, 
the novel calls attention to a more recent phase of European commercial activity in the 
Niger Delta—a phase enabled by a longer history of European imperialism in Africa, but 
one that is continuously evolving.  
 Despite her awareness of the context of gendered exploitation, Zilayefa disregards 
the lessons from previous generations of Niger Delta women and still believes she can 
escape the frustrations of her life in the village by pursuing an older, wealthier man—
suggesting, perhaps, that Niger Delta peoples are relying on futile strategies for 
improving their circumstances. The first such man Zilayefa finds is Sergio, a middle-aged 
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Spanish furniture dealer, who is involved in negotiations to obtain legal rights to her 
village’s timber (22). That Sergio wants to remove one of the community’s few 
remaining natural resources to make into furniture for sale in Europe evokes a much 
longer colonial history of Europeans taking resources from Africans for resale among 
Europeans, especially as his claiming of trees recalls European aggression in the palm oil 
trade (as palm oil, like timber, is of course a tree product). Like Plato with Bibi, Sergio 
briefly courts Zilayefa but then leaves without any warning, which emotionally 
devastates the teenager (28). Again like Plato, Sergio thus comes to stand for Western 
European imperialism, taking advantage of both Zilayefa and her community’s resources 
when doing so is convenient, and leaving without warning or concern for the 
consequences. Moreover, his sexual exploitation of Zilayefa goes hand in hand with his 
economic exploitation of her village’s resources.  
 Months later, in Port Harcourt, Zilayefa embarks on an affair with the retired 
Admiral Kenneth Alaowei Amalayefa (117). Aside from when they are first introduced, 
Zilayefa always refers to him as “Admiral,” a generic moniker that underscores that this 
individual character could be any senior naval officer; that is, like “Papadopoulos,” 
“Admiral” indicates the prevalence of his type of behavior and thereby invites an 
allegorical reading. The exact details of his work are ambiguous, but Zilayefa knows that 
he “was once a high-ranking government official and must have taken his share during 
his tenure to start his businesses,” implying that he stole government funds for his 
personal coffer (122-123). Indeed, due to pervasive governmental corruption encouraged 
by Big Oil, much of the income from oil profits winds up going to private individuals in 
powerful positions, like Admiral’s former job as a “high-ranking government official.” In 
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Zilayefa’s words, oil pipelines “moved the wealth from beneath my land and into the 
pockets of the select few who ruled Nigeria” (39). The implication about Admiral’s 
personal wealth, then, is that it originated in villages whose exploitation he has 
perpetuated as a politician and later as a businessman.  
Indeed, compared to Sergio’s Western European background, Admiral’s role is 
more complicated, as he is Ijaw like Zilayefa. His allegiances are difficult to trace: 
though he unethically profits off Ijaw land, in other instances he helps create much-
needed jobs for Ijaw youth (121-122). Admiral’s role in exploiting Niger Delta 
communities also complicates the historical reliance on ethnicity as a category for 
activism in the Niger Delta, as both his class and gender put him in a position of 
dominance and in the role of exploiter, not exploited. The complexity of his position, 
though, is part of the point. While the European Sergio’s motivations are clearly 
exclusively self-interested, the Nigerian Admiral’s varied allegiances reflect the 
frequently shifting alliances among Nigerian soldiers, local Niger Delta government 
leaders, and militant groups, especially in the post-Saro-Wiwa moment of the novel’s 
setting, when stakeholders were reformulating their strategies and goals. Where Sergio 
(European economic interests) departs as soon as he has acquired the financial and sexual 
resources he desires, Admiral (domestic interests) remains, to ambiguous end.  
 Yet the similarities between Sergio’s and Admiral’s treatment of Zilayefa are 
significant, suggesting that international and domestic exploitation of the Niger Delta’s 
resources in fact operate quite similarly. What Zilayefa primarily seeks from her 
relationship with Admiral is not affection between equals, but rather the “close paternal 
affection that [she] never had” because she never knew Plato (138). Zilayefa seeks a 
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substitute for Plato; if Plato stands for an earlier phase of European—and often 
paternalistic—exploitation of Africa, then Admiral in becoming that substitute steps into 
the role of exploiter. Indeed, Zilayefa gets frustrated with Admiral’s condescending 
explanation of the Niger Delta crisis, and she complains that he sounds “like an old 
headmaster”—a phrase that echoes the terminology of African colonial “masters” and the 
titled “headmasters” at the heart of colonial education (139; Ranger 211; Sicherman 11). 
If Admiral is representative of the Niger Delta’s various and conflicting local interests, 
Yellow-Yellow suggests, then the actions of these local actors are, in some ways, only 
echoing paternalistic, self-interested European imperialism. 
 In addition, Zilayefa’s financial gain from the affair with Admiral, rather than 
being of clear net benefit to her, bolsters the one-sidedness of their relationship. Because 
of the money she receives from him, she feels increasingly indebted, like she “owed it” to 
Admiral to succeed with her university entry exams (154). Often, however, Admiral only 
gives her money to quiet her; she reflects unhappily on the “Days when he would meet 
me in his bedroom, hastily ask how I was doing, and put a wad of money in my handbag 
so that he could return to the discussions in his living room” (158). Admiral’s financial 
contributions are in name for Zilayefa’s educational benefits, but ultimately they seem 
like a token gesture to keep her complacent. Much as the oil companies mention their 
scholarships on the radio without explaining how to apply for the scholarships, Admiral 
pushes cash onto Zilayefa, as he occasionally does to Ijaw activists who request his help, 
without giving any guidance and mostly seeming to want both Zilayefa and the activists 
out of the way so that he can pursue “the discussions in his living room”—mostly about 
managing escalating violence in the Niger Delta. The fact that he continues his 
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presumably corrupt, behind-the-scenes work, while keeping Zilayefa complacent, 
suggests a condemnation by the novel of token financial gestures by oil interests and by 
the Nigerian government, as merely a distraction from their failure to effect systemic 
change.  
 The emotional aspects of their affair further the one-sidedness of the relationship, 
in turn furthering the novel’s depiction of the relationship between Niger Delta peoples 
and their leaders as deeply unequal. At one point, when Admiral is first courting the 
initially shy Zilayefa, she says, “we sat quietly for what seemed like a month and a day, 
with Admiral looking at me and me looking down at my lap” (131). Besides indicating 
the awkwardness between the mismatched pair, the phrase “a month and a day” alludes to 
the title of Ken Saro-Wiwa’s A Month and a Day: A Detention Diary (1995), which 
Agary specifically cites in her novel’s Acknowledgments as the inspiration for her work 
of fiction (179). Saro-Wiwa’s title refers to the duration of his detention under false 
pretenses by the Abacha regime in 1993, an illegal endeavor aimed at deterring his 
environmental activism. By referencing the late leader’s censure and imprisonment, 
Zilayefa’s description situates her as being held captive by a dictatorial regime, as if 
Admiral initiating the affair is analogous to the Abacha regime’s first detention of Saro-
Wiwa. Even though Zilayefa seems excited about the affair, then, this phrasing suggests 
that it might be the beginning of the end for her independence. In this scene, the text casts 
Admiral as representative of the Nigerian government, even though other moments 
suggest he stands for local activist leadership or perhaps militant agitation. Again, the 
fact that what or whom exactly Admiral stands for is unclear serves to emphasize the 
complexity of alliances in the region; in the way that this aspect of the allegory is almost 
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illegible to the reader, so the network of forces shaping the Niger Delta’s future is nearly 
undecipherable to most residents of the Niger Delta, Yellow-Yellow suggests.  
 As with financial and social power dynamics, the sexual element of Zilayefa’s 
and Admiral’s relationship also indicates a power imbalance. When they first sleep 
together, Zilayefa describes the event as an “invasion of [her] body by Admiral” (145). 
Reading Zilayefa’s body as the land of the Niger Delta, the term “invasion” is striking 
here because if we read Admiral as the federal Nigerian government, then it would 
already have sovereignty over the Niger Delta and by definition could not “invade”; if we 
read him as local activism, then ostensibly it would already be working on behalf of the 
Niger Delta and similarly could not “invade.” Raising questions about localism and 
sovereignty, the passage suggests that, for most Niger Delta peoples, the distinction 
between external and domestic forces is indistinguishable—it all feels like an “invasion” 
of their own homeland.  
Through Zilayefa’s relationships with Sergio and Admiral, Yellow-Yellow thus 
depicts the wealthy men—one European and one Nigerian—who take advantage of 
Zilayefa’s desperation and naiveté on an individual level, while being precisely the same 
men who on a larger scale exploit the peoples and resources of the Niger Delta to their 
own financial advantage. The ways in which the novel characterizes Zilayefa’s lovers 
indicate that the exploitation of the environmental goes hand in hand with the 
exploitation of young, vulnerable women. These men not only take advantage of the 
youthful Zilayefa in their personal lives, but they also exploit her village (and others like 
it) in their professional lives. Though Zilayefa identifies the oil companies as the major 
antagonist (138), she ultimately comes to consider them both as the problem. Yellow-
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Yellow makes the case that a power imbalance will always exist, and that the older men 
(like larger political and economic forces) will always have the upper hand, leaving no 
way to improve life for most Niger Delta residents within existing structures without 
ultimately reinforcing them. Despite this pessimistic aspect, Zilayefa’s youth seems to 
suggest that the Niger Delta still has a great deal of opportunity, as I discuss in the next 
section. 
 
“NO ONE WANTED TO BE THE NEXT KEN SARO-WIWA” 
 To be sure, the novel is not only about Zilayefa’s—and the Niger Delta’s—
“selling herself,” but also about possibilities for resistance. Because exploitation takes a 
gendered form, Yellow-Yellow indicates, resistance must also take a gendered form. As a 
poor, uneducated young woman, Zilayefa does not have access to organizations like 
Deltawomen, but she nonetheless enacts what might be legible as “everyday forms of 
resistance,” including self care and refusal to participate in the reproduction of 
exploitative patriarchal structures. Women’s support networks are integral to this process, 
as Zilayefa draws from them for emotional, financial, and medical support, and at the 
same time is motivated by her desire to contribute to these networks emotionally and 
financially.  
 First, though, Yellow-Yellow depicts highly visible forms of protest as not feasible 
in the immediate aftermath of the murders of the Ogoni Nine. Zilayefa reflects, “No one 
wanted to be the next Ken Saro-Wiwa” (138). The phrase “next Ken Saro-Wiwa” might 
in another context have suggested a hero participating in an honored tradition of 
environmental activism, but here, Zilayefa means that any “next Ken Saro-Wiwa” would 
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necessarily die “in vain” (138). The novel also reiterates the sense of futility surrounding 
broad alliances and protest movements when describing boys who “wander[ed] about the 
village aimlessly, dropping the phrase ‘Aluta continua’ [sic] at the slightest provocation” 
(34). The mention of the phrase “a luta continua” (meaning, “the struggle continues”) 
explicitly links the boys’ lack of direction to the struggle against the oil industry, as the 
phrase was particularly common in 1990s era Niger Delta activism. Rather than being a 
rallying cry as it was for Saro-Wiwa, “a luta continua” becomes a lackluster, directionless 
cliché in the face of the increasingly repressive Abacha regime. Even if Zilayefa had 
access to broader networks of alliance, then, the dangers of such overt resistance would 
be too great, especially given the unlikelihood of success in her political climate.   
 Instead, Yellow-Yellow calls attention to self care as one key mode of resistance. 
The first chapter offers an example when an oil spill occurs in their village and destroys a 
significant part of Bibi’s small farmland. Immediately, Bibi goes home, where Zilayefa 
tries to find out what happened, but Bibi is “void of words” (3). In contrast with the other 
villagers, who march together en masse to complain to the head of the village, Bibi 
“coolly” goes to clean herself at the river; rather than participating in collective action, 
Bibi thus distances herself from her village community and does not explicitly voice her 
complaint (4, 3). At first glance, this characterization might seem to suggest that Bibi is 
passive in the face of such events. While the other villagers attempt to demand action, 
however, Bibi instead focuses on removing the spill’s physical effect on her body. Likely 
aware that the protests will achieve little—and could perhaps even give rise to violent 
retaliation, as occurred tragically at Biara only three years prior—Bibi knows she can at 
least care for herself so that she can continue to provide for herself and her daughter. 
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Realistically, “concerns of household survival” mean that Bibi cannot risk wasting time 
or endangering her physical safety by participating in the march (Scott 246). Especially 
since the oil industry has such a significant impact on the well-being of women’s bodies, 
her focus on caring for her own body by cleaning off the oil is particularly legible as a 
means of resisting its life-threatening effects. Here, self care becomes “an act of political 
warfare”; where marching in broad solidarity seems unlikely to yield results, Bibi instead 
demonstrates her opposition and models it to her daughter in this more subtle way (Lorde 
131).  
The most dramatic instance of resistance in Yellow-Yellow appears at the novel’s 
climax, when Zilayefa decides to end her three-month pregnancy by secretly inducing her 
own abortion. Zilayefa knowingly risks her life to avoid bringing a child, who would be 
the result of wealthy men taking advantage of its mother, into a world with such injustice. 
Significantly, she is unsure whether Admiral or Sergio (with whom she unexpectedly 
reconnected in Port Harcourt) would be the father, but this uncertainty plays no role in 
her decision. Zilayefa is keenly aware that motherhood is a major setback for women she 
has known, from her own mother’s case to that of other girls in her village, who drop out 
of school due to unplanned pregnancies (34). She knows that, if she has a baby, she 
cannot continue to be a “workaday girl” like the childless Sisi and Lolo (68). Both Sergio 
and Admiral have taken advantage of her sexually—and, as the reader knows, of the 
Niger Delta financially—and Zilayefa realizes she would rather face a very real risk of 
death than be weighed down by the product of these men’s exploitation. The fact that the 
father’s identity makes no difference in her decision reiterates that both men have 
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exploited her, just as both European imperialism and domestic exploitation of the Niger 
Delta’s resources have contributed to the ongoing environmental and political disaster.  
To perform the abortion, Zilayefa utilizes knowledge from the women of her 
village and resources from Sisi, thereby drawing from various women’s alliances. The 
fact that she draws from both of these networks is key. Charles Cliff Feghabo has argued 
that Yellow-Yellow specifically casts help from “the more privileged urban woman” as the 
solution for Zilayefa and therefore for the many women in her position to improve their 
lots—a contention that portrays the novel as somewhat elitist in its leanings (331). While 
I agree with Feghabo that Zilayefa’s formal education and network with other single 
women in Port Harcourt play important roles, I show here how, in contrast with what he 
argues, knowledge from rural women without formal education—not the “privileged 
urban” female characters—plays a critical role. The text specifically states that Zilayefa 
searches for plants that look like those that “girls in the village” had taught her would 
induce abortion (176). Indeed, in many Niger Delta communities, women are the primary 
keepers of knowledge about plant medicines (Barikor-Wiwa). The resources that Sisi 
makes available to Zilayefa prove invaluable, as she finds the necessary plants on Sisi’s 
street and uses her space in Sisi’s house to perform the abortion (176-178). With this act, 
Zilayefa takes charge of her own body at a critical moment by utilizing knowledge and 
resources from women she has known throughout her life—and here, the rural women 
play a role no less significant than that of the urban women.  
Not only is Zilayefa’s abortion enabled by these networks, but she also conceives 
it as the beginning of her contribution back to her communities. Specifically, she sees the 
abortion as an act on behalf of herself and her mother, whom she can support if she 
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completes her education and gets a job in Port Harcourt: “I had to do this for myself and 
for my mother” (174). Zilayefa’s abortion therefore proves essential to her resistance and 
to supporting her family commitment. Rather than allowing herself and her mother to be 
further weighed down by one of the men who exploited both her and her home, Zilayefa 
risks her life to improve her family’s lot.  
Although she knows the choice to abort her pregnancy might cost her life, 
Zilayefa feels liberated as she waits for the plants to take effect and decides to end her 
quest for approval from men. Zilayefa’s waiting in the fetal position while she undergoes 
the abortion also reflects this change in her life by echoing an earlier moment in the 
novel. Earlier, when Sergio stands up Zilayefa in her village, she suffers her emotional 
distress in the fetal position: “I went to my room and climbed into my bed, enveloped by 
desolation. All I could do was pull my knees up to my chin and lie there, in the foetal 
position. My mother put a wrapper over me and lay down beside me; she held me tight 
and did not say a word” (28). In contrast, when abortion-related cramps awaken Zilayefa 
in Sisi’s Port Harcourt home, she says, “I do not know for how long I lay in bed, unable 
to move because my legs refused to yield to my will, until somehow I managed to crawl 
to the bathroom. I lay curled up in the foetal position on the cold tile floor until my sweat 
and the blood that gushed from between my legs drenched my clothes, and I began to 
shiver from the cold and the pain” (178). In the first instance, upon her abandonment by 
Sergio, Zilayefa retreats to her bed to get into a fetal position; in second instance, despite 
her tremendous physical pain, Zilayefa is able to force her body to move away from her 
bed and into the bathroom. She exercises a physical greater control over her body that 
reflects a great emotional and social control; rather than mourning the departure of a man 
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in her life, she is destroying the evidence of her affairs. In addition, in the earlier scene, 
Bibi is present to comfort Zilayefa; in the latter scene, she is entirely alone, and as far as 
the reader knows at the moment, possibly dying. The stakes are consequently much 
higher and more dependent on Zilayefa’s individual choices and the success of her 
medical effort.  
The book’s last paragraph reveals that Zilayefa survives, so the fetal position also 
comes to signify her rebirth as an independent, grown woman. In fact, the text explicitly 
links the protagonist’s “rebirth” with that of Nigeria, as her abortion occurs shortly after 
Abacha’s death. Just before Zilayefa picks the plants she will consume, she hears 
celebrants of the dictator’s demise in the streets, finally excited for their future as a 
nation: “They talked about tomorrow as if they really believed in it, as though magically 
all the problems in their lives would be fixed tomorrow” (176). Later, as she waits in the 
fetal position on the bathroom floor, she sees herself starting over in a way parallel to the 
way that Nigeria will: “if I lived, it was an opportunity for a personal rebirth along with 
Nigeria. I promised God and myself that I would focus only on completing my education 
and making my mother, Sisi, and Lolo proud of me” (177). Zilayefa’s refusal to give 
birth to the child of a man who has exploited her is thus tied to her own personal rebirth 
and the hopes for national rebirth upon Abacha’s death. This explicit connection also 
means that Zilayefa, representing the Niger Delta, also stands for the political body of 
Nigeria as a whole. In this formulation, the plight of the Niger Delta is synonymous with 
the plight of the nation, and the effort to improve life for those in the Niger Delta 
becomes essential to improving life for all Nigerians. By ensuring that Zilayefa survives 
the procedure, Yellow-Yellow becomes a narrative of women’s resistance under life-
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threatening circumstances and under arguably the most oppressive regime in Nigeria’s 
post-independence history. Though Yellow-Yellow therefore ends on an optimistic note—
confirming its protagonist’s survival—the conclusion is also an ambivalent, as the post-
Abacha era did not bring about as many changes to the status quo as Nigerians had 
hoped. Even by the time of the novel’s publication in 2006, the newly democratic Nigeria 
had not substantially changed most Nigerians’ lives, and certainly not in the Niger Delta.  
 In the way that Zilayefa cuts off her relationships with Sergio and Admiral—and 
destroys the result—so the novel suggests that the Niger Delta must extricate itself from 
exploitative relationships with international and domestic political and economic forces. 
Several aspects of this reading are quite optimistic. Zilayefa’s refusal to give up or to 
compromise suggests resilience on the part of Niger Delta peoples. The explicit 
connection between Zilayefa’s “rebirth” and that of the nation indicates that individual 
agency and acts of resistance do indeed matter, despite the scope of the crisis. The text’s 
embrace of women’s rights—emblematized by reproductive rights—and its 
empowerment of Zilayefa, and by extension the peoples of the Niger Delta, is hopeful as 
well.  
 At the same time, however, the allegory also carries a number of troubling 
implications. It suggests, for example, that the responsibility lies with women to combat 
patriarchy and with the residents of the Niger Delta to break out of its current relationship 
to international and domestic oil interests. Zilayefa refuses to have either Sergio’s or 
Admiral’s child, but she also refuses to critique their behaviors, which comes to imply 
that these men could not be expected to behave any differently—in turn implying that 
multinational corporations, for example, cannot be held responsible for their actions. 
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Even in the lead-up to her abortion, Zilayefa dismisses Sergio as merely “a nice man” and 
reasons that Admiral “was not ready to have more children” (172, 173). The idea of a 
sixty-year-old man with two adult children being “not ready” for children is particularly 
ridiculous. In addition to this implication that purposely absent fathers and Big Oil cannot 
reasonably be held responsible for taking advantage of women and the Niger Delta’s 
resources, the allegorical reading also invites questions as to how exactly the region’s 
disempowered peoples should effect the type of systemic change that the novel clearly 
indicates will be necessary. That is, Zilayefa retains her support networks through Bibi 
and Sisi, but on what or whom should the Niger Delta rely? Further, Zilayefa’s 
willingness to die as a consequence of her abortion, if read allegorically, seems to suggest 
that the peoples of the Niger Delta should be willing to self-destruct in pursuit of their 
rights—a strategy that is neither desirable nor realistic. This point, in conjunction with 
the placement of Zilayefa’s abortion in a past historical moment that turned out not to 
offer as much opportunity for change as was hoped, substantially undermines any 
optimism in the conclusion. In other words, Yellow-Yellow may not be agitating for so 
much change to the status quo after all, if it places all responsibility for change on 
individuals in the Niger Delta, implicitly exonerates those behind the unequal system, and 
locates hope squarely in a past historical moment. The feminist narrow nationalism that 
Agary’s novel embraces, then, is ultimately ambivalent.  
 
BOMA HEALS ON IRIKEFE 
In contrast with Yellow-Yellow’s clear foregrounding of female characters, Oil on 
Water focuses on two male characters, the protagonist Rufus and his colleague Zaq, who 
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journey together through the ravaged Niger Delta to search for the kidnapped wife of a 
British oil executive. Current scholarship on the novel echoes its emphasis on male 
characters, largely focusing on Oil on Water’s depiction of the complex allegiances of the 
various male actors involved in the conflict, including Nigerian soldiers, militant groups, 
and local chiefs. Women’s Studies and literature scholar Leerom Medovoi, for example, 
traces how Habila’s novel “attempts to map the structural conditions of violence” in the 
Niger Delta around the height of the 2009 militant insurgency (23). Delving into the 
implications of this complex web of violence, literary scholar Byron Caminero-
Santangelo shows how Oil on Water not only criticizes militant groups’ modes of 
operation—a critique that many others have launched—but also calls into question the 
enduring dominance of Saro-Wiwa’s narrative of ethnicity-based solidarity. Ultimately, 
Caminero-Santangelo concludes, “Any hope in Oil on Water is associated not with armed 
resistance but with cultural narratives and practices which might enable healing and 
ground ways of life that challenge the fairy tale of oil” (232). Indeed, as I demonstrate in 
this section, Habila’s novel calls for alternative means of resisting the conflict.  
More specifically, I extend Caminero-Santangelo’s argument by attending to 
gender issues in examining how Rufus’s older sister Boma—ostensibly a minor 
character—most exemplifies the “hope” that Caminero-Santangelo identifies in the 
novel’s suggested “cultural narratives and practices” (232). Boma is one of only three 
female characters in Oil on Water who get to speak in the text’s main timeline, besides 
Isabel and Gloria, a nurse who cares for the dying Zaq and becomes a romantic interest 
for Rufus. Severely injured in an oil-related explosion approximately five years prior to 
the main action, Boma turns to Rufus when she is abandoned by her husband John and 
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loses her home. Without Isabel’s socioeconomic advantages or Gloria’s professional 
training, she initially seems to be the most disempowered of these three women 
characters. In contrast, though, I argue that she is in fact the novel’s only character who 
demonstrates “everyday forms” of resistance and survival, emblematized by her joining a 
small, insular religious community she encounters on the fictional Irikefe Island, located 
in the rural Niger Delta. To provide context for Boma’s efforts, I first offer an analysis of 
the two major events around which the narrative is structured: the kidnapping of Isabel 
Poole and the fire in Boma’s village. I argue that the novel juxtaposes Isabel and Boma in 
order to highlight and critique the extreme disparity between the media’s treatment of the 
kidnapped, wealthy white woman and the impoverished, rural Nigerian woman. As a 
minor character, Boma is at the sidelines of the novel in the way that Niger Delta women 
are often sidelined in media narratives; the fact that we view her mostly through Rufus—
both the protagonist and a journalist—helps draw that connection. The novel invites us to 
look more closely at what Boma is doing, beyond the media-ready militants in the 
novel’s (and the real-life mainstream media’s) foreground. 
  From the beginning, Oil on Water offers numerous critiques of journalism’s 
limitations in representing the Niger Delta conflict, notable especially given Habila’s own 
background as a journalist. Some of the novel’s concerns are inherent to the journalism as 
a genre—complex narratives are “neatly labeled and dated,” and reporters often cannot 
create reliable accounts because they cannot safely enter the violence-ridden region (3, 
7). Other critiques however, seem aimed at the drive for profit, like the complaint that 
newspapers exploit kidnappings for sales, focusing on sensational events rather than more 
quotidian realities (36). Taken together, the text’s negative evaluations here assert the 
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role of novels in depicting the Niger Delta conflict, as novels can leave room for greater 
ambiguities (such as those created by the novel’s purposely disorienting time jumps) and 
can allow writers and readers into otherwise largely inaccessible spaces.  
 One such event that Oil on Water enables us to witness is vandalism of oil 
pipelines by desperate characters—an act of “everyday resistance” that comes as almost a 
last resort (Scott 248). Rufus’s father and John’s father Emmanuel start a black market 
business in which they buy gasoline at a low price from “little children” (who have 
presumably stolen it) and resell it to drivers passing through Junction late at night (69). In 
this way, they claim for themselves a tiny fraction of the oil profits to which so many 
Niger Delta communities are entitled but never receive. They pursue this scheme because 
they have run out of other ways to earn a living, not because they see it as desirable or 
sustainable. They are keenly aware that eventually the police will want more bribes than 
they can afford, at which point Rufus’s father acknowledges, “‘They’ll arrest us, or take 
over the whole business themselves” (69). Whether Rufus’s father is directly responsible 
for the disastrous fire that injures Boma is unclear, but in keeping with his prediction, he 
receives the blame and goes to prison for causing the accident. Oil on Water is 
sympathetic to the frustration and desperation that lead the men to risk their freedom and 
lives for this small reward, but it ultimately associates no meaningful hope with such acts.  
 In contrast with the narratives of people like Rufus’s father and Emmanuel, the 
novel’s only white and female character, Isabel Poole receives a great deal of attention 
from both the media and the novel’s male characters. The epitome of the “missing white 
woman meme” (Wenzel “Behind the Headlines” 14), Isabel becomes a kidnapping victim 
as a result of a soap opera-like series of events: her husband James (also white and 
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British) has an affair with their maid Koko, who was engaged to marry the couple’s 
driver, Salomon; in retaliation, hoping to extract a financial penalty from James without 
physically endangering anyone, Salomon orchestrates Isabel’s kidnapping; and 
eventually, militants take over the kidnapping and murder the naïve Salomon (218, 220, 
230). Like with vandalism of the oil pipelines, Salomon initially sees the kidnapping as a 
means for obtaining reparations from James (220). These attempts at “reparation,” along 
with Rufus’s claim at one point that he, too, deserved “some reparation” from James, 
together suggest a situation in which everyone is trying to get what they feel they are 
owed financially, yet no one does so successfully—perhaps a critique of Niger Delta 
activists’ longstanding emphasis on fighting for financial compensation, a strategy that 
has so far hardly brought peace or stability to the region (107). In any case, this backstory 
serves as a critique of twenty-first-century militant groups’—and especially MEND’s—
kidnappings aimed at seizing media attention and reaping financial rewards in the form of 
ransom (as well as the mass media’s tendency to feed the phenomenon). Salomon’s 
desire for vengeance, in conjunction with his incompetence, suggests a similar bumbling 
approach on the part of participants in the conflict. Meanwhile, the powerful militants’ 
unblinking turns to violence, emblematized by their murder of Salomon, suggests that 
their kidnappings often go hand in hand with atrocities against the very people they are 
ostensibly trying to help.  
Further, this entire conflict—which costs the lives of various bystanders—results 
from James’s affair with Koko. That is, one wealthy white man’s disruption of an 
apparently otherwise functional and healthy relationship between two Nigerians (and the 
text does indicates that James, not Koko, initiates the affair) brings about disaster for 
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many Nigerians whom James will never meet and traumatizes his wife (who likely but 
does not definitely survive the ordeal), all with effectively no consequence to himself. If 
we make the move of reading Koko as a “claim” by James over his Nigerian employee 
Salomon—a troubling move in that it eliminates agency and even humanity on Koko’s 
part, but nonetheless a move I think the text invites—the situation becomes allegorical to 
the Niger Delta’s history: white British men laying claim on a whim to resources to 
which peoples of the Niger Delta are entitled. By linking European imperialism to the 
kidnapping via the Pooles, the novel thus makes the case that decades of exploitation by 
Big Oil and other foreign interests, not Nigerian corruption, are truly at the root of 
militant violence in the Niger Delta.  
 Despite the numerous actors involved, though, Isabel becomes the media’s focal 
point. One television news program shows a full-screen “blown-up photo” of her in 
London and juxtaposes it with a “shot of picketing youths holding placards in front of an 
oil-company building,” as if the protestors have somehow caused her predicament (rather 
than her own husband). The protestors are numerous and anonymous, while Isabel retains 
her individuality in the media narrative, as if the missing white woman is the only 
(interesting) tragedy involved.  
 Oil on Water draws several links between the wealthy white Isabel, whose face is 
all over every news program, and Boma, the impoverished Nigerian character known to 
almost no one beyond her immediate family. The characters’ recent biographies align: 
Boma and Isabel each feel that having a child would have saved their respective 
marriages (106, 110). The fact that the novel reveals this information only four pages 
apart, especially in a text that jumps so frequently in setting, clearly invites the reader to 
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draw a link. The description of the damage to both characters’ faces as a consequence of 
the Niger Delta conflict draws another such connection between them: the text repeatedly 
mentions Boma’s facial cars from the fire, as well as how “red and blotchy” and “covered 
in rashes” Isabel’s face became within a few days of the kidnapping (227, 197). The 
environmental and other physical dangers of the region thus make themselves legible on 
these women’s faces. Significantly, though, Isabel’s allergic reactions and sunburn will 
disappear from her face, whereas Boma’s face will remain scarred, reminding the reader 
that Isabel’s trauma—though serious—is only temporary, and she can return to safety in 
London, while Boma cannot escape the deeper impact of the conflict.  
 Furthering these characterizations, Oil on Water aligns the experiences of these 
two otherwise very different characters in order to highlight disparities between their 
treatments in narratives about the conflict. Indeed, Boma and Isabel also have in common 
that they immediately drive almost all of the protagonist’s actions in the text’s main 
timeline: Rufus is consistently torn between journeying further into the Niger Delta to 
find Isabel and returning to Port Harcourt to look out for Boma. Even though Boma is his 
sister, he often chooses his quest to find the complete stranger over care for his closest 
relative. Especially because Rufus is a journalist, this obsession with the white woman 
serves as a condemnation of disproportionate attention to the sensational and to the 
relatively few European victims of the ongoing conflict.  
  Moreover, at least partly because of his relative inattention to Boma, Rufus 
consistently underestimates her, seeing her as a passive and helpless victim. At one point, 
Rufus observes how, after the fire she barely survives, his sister consistently positions 
herself with “the burned, badly healed side of her face hidden. She did it unconsciously, 
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but the scar always dictated how she stood, how she sat” (94). The fact that her face was 
“badly healed”—not just “burned”—evokes the reality that medical facilities available to 
residents of oil-producing communities in the Niger Delta are often poor quality, despite 
decades of promises by oil companies to improve local infrastructure. Though Boma’s 
movements are not in a strict sense physically restricted by her injuries, the fire’s 
psychological damage continues to limit how she moves her body and incompletely 
engages even with her own brother, as she partially faces away from him. In Rufus’s 
description of her stance, the word “always” emphasizes that these effects remain 
permanently with Boma—her temporal distance from the event does not diminish these 
limitations—and similarly, the verb “dictated” underscores the scope of the trauma’s 
control over Boma, suggesting she has no option but to “obey” her scars and position 
herself uncomfortably, limiting her own visibility. This passage thus positions Boma as a 
passive victim—a characterization that echoes the weakness suggested by the fact that 
she only survived thanks to Emmanuel’s intervention. As I argue below, the novel 
purposely establishes this perception in order to disrupt it later. As narrator, Rufus 
consistently conveys to the reader the extent of the Junction fire’s impact on the women 
of his family, thereby underscoring how the devastation of oil-producing communities 
(“countless villages going up in smoke”) disproportionately affects women throughout 
the region. While the novel’s attention to this aspect of the conflict is clearly 
commendable, the emphasis on Boma’s scars, her abandonment by her husband and 
subsequent eviction, and her extensive weeping with her mother at first seem to 
contribute to a picture of Niger Delta women as feeble victims.  
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A closer reading of the novel, however, reveals that this implication has more to 
do with Rufus’s well-intentioned but patronizing attitude toward Boma. Since we access 
the story through his eyes, we, too, initially see Boma as tragically damaged but lacking 
in depth or agency. Only gradually does Oil on Water reveal that Rufus—our seemingly 
reliable narrator—has seriously underestimated his older sister’s capabilities. One 
moment that particularly reveals Rufus’s condescension and conversely Boma’s strength 
of character is the scene where the two find each other on Irikefe Island. A group of law-
bucking, violent soldiers have captured Rufus, insisting that they cannot be sure of the 
journalist’s allegiances, and they bring him to Irikefe. Rufus has been on the island 
before, but since his last visit the peaceful, religious island community has been 
devastated by a battle between soldiers and militants. With the recent destruction as 
backdrop, Rufus learns that Boma has come to the island. Surprised by her ability to 
navigate the Niger Delta’s network of rivers, he does not understand how she could have 
found the island on her own (“How did she get here?”) and immediately assumes that she 
has endangered her own life to look for her ex-husband John, who may have joined a 
militant group (169). Without waiting to hear his own sister’s explanation for her actions, 
Rufus informs her of his assumption: “‘What are you doing here? I know, don’t tell me. 
You’re hoping to find John in the forest, waiting for you’” (170). As a journalist, Rufus is 
ostensibly experienced in waiting to hear answers to his questions in order to obtain 
accurate information, but here, he does not even pause before responding to his own 
question (“What are you doing here? I know”), despite the lack of evidence supporting 
his answer (“You’re hoping to find John”). He assumes she is a victim looking for 
someone to rely on and is unable to adapt to an evolving situation.  
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The typically mild-mannered Rufus continues his lecture:  
 My voice rose as I spoke, and I felt it rising even higher. I pointed around.  
—Look, they’re fighting a war here. You could get killed, Boma. And all for 
what, for a man who walked out on you because he couldn’t bear to look at your 
face anymore? It’s time to move on. He’s never coming back. He’s gone. Accept 
it. (170) 
Although Boma is Rufus’s senior by several years, here Rufus is shouting at her as if she 
were a child—an implication reiterated when he later complains, “her presence only 
added to the weight on my shoulders,” as if he were responsible someone who could not 
care for herself (171). His “point[ing] around” at the battle’s damage, while explaining, 
“they’re fighting a war,” comes across as condescending and even silly. Boma is an adult 
from the region who sees the damages of the oil conflict in the mirror every day—clearly, 
she is well aware of the risks involved. Disregarding these facts, Rufus suggests that 
Boma is both oblivious to the ongoing situation and somehow less able to take care of 
herself than he is, despite the fact that he is the one under the trigger-happy soldiers’ 
watch, while she is free to go at any time. Moreover, in addition to the fact that he has 
rashly assumed that John is the reason for Boma’s appearance on Irikefe, Rufus frames 
her breakup with John in a way that is both cruel and patronizing: he reminds her of her 
scars, suggests that her physical appearance caused the breakup, and shouts simplistic, 
repetitive instructions (“move on,” “Accept it”) for moving forward after her marriage’s 
dissolution—a traumatizing event that Rufus has never experienced and on which he has 
no authority to speak.  
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 After Rufus finishes his tirade, the patient Boma turns the tables by telling her 
younger brother that she has in fact come to Irikefe to help him. She explains to him, 
“‘You were supposed to be gone [from Port Harcourt] for only a day. I went to your 
office to see if they had any news and they said no. Nothing. And then your editor said to 
tell you not to bother to show up at the office’” (171). Concerned for her brother’s safety, 
Boma pursues a rational path to fact-finding. She trusts Rufus to return when he 
promises, but when he does not do so, she seeks information from his employers, who 
had given him the assignment to track Isabel Poole in the area around Irikefe. Only when 
Boma has exhausted all these avenues does she enter the dangerous area to ensure her 
brother’s safety. Her rationality here appears in stark contrast to Rufus’s erratic behavior. 
He has abandoned his original work assignment, gotten himself entangled in a potentially 
deadly conflict with no clear purpose in mind, and pursues his meandering quest so long 
that he loses his job. Where Rufus cast himself as a capable agent responsible for his 
overly emotional sister, Boma recasts the situation more accurately to reflect herself as 
the rational actor and her brother as the impractical character who has needlessly put his 
life in danger. With this reversal, Oil on Water reveals that the seemingly reliable narrator 
has been consistently underestimating his sister in viewing her as a passive victim 
dependent on men, whether John or himself. In the way that the narrator Rufus talks over 
Boma and overlooks her capacities, so too have media narratives about the crisis often 
written over women’s voices and agency. The fact that Boma, not the protagonist-
journalist (responsible for storytelling both within the novel and in the mainstream 
media), reveals the flaws in Rufus’s and the reader’s assumptions here, implies that a 
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closer examination of women’s (and other) everyday forms of resistance has the potential 
to reveal information or alliances that dominant narratives cannot.  
Though Boma travels to Irikefe in order to look out for her brother amidst 
regional violence, she also comes to find a means of resistance in the island’s insular 
religious community. Practicing an ecologically based spirituality, the island’s 
worshippers “believe in the healing powers of the sea” and that “the sun rising brings a 
renewal” (126, 90). Among their practical goals is to “keep this island free from oil 
prospecting and other activities that contaminate the water and lead to greed and 
violence” (129). In a region with unpredictable violence and that is so politically and 
geographically fragmented, broader alliances are—at least for the present moment—
unavailable to Boma and the other worshippers. Though the island is a small claim, it 
provides a concrete and apparently manageable starting point for a nationalist project 
very much about political and territorial sovereignty. In this way, the religious group has 
specific political goals that entail combating the encroaching oil industry. The water and 
the large statues they have constructed indicate that the specific location of Irikefe is 
essential to their faith. Despite what is going on around them, they assert that they will 
not give up their land to the oil industry and related conflict—a highly political stance for 
which geopolitical location matters a great deal.   
Like Zilayefa and unrestrained by any romantic relationship, Boma decides to 
remain permanently among Irikefe’s worshippers. The novel approves her decision; for 
the first time in the narrative, Rufus feels that his sister “looked well” (237). As the novel 
concludes, he watches her from a distance as his boat departs. He describes what he sees: 
“Now the worshippers were in the water, swaying and humming; I strained my eyes, 
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trying to determine which of them was Boma. She’d be happy here, I was sure. This was 
a place of healing and soon she’d forget John, her scars would recede to the back of her 
mind and one day she’d look in the mirror and see they were gone” (239). In this scene, 
the worshippers’ placing themselves in the water underscores their connection to the 
environmental and political causes they espouse. Bodies that bear the physical damage 
are visually integrated into the environment that also bears damage caused by the oil 
industry’s excesses; like Yellow-Yellow, Oil on Water argues that the healing of bodies—
here, regardless of gender—is intertwined with the healing and protection of the 
environment. Even though Boma has only been at Irikefe a few days, she is so integrated 
into their community that even her own brother struggles to distinguish her from the rest 
of the group, “strain[ing]” his eyes to identify her but unable to do so with any certainty. 
Among the worshippers, Rufus hopes, Boma will finish “healing” from the trauma of the 
Junction fire. He does not actually expect her scars to disappear at this point, but he does 
anticipate that they will no longer “dictate” how she interacts with others or sees herself, 
as they did back in Port Harcourt.  
The insular religious community Irikefe thus provides a means of healing, 
survival, and resistance for the novel’s most significant female character. While Oil on 
Water cannot confirm that the group at Irikefe will succeed even in their most immediate 
goals—an uncertainty compounded by Rufus’s unreliability as a narrator of Boma’s 
realities—it is nonetheless the closest that the novel gets to identifying hope in the region. 
Like the everyday forms of resistance Scott describes, the formation of the group on 
Irikefe is “unlikely to do more than marginally affect the various forms of exploitation” 
perpetuated by Big Oil and related interests, the novel locates hope in the possibility that 
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perhaps, “multiplied many thousand-fold,” such small alliances could together begin to 
combat the environmental, social, economic, and political destruction to the region—
modes of resistance that “make no headlines” but, the novel argues, may well have a 
more constructive impact than those that do, like militant kidnappings (Scott 29-30, xvii).  
 
EVERYDAY FORMS OF WOMEN’S RESISTANCE 
In a struggle where sensationalist moves like kidnappings grab media attention 
but effect little change for oil-producing communities, and where even some of most 
seemingly radical elements have become drawn to the allure of petrocapitalism dollars, 
an examination of other possibilities becomes essential. Agary and Habila, both of whom 
would have been in their twenties at the time of Saro-Wiwa’s death, write from third 
generation Nigerian perspectives that question the increasingly corrupt movements 
theoretically descended from those of Saro-Wiwa’s era. Yellow-Yellow and Oil on Water 
enable readers to consider less sensational aspects of the conflict and contest the 
presumption that Niger Delta women remain immobile—not even “stirring”—in between 
visible moments of mass protest (Peel “Peacefully”). Reading these texts within Scott’s 
framework of “everyday forms of resistance” also reveals various gendered aspects to 
resistance—while both novels depict vandalism of oil pipelines as an act of rebellion 
perpetuated by male actors, for example, they also suggest that the disproportionate 
impact of the conflict on women suggests that women’s alliances may reveal particularly 
productive strategies for resistance. The optimism embraced by each novel’s conclusion 
at least partially (and perhaps pragmatically) counters their pessimism about effecting 
change on a broad scale.  
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Also reflecting practical constraints, Zilayefa’s and Boma’s modes of survival of 
resistance operate within narrow networks, as fear of retaliation and logistical 
impossibilities preclude broader alliances. While the small size of such networks can 
often translate into accessibility, enabling the inclusion of people who might otherwise 
not be involved in any resistance effort, groups like Sisi’s network and the Irikefe 
worshippers are not building a broad coalition that would likely have the capacity to 
effect change on a larger scale—which will surely be essential to the ultimate survival of 
the Niger Delta’s peoples and environment. Another potential limitation of these models 
lies in the fact that Yellow-Yellow in particular relies on a binary understanding of gender 
and a series of heteronormative assumptions in laying out its argument—a conception 
that risks obscuring the realities of many Nigerians, even while it calls attention to the 
plight of often overlooked young women like Zilayefa.  
Despite these limitations, though, Yellow-Yellow and Oil on Water still offer key 
contributions to popular and scholarly conversations about the Niger Delta crisis. 
Treating their subjects with nuance, Agary’s and Habila’s novels also cast Zilayefa and 
Boma, respectively, as simultaneously victims and agents of resistance in their assertions 
of political sovereignty, whether through feminist or eco-spiritual narrow nationalisms. 
Even if they cannot fight for sweeping change, their smaller claims—just to “this island,” 
for example—offer some hope. The novels work together to highlight women’s obstacles 
as well as their agency, add historical depth to narratives about women’s participation, 
and offer models for resistance beyond highly visible protests—which, although 
important, are not the only way to take action against oil companies, despite what 
dominant narratives would suggest. With Zilayefa surviving her abortion and committed 
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to pursuing her education under Sisi’s sponsorship, and Boma finding peace among the 
worshippers at Irikefe, Yellow-Yellow and Oil on Water both end on hopeful notes, even 
as they acknowledge the tremendous challenges facing the Niger Delta in the twenty-first 
century.  
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Chapter 2: “Family Always Came First”: The Yahooze Generation in  
Adaobi Tricia Nwaubani’s I Do Not Come to You by Chance 
 
 In the late 1990s, a young Nigerian man named Osondiowendi emailed a 
Wisconsin resident named Mirabelle, asking her to help recover the fortune of a recently 
deceased businessman client of his. Osondiowendi explained that the late client had no 
immediate family, so if Mirabelle would officially claim to be his next of kin, 
Osondiowendi would share over half of the client’s $19,000,000 (USD) with her. 
Mirabelle agreed to the fraudulent plan, and Osondiowendi went on to request some 
comparatively small advance fees from her in order to process the necessary paperwork: 
a death authorization form, a next of kin affirmation, a bank recognition form, and a 
deceased demise declaration. Unfortunately for Mirabelle, these fees eventually added up 
to about $23,000, and worse, she never received any of the promised sum. 
Osondiowendi—whose real name was Kingsley Ibe—had invented the entire story, so 
while Mirabelle thought that she was effortlessly profiting off a late businessman’s 
fortune, Kingsley was starting to make his real fortune off the unsuspecting Mirabelle.  
 This particular story happens to be fictional: Kingsley is the protagonist of Adaobi 
Tricia Nwaubani’s 2009 novel I Do Not Come to You by Chance, and Mirabelle is his 
first scam victim, or “mugu.” Nonetheless, it bears many features of the notorious email 
scams so often associated with Nigeria, often called “419” scams after the section of 
criminal code that prohibits such activities. First, Kingsley invents a fortune for Mirabelle 
to receive—a hook that draws her into his narrative and persuades her to respond. 
Second, he ensures that the circumstances seem just unethical enough—Mirabelle knows 
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perfectly well that she is not the deceased businessman’s next of kin—for the scam 
victim to keep the plan a secret. Secrecy is important, or else a friend of the victim might 
point out the riskiness or unlikelihood of the venture (Igwe 55). By offering up a 
fraudulent scheme, Kingsley also engages the common 419 strategy of playing to 
stereotypes about Nigerians: Mirabelle is more likely to believe the story because she 
probably already imagines Nigerians as corrupt (Krishnan 87). Third, Kingsley hides his 
identity from his victim to protect himself. Like many other scammers, he chooses a pen 
name with a meaning amusing to himself but opaque to his victim: in Igbo, “osondi 
owendi” means roughly, “while some people are wailing, others are rejoicing,” or, “what 
is cherished by some people is despised by some people” (D.J. Smith A Culture 41; Sote; 
AndreUweh). This expression is humorous to Kingsley because Mirabelle thinks that the 
businessman’s untimely demise (“wailing”) is reason for her to rejoice, but in actuality 
Mirabelle’s unfortunate gullibility and subsequent loss of her savings (her own 
“wailing”) becomes reason for Kingsley to rejoice. Finally, Kingsley completely invents 
paperwork to extract a series of “advance fees” from Mirabelle, stringing her along until 
she runs out of money; documents like a “death authorization form” and a “deceased 
demise declaration” clearly do not exist, but drawn into the narrative and eager for her 
“inheritance,” Mirabelle eagerly signs away and submits Western Union money transfers 
as requested.  
 As Mirabelle’s case exemplifies, sometimes nearly indistinguishable layers of 
fiction and fact are integral to Nwaubani’s novel (not to mention 419 scams generally): 
Mirabelle believes she is participating in a fiction by claiming to be a businessman’s next 
of kin, but she is only participating in Kingsley’s larger narrative invention, which in turn 
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all belongs to Nwaubani’s work of fiction, itself based on very real events. And, in 
reality, 419 scammers invent their own fictions to deceive scam victims, who, like 
Mirabelle, often believe they are participating as beneficiaries of one fiction but turn out 
to be the victims of still another fiction. The scammer may claim, for example, to be a 
wealthy Nigerian widow trying to gain access to her inheritance, or perhaps a 
businessperson attempting to secure oil industry earnings, or any number of other 
character types (D.J. Smith A Culture 48-49, 44-45). Sometimes scammers even claim to 
be investigators who can help recover money lost to scammers, requesting one or more 
“advance fees” for the alleged investigation, only to disappear like any other 419er 
(Comaroff and Comaroff 15). As Jean and John Comaroff have explained of these layers 
of deception, in 419 schemes, “Forgery also begets forgery, in an infinite regress” (15). 
Nwaubani consciously plays with this palimpsest of fictions. She remarked in one 
interview about the novel, “All the scams in my book are ‘real’! Nigeria’s best writers of 
fiction are definitely doing everything else except writing” (Nwaubani “Chance 
Happenings”). That is, the stories that her characters tell to their targets are based on 
stories that real-life 419ers have told. Borrowing further from these alleged “best writers 
of fiction,” Nwaubani takes her novel’s title from a common opening line for 419 emails. 
“I do not come to you by chance,” the messages avow, suggesting to their readers that 
they are specially selected to take advantage of a rare opportunity. This single line 
embodies yet another set of fictions, as these messages are sent indiscriminately,26 so the 
recipients are not special; the alleged “opportunity” is actually one of many just like it, so 
it’s not rare to receive such a message; and, of course, the opportunity does not actually 
                                                 
26 419ers send massive email blasts using data from chat rooms, online company directories, personal ad 
sites, and more recently, email extractor software (D.J. Smith A Culture 36; Igwe 35).  
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exist, so it is itself a fiction as well. The title for Nwaubani’s work of fiction thus draws 
from a real-world example of a tremendous set of fictions—emblematizing the 
complexities of the system of advance fee fraud.  
Sometimes the overlapping fictions can even interfere with research on the scams. 
A company called Ultrascan Advanced Global Investigations, for example, claims to 
release reports with statistics and analysis almost every year. Many other sources rely on 
those statistics in their own documentation, including the journalistic publications 
Washington Post (2009), Techworld (2010), Slate (2012), Quartz (2014), Geektime 
(2014), the Hindustan Times (2014), and the BBC (2015), as well as scholarly sources, 
including Chidi Nnamdi Igwe’s Taking Back Nigeria from 419: What to Do about the 
Worldwide E-Mail Scam—Advance-Fee Fraud (2007), an otherwise reliable book, which 
I cite in this paper. Unfortunately, however, Ultrascan AGI is itself a scam. It promises to 
get 419 scam victims their money back, but all it does is take more money in the form of 
“processing fees” and the like (Seliger). In addition, the figures that Ultrascan AGI 
presents are clearly fake, illustrated by the fact that significant portions of the reports are 
duplicated from year to year. The spread of this false information throughout otherwise 
reliable sources demonstrates the pervasiveness and global nature of this fraud—and it 
reminds us, too, that more of us can be fooled than we might like to think. 
 These various fictions have serious implications both for the scam victims and for 
Nigerians who operate outside the world of 419. While many email users today are 
immediately wary of these types of messages from strangers, promising tremendous 
financial rewards for relatively little effort, many still become victims of advance fee 
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fraud, much like Mirabelle.27 Victims have lost their savings, family relationships, and 
even their freedom. One recent scam led an American woman named Audrey Elrod to 
funnel almost half a million dollars to Nigeria, as she was convinced that doing so would 
rescue the son of a man she believed to be a Scottish oil worker and her online boyfriend; 
for her crimes, the woman has now been held in federal custody for over two years, while 
her scammer is essentially untraceable (Koerner; U.S. Attorney’s Office). The scams also 
harm honest Nigerians. Understandably, many Nigerians have grown alarmed at the 
world’s growing association of their country with these infamous scams (D.J. Smith 
“Ritual Killings” 804). The damage to Nigeria’s national reputation is not purely a matter 
of pride; the consequences for honest Nigerians range from having their email 
automatically marked as spam, to facing logistical obstacles in pursuing education 
abroad, to losing potentially hundreds of millions of foreign investment dollars (Igwe 
110). Finally, Nigerians can also be direct targets of domestic 419 scams (D.J. Smith A 
Culture 28).  
 Given the stakes for honest Nigerians and scam victims around the world, many 
anthropologists, political scientists, and other researchers have pursued the subject. Some 
experts have focused on the role of individual action in the propagation of 419. Language 
expert Chidi Nnamdi Igwe, for example, identifies the crimes as the “unacceptable 
conduct of a few unpatriotic individuals,” avaricious loners who are exceptions among a 
law-abiding majority (109). Detailing specific instances of such “unpatriotic individuals,” 
anthropologist and political scientist Wale Adebanwi recounts the achievements of anti-
corruption government official Nuhu Ribadu in bringing several 419 kingpins to justice 
                                                 
27 Exact statistics are difficult to come by, largely due to the nature of these crimes: the perpetrators rarely 
get caught, and the victims are often too embarrassed to come forward. 
 103 
in the early 2000s. Adebanwi underscores that prosecuting these individuals entailed 
many challenges—like physicians being paid off to assert that the scammers are not 
competent to stand trial—but ultimately argues that the work of committed officials like 
Ribadu is essential to hindering the spread of 419 (Authority Stealing 47, 80). Though 
both Adebanwi and Igwe note that systemic factors have enabled the growth of 419, they 
nonetheless home in on individual action in advancing their solutions.  
 Also deeply concerned about the work of particular individuals in perpetuating 
419, anthropologist Daniel Jordan Smith has argued that 419ers’ endeavors seriously 
disrupt longstanding community ties. He writes, “the perpetrators undertake actions to 
deceive others in schemes that ultimately benefit only themselves,” and elsewhere, “The 
419 men represent the consequences of power and wealth unleashed from the obligations 
of kinship and patron-clientelism” (A Culture 223; “Ritual Killing” 819; all emphasis 
mine). More specifically, Smith argues that many Nigerians today feel conflicted 
between the pull of personal ambition and that of “obligations to one’s kin and 
community” (“Ritual Killing” 819). 419ers, he contends, are instances of individual 
ambitions winning this conflict entirely.  
 Alongside these analyses about individual actors, Smith and others also situate 
419 scams within a larger global context. A major part of Smith’s anthropological work 
portrays 419 emails as reflective of the scam-writers’ interpretations of global 
inequalities (A Culture 29, 51). As Smith explains, they observe economic and political 
systems “intertwined” with corruption and reflect these realities back in their messages 
(51). In a similar vein, political scientist Harvey Glickman argues that many Nigerians 
observe a system of international commerce in which the global north is, quite 
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unethically, “draining Africa of natural resources in unequal partnerships with foreign 
governments and multinational corporations,” and some respond by competing by 
whatever extralegal means they can access—often in the form of 419 schemes (476). 
Witnessing, for instance, Shell’s blatant exploitation of the resources and peoples of the 
Niger Delta inspires some Nigerians not to defend their rights as Boma does, but instead 
to follow suit by participating in systemic crime. Considering a different facet of the 
global dynamics of 419, Glickman also highlights how profits from the scams can help to 
support illegal international weapons and drug trade (481). Finally, of course, is the fact 
that 419s only succeed because enough targets around the world are, like Mirabelle, 
willing to participate in unethical plots (Apter 274). In their analyses of such factors, 
researchers have drawn attention to the global contexts that motivate and enable the 
perpetuation of advance fee fraud.  
 While fairly substantial scholarly research has examined 419 scams, few creative 
representations of these (rather creative) schemes exist. Published in 2009, I Do Not 
Come to You by Chance was the first novel to focus on 419 scams, and it remains the 
only Nigerian novel to date that has done so. A short story by Sefi Atta, “Yahoo Yahoo” 
(2010), released shortly after Nwaubani’s book, narrates the teenaged protagonist 
Idowu’s brief foray into life as a scammer, but he ultimately backs out, fearful of 
potential consequences from his parents and law enforcement.  The only novels that focus 
on 419 besides Nwaubani’s are South African writer Lauren Beukes’s Zoo City (2010) 
and Canadian author Will Ferguson’s 419 (2012). Zoo City, like I Do Not Come to You, is 
narrated by a 419er, in this case a young South African woman named Zinzi, who 
engages in various illicit operations to repay her debts. The dystopian text sympathizes 
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with her struggles but ultimately condemns her 419 involvement; Zinzi’s lover, a 
Congolese refugee, criticizes her scam-writing not because of its direct effects on 
overseas victims, but rather because Zinzi exploits the real suffering of people in central 
Africa by inventing starving Congolese orphans to elicit sympathy from her unwitting 
email recipients (257). Deeply affected by this perspective, Zinzi later emails all of her 
contacts, confessing the scam and warning them to be less “naïve” in the future (276). 
Ferguson’s 419, in contrast, focuses on the story of a Canadian scam victim’s daughter, 
Laura, seeking to avenge the wrongs against her father, who has died by suicide 
following his tremendous financial losses to a 419er. Laura’s subsequent and unlikely 
journey to Nigeria results in the death of a young Nigerian only minimally involved, 
underscoring that the scams are disastrous for parties on both ends. Though “Yahoo 
Yahoo,” Zoo City, and 419 emphasize distinct harms, they agree that the scams are 
destructive and eventually bring an end to the ones they portray, whether through 
Idowu’s fear, Zinzi’s penance, or Laura’s revenge.  
Their critiques stand in stark contrast to I Do Not Come to You, which ends with 
Kingsley’s indefinitely continuing to pursue 419 under the cover of a legitimate 
cybercafé business. In the late 1990s, Kingsley is a young, unemployed university 
graduate whose parents are already struggling to support him and his three teenaged 
siblings when his father, Paulinus, goes into a coma and requires costly medical care. 
Despite his academic qualifications, Kingsley cannot obtain his desired job as a chemical 
engineer. As I will show, the novel uses his growing frustrations as a means to explore a 
variety of communities present in turn-of-the-millennium Nigeria, as he seeks both a 
practical safety net and a guiding ethical philosophy during these challenging times. 
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Ultimately, Kingsley finds what he seeks in his family: his Uncle Boniface (a 419 
kingpin) helps pay for Paulinus’s expensive medical care, and Kingsley continues to be 
driven by the moral imperative of supporting his family, particularly given his role as 
opara, the family’s oldest son. In the face of his material need, Kingsley’s initially 
fervent ethical critique of corruption goes out the window when, under Boniface’s 
tutelage, Kingsley launches his career in advance fee fraud. Tensions grow between 
Kingsley and those around him who disapprove—particularly his mother, Augustina—
but by the end, he is operating a successful cybercafé chain as a front for his thriving 419 
outfit. In part, the novel is legible as a critique of the lack of options available to 
members of Nwaubani’s generation; while the novel does not give formal approval to 
Kingsley’s behavior, it nonetheless sympathizes with his frustrations and eventual 
decision to pursue crime. In so doing, it also offers rare insight into potential motivations 
for the perpetuation of 419, as real-life scammers must remain secretive in order to 
succeed, and even those who get caught have little incentive to show their cards. As with 
Yellow-Yellow and Oil on Water, I Do Not Come to You embraces the ability of the novel 
as a genre to let readers into a space otherwise difficult to access; where Agary’s and 
Habila’s novels offered glimpses into the dangerous physical terrain of the Niger Delta, 
Nwaubani’s novel helps readers enter cyberspace to imagine the “real,” almost always 
impossible to trace, author behind the ubiquitous messages. 
Any reading of the novel must take into account that Nwaubani’s wry, satirical 
tone can be difficult to parse, in her fiction and elsewhere. Born in southeastern Nigeria 
in 1976, the writer comes from an educated and fairly well-connected Igbo family; one of 
the most influential first generation Nigerian writers, Flora Nwapa, was Nwaubani’s 
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mother’s cousin (Nwaubani “Chance Happenings”). In contrast with the African novelists 
like Nwapa who first influenced her writing style, however, Nwaubani found herself as a 
young writer increasingly drawn to works that dealt with somber issues in a humorous 
tone. She has cited, for instance, Irish American author Frank McCourt’s memoir 
Angela’s Ashes (1996) as an influence for its dry humor in narrating the author’s tragic 
and impoverished youth (Nwaubani “Chance Happenings”).28 Now based in Lagos, she 
maintains this strategy across the genres in which she writes. I Do Not Come to You by 
Chance is her only novel, but she writes both serious journalistic pieces as well as 
satirical op-eds for publications including the New York Times, the Guardian, the BBC, 
and Al-Jazeera. I rely on Nwaubani’s interviews and other writings to inform, but not 
dictate, my reading of I Do Not Come to You. Nwaubani’s 2013 New York Times op-ed 
on the treatment of domestic workers in Nigeria offers a useful example of the 
complexity of her tone, as she launches a serious critique using a seemingly lighthearted, 
humorous voice. In the piece, she describes “househelps” as giving off a “feral scent” 
(“In Nigeria” SR4). Many readers, including myself, understand the piece as using this 
phrase ironically, in order to mock a prevalent, condescending attitude toward domestic 
workers, but understandably, others have read her tone as patronizing and offensive 
(Ikheloa). A successful reading of I Do Not Come to You, then, requires substantial 
attention to tone and nuance, as Nwaubani’s satirical framework invites us to ask how 
seriously we should take Kingsley’s attitudes toward corruption, nation, and community 
in I Do Not Come to You by Chance.  
                                                 
28 Nwaubani has said of her reaction to McCourt’s book: “It was one of the most dismal tales of hardship I 
had ever read, but the style was humorous. Eureka!” (“Chance Happenings”). Her novel I Do Not Come to 
You by Chance, similarly, is no doubt a “dismal tale of hardship”—the financial, medical, and educational 
challenges that Kingsley’s family faces are quite serious—but the text conveys these calamities in a 
humorous, often lighthearted voice.  
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Another factor that complicates any reading of the novel is Boniface’s death. Near 
the end, as Boniface approaches his election to political office, a rival pays his chef to 
poison him, and three Indian prostitutes discover his corpse the next morning (385).29 
This fate almost exactly replicates the rumors surrounding the assassination of Nigeria’s 
notorious dictator Sani Abacha, who died in 1998, shortly prior to the main action of I Do 
Not Come to You (Weiner A4; Orr 9). Although the novel treats Boniface as a humorous, 
often generous character, then, it ultimately condemns his actions by aligning him with 
the most violent, despised leader in Nigeria’s recent history. Significantly, however, 
where Boniface dies, Kingsley gets to carry on with his actions, as long as he operates on 
a smaller scale than his uncle—suggesting that, while the novel does not promote such 
activities, it nonetheless sees them as pervasive and inevitable.  
To date, four literature scholars have contributed critical analyses of this 
challenging novel, all situating it in conversation with other third generation African 
texts. Oluwole Coker and Shalini Nadaswaran contend that I Do Not Come to You serves 
as commentary on Nigerian political structures: Coker draws out a critique of feeble 
government leadership, and Nadaswaran reads Augustina’s consistently upstanding ethics 
as condemnation of an enduring Nigerian patriarchy. I take issue with Nadaswaran’s 
argument, though, as Augustina seems more oblivious than critical—an issue to which I 
will return. Hamish Dalley and Madhu Krishnan, on the other hand, focus on the novel’s 
complex depiction of national affiliations. Ultimately making an argument about genre 
and literary categorization, Dalley contends that the complex “transnational context” of 
advance fee fraud demands that we consider the book in a more nuanced framework than 
                                                 
29 Specifically, the chef poisons his dog meat, which Boniface eats because he believes that it will make 
him immune to disease and protect him from his enemies. Ironically, then, his belief in his ability to make 
himself invincible is precisely the cause of his death.  
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what the category of “Third Generation Nigerian Literature” typically allows (19). I 
contend, here and throughout the dissertation, that the category of “third generation 
Nigerian literature” already allows for more flexibility than Dalley believes. For her part, 
Krishnan makes the case that I Do Not Come to You evokes a twenty-first-century 
Nigerian nationalism more nuanced than its predecessors, due a complex web of local 
and global affiliations that coexist with national ties; moreover, Krishnan asserts that, in 
Nwaubani’s hands, “the scammer becomes the very embodiment of national 
commitment” (88).  
In this chapter, I aim to extend Krishnan’s argument to show how I Do Not Come 
to You depicts a twenty-first-century nationalism that not only is multilayered, but also 
entails corruption as an integral part of “Nigerian social fabric,” as Jean and John 
Comaroff have suggested (15). While Krishnan sees Nwaubani’s scammers as “filling the 
void created by the failures of governmental policies,” I go further to argue that the novel 
casts 419 as doing more than bridging infrastructural gaps—it is pervasive and 
inextricable from the realities of many third generation Nigerians like Kingsley (Krishnan 
88). Where Zilayefa attempts to extricate herself from a system of enforced inequalities, 
Kingsley ultimately shrugs his shoulders and joins in. To be clear, I do not mean to 
suggest at all that Nigerians, or any other group of people, are inherently corrupt. Rather, 
I aim to highlight the ways in which this particular novel depicts a particular variant of 
Nigerian nationalism as interwoven with corruption. Where former US Secretary of State 
Colin Powell cast Nigeria as a “nation of scammers” intending to disparage (French 35), I 
Do Not Come to You humorously embraces the stereotype, defying older Nigerians’ and 
the international community’s insistence on compliance with a particular ethics. 
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After a brief overview of the history of advance fee fraud in Nigeria, I begin by 
situating I Do Not Come to You as a rewriting of earlier Nigerian nationalist narratives. 
Nwaubani’s novel, through its play with genre and tone, upsets the global inequalities 
and the earnest middle class ethics formerly at the heart of much nationalist literature, 
and in so doing, integrates criminality as a key component of at least one strain of third 
generation nationalism. One key intervention is thus my contextualization of I Do Not 
Come to You within a particular subgenre of Nigerian literature (a vertical analysis), 
rather than as an instance of third-generation Nigerian literature (a horizontal analysis), as 
criticism of the novel has so far exclusively done. I then draw out Kingsley’s particular 
variant of nationalism, cast by the novel as distinct from previous generations’ 
nationalism but representative for those of Kingsley’s—and his creator Nwaubani’s—
generation. In particular, and as Krishnan has observed, this nationalism entails strong 
familial commitments; conversely, I also demonstrate that religion and ethnicity, often 
considered primary categories for Nigerian identity affiliations, remain in the background 
of Nwaubani’s text. Significantly, and in contrast with the analyses that focus on 419 as a 
product of deviant individual actors, I Do Not Come to You suggests that the scammers’ 
endeavors can be in fact quite closely tied to their local communities, and are even a 
direct result of their commitment to supporting their extended family networks. Far from 
“unpatriotic individuals” who selfishly disrupt longstanding kinship ties (Igwe 109), 
Kingsley and his peers are motivated by commitments to family and defend Nigeria 
against those who criticize the country. Finally, I explore how the novel situates 
Kingsley’s criminal activities in a global context, especially as it depicts criminality as a 
means of empowering Nigerians in an imbalanced economic and political system.  
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The chapter concludes with a discussion of the implications of my argument for 
contemporary Nigeria. The new Buhari government and other Nigerians must reckon 
with a younger generation’s views of corruption, criminality, nation, and community. If 
corruption is inextricable from many younger Nigerians’ understandings of national 
affiliation, then deterring 419 will be a much larger project than a matter of stopping 
individual criminals. What possibilities exist for combating this fraud that remains 
detrimental to most Nigerians? Does the novel ask us to accept criminality as a mode of 
survival? What is the role of humor in representing the serious issues at stake here? To 
situate this investigation, the chapter first offers some essential background information 
on 419 schemes.  
 
ADVANCE FEE FRAUD 
While popular imagination tends to conceive of 419 as an internet age 
phenomenon, the practice of advance fee fraud—the umbrella term for this type of 
crime—actually originated in sixteenth-century Europe, most notoriously with the so-
called Spanish prisoner letters. In this scheme, fraudsters asked their targets for an 
advance fee to help smuggle an innocent child out of a Spanish prison; the target would 
be promised a financial reward as well, since the fictional child would inevitably be from 
a desperate, wealthy family. Various, very much fictional, rescue attempts would fail, and 
the letter-writer would keep asking the victim for advances to keep trying for the rescue 
(Glickman 472). From these origins, advance fee fraud came to take on a number of 
forms, developed by a number of perpetrators from around the world.  
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Due to a variety of economic, political, and technological factors, advance fee 
fraud took off in 1980s Nigeria.30 When Kingsley was born in the late 1970s, an oil boom 
had enabled major investment in education, which in turn increased the number of 
qualified university graduates (Igwe 30). Competition for desirable jobs grew and was 
exacerbated by an economic downturn around 1983 partly spurred by international 
structural adjustment policies, all providing incentive for financially strapped fraudsters 
(Igwe 30; Bayart 69; Apter 269). At the same time, the institutionalization of corruption 
in Nigeria, often attributed to Ibrahim Babangida’s 1985-1993 administration, facilitated 
the conditions that allowed 419 to flourish (Adebanwi Authority Stealing 35). Some 
fraudsters used snail mail, but the spread of fax machines enabled early 419ers to reach 
more potential targets more efficiently (Glickman 473).  
By the late 1990s, when Kingsley graduates university,31 419 schemes had 
escalated due to both technological and political developments. The advent of the 
internet, accompanied by the mushrooming of internet cafés and Western Union 
locations, enabled scammers to operate on a greater scale than faxes had permitted (Igwe 
32, 67).32 Around the same time, the 1998 death of dictator Sani Abacha and subsequent 
reinstatement of democracy brought about greater freedoms—in contrast with Abacha’s 
extreme restrictions on internet usage—but not necessarily preferable job opportunities or 
                                                 
30 Though the scams continue to be most famously associated with Nigeria, they originate from places all 
over the world, including elsewhere in Africa, as well as Singapore, China, and Russia (Glickman 472).  
31 Although the novel avoids mention of any specific dates, Kingsley mentions that Princess Diana’s and 
Sani Abacha’s deaths, which occurred in 1997 and 1998 respectively, are recent at the time that he finishes 
university and his father enters a coma (Nwaubani 21). Presumably, then, this part of the plot begins around 
1998 or 1999, and it continues for a few years, as we learn that Kingsley’s three younger siblings—each a 
year a part from one another—finish secondary school and go on to university during the course of the 
novel.  
32 Western Unions had existed since 1989, but their locations were few until the late 1990s (Igwe 67). 
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salaries (Green and Karolides 393; Igwe 23-24). As a result, a growing number of 
frustrated, young, educated Nigerians, like Kingsley, turned to 419.  
The repertoire of 419ers’ stories has evolved alongside political circumstances, 
staying up-to-date to remain convincing as well as one step ahead of the potential victim. 
As Zoo City’s protagonist Zinzi explains of her scam-crafting, not without irony, “It’s all 
topical. All rooted in the hard realities of the world” (Beukes 37). In the mid-2000s, for 
example, events like the Iraq War and the Indonesian tsunami provided fodder for stories 
about stranded orphans who needed financial assistance (D.J. Smith A Culture 34). Like 
the common “next of kin” yarn to which Nwaubani’s Mirabelle fell victim, other typical 
narratives engage Euro-American imaginaries of African corruption. After Abacha’s 
death in 1998, for example, a plethora of messages allegedly from his widow appeared in 
inboxes around the world, asking for help accessing the late dictator’s fortune. The story 
was that Abacha’s jealous successors had blocked his widow’s access to her rightful 
inheritance, but with the payment of some initial banking fees, the “lucky” message 
recipients could help restore her funds in exchange for a handsome reward (D.J. Smith A 
Culture 48-49). Another popular variation plays on global awareness of conflict over 
Nigeria’s oil resources. The 419er claims to be a bureaucrat or executive who can only 
gain access to an overinvoiced petroleum contract with the help of someone with a 
foreign bank account. Again, the message recipient is assured a big fraction of the cash, 
an obviously unethical plan if it were to exist; the recipient is asked only to please 
provide the bureaucrat with full bank account access for a short window of time. In both 
of these scams, of course, the 419er asks for as many advance fees or as much bank 
account access as the recipient will grant, and then disappears.  
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More recently, a financially lucrative version of what Americans know as 
“catfishing”—luring someone into an online romantic relationship with a character of the 
catfisher’s invention—has also been in play, particularly thanks to the growth of online 
dating services. In such “romance scams,” the 419er develops a fictional persona to 
pursue a romantic relationship with the target. After weeks or even months of courtship, 
the 419er invents a costly disaster, like involvement in a car crash or an unjust legal 
situation, and asks for financial assistance. Once the victim runs out of money, sometimes 
even after having borrowed funds she can never repay, the scammer disappears. As 
Glickman has noted, since advance fee fraud’s origins centuries ago, “the story to entice 
people has changed, [but] the basic principles of the scam have not” (472).  
A witness to (and author of) these and other 419 subgenres, Nwaubani’s character 
Kingsley is cast as representative of a certain group within his generation: those who are 
well-educated but unsatisfied by their more savory professional options. Like his creator, 
Kingsley is a third generation Nigerian, representative of the so-called “Yahooze 
generation,” as some have dubbed his age group to emphasize the proliferation of false 
Yahoo! email addresses as a consequence of growing 419 schemes (Adebanwi Authority 
Stealing 36). To be sure, Kingsley’s experiences and choices are far from representative 
of those of most Nigerians. Nonetheless, Nwaubani’s novel presents them as reflective of 
the realities of a certain population whose frustrations matter. Indeed, as many as 23.1% 
of university graduates in Nigeria are unemployed—a reality that leads Kingsley, upon 
failing to obtain his dream job as a chemical engineer, to describe himself as “a 
component of Nigeria’s rising unemployment statistics” (Makoni; Nwaubani 33).  
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A REVISION OF EARLIER NATIONALIST NARRATIVES 
 One key frame for I Do Not Come to You by Chance’s narrative of the young, 
frustrated university graduate is through its manipulation of a subgenre of first and 
second generation Nigerian writing that I call here the “moral decay” narrative. This type 
of narrative ultimately upheld the nation, even if critiqued particular aspects, and in fact, 
its effort to criticize corruption was part of a larger project of national improvement. I Do 
Not Come to You engages this subgenre only to reverse its ending, thereby casting 
criminality as part of a certain type of nationalist undertaking.  
Among the most prominent Nigerian “moral decay” narratives are the first 
generation novels No Longer at Ease (1960) by Chinua Achebe and Kinsman and 
Foreman (1966) by T. M. Aluko, as well as second generation writer Festus Iyayi’s novel 
Violence (1979). From elsewhere in Anglophone Africa, first generation Ghanaian writer 
Ayi Kwei Armah’s The Beautyful Ones Are Not Yet Born (1968) belongs to a similar 
genre.33 These texts deal with corruption from the perspective of a protagonist—generally 
male—who starts off as an upstanding community member committed to particular 
values. Over the course of the novel, he feels the weight of increasing financial pressure 
(often financial obligations to his family or community; medical and education costs are 
frequent culprits), becomes frustrated by his career path, and discovers that many of his 
peers are engaging in criminal behaviors (like accepting bribes). In some cases, he in 
desperation commits the type of crime he had once scorned and must face the 
consequences (No Longer at Ease), and in others, he refuses to give in but remains 
                                                 
33 As literary scholar Neil Lazarus has noted, The Beautyful Ones emphasizes that the initial decolonization 
period had offered (since missed) opportunities for “radically transforming Ghanaian society” (50). Forty 
years later, by the time of Nwaubani’s publication of a comparable Nigerian “moral decay” tale, any such 
opportunities would have long since passed.  
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frustrated by the status quo (Kinsman and Foreman, Violence, and The Beautyful Ones). 
Either way, the novel pities the protagonist, casting his situation as one that has become 
tragically typical for those of his age, education level, and socioeconomic background. It 
thus serves as a call to action against corruption, ultimately to strengthen the nation.  
Although the historical context of these earlier novels is quite different from that 
of I Do Not Come to You by Chance, Nwaubani has clearly adapted the generic form for a 
turn-of-the-millennium setting. Of these moral decay narratives, the storyline of I Do Not 
Come to You by Chance most closely follows that of Achebe’s No Longer at Ease (1960), 
given that both novels’ protagonists eventually succumb to participating in systemic 
crime. In No Longer, the second book of Achebe’s seminal African trilogy, protagonist 
Obi Okonkwo bows under financial pressures from his community, family,34 and fiancée 
Clara, shifting in his initially outspoken, judgmental attitude toward corrupt civil 
servants, and begins to accept bribes. In all of these ways, Obi’s plight appears highly 
similar to Kingsley’s—except, in the end, Obi is caught by police, tried, and punished, 
whereas Kingsley continues to pursue his 419 schemes in a novel that treats his crimes as 
humorous, rather than tragic. I Do Not Come to You, then, lines up closely with this genre 
of the protagonist fallen to corruption, only to disrupt the ending, as Kingsley gets away 
with his crimes (or is not “made to face the music,” to borrow a phrase of Achebe’s from 
his nonfiction book on corruption, The Trouble with Nigeria (54)). No longer a problem 
to be eradicated, criminality instead endures within Kingsley’s version of nationalism.  
I Do Not Come to You also reverses several other aspects of first generation 
writing. Its play with characters’ names from Chinua Achebe’s Arrow of God (1964), the 
                                                 
34 Much like Kingsley, Obi must pay a younger brother’s tuition and a parent’s substantial medical bills 
and later, funeral costs.  
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third book of the author’s African trilogy, is one such reversal. Achebe’s British colonial 
villain, Captain T. K. Winterbottom, becomes in Nwaubani’s text an American “mugu” 
named Winterbottom. Where the earlier Winterbottom exploited Achebe’s protagonist, 
Ezeulu, for his own professional advancement, the third generation Winterbottom is 
exploited by Nwaubani’s protagonist for his own financial gain. Similarly, Captain T. K. 
Winterbottom’s obedient and soft-spoken servant, Boniface, becomes the garrulous 419 
kingpin that helps Kingsley exploit the American Winterbottom. By inverting the power 
dynamics among characters of each name, I Do Not Come to You underscores the notion 
of 419 scams as a means of empowering Nigerian actors in the face of a global order that 
has historically disempowered them.  
Another key distinction between I Do Not Come to You and earlier nationalist 
narratives is that it willingly engages a negative stereotype that Nwaubani’s predecessors 
would have sought to correct. As many scholars have noted, first and second generation 
African literature often “aims at countering the Western image of Africa in cultural and 
socio-political perspectives” (Ojaide “Examining Canonisation” 11). Achebe was at the 
forefront of this struggle, often emphasizing that one of his major literary goals “was to 
fight back the negative ideas of Africa propagated by the European colonisers and those 
sharing a similar imperial ideology” (Ojaide “Examining Canonisation” 11). Nwaubani, 
however, embraces the rather negative 419 stereotype in her novel. Although she thinks it 
is “annoying” and “a shame” that so many non-Africans associate the scams with 
Nigeria, she also finds the topic “quite amusing” (“Chance Happenings”). In addition, she 
has explained that she wanted to address the stereotype in fiction before non-Africans 
did, so that she could tell this particular story before “some white man from, say, 
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Nebraska or Louisiana, […] jumped out of the hedges one day with a novel about 
Nigerian 419” (Nwaubani “Chance Happenings”). At least in the realm of fiction, then, a 
Nigerian voice was able to take on this particular stereotype before “some white man” 
did, in contrast with the long preexisting stereotypes faced by previous generations. 
Nonetheless, Nwaubani’s novel neither laments nor contests the association of Nigerians 
with 419, displaying a disregard for how others might perceive Nigerians. As she has 
explained of her writing process, “I wasn’t worried about those Westerners who think 
everything Nigerian is 419; I wasn’t worried about those Nigerians who are obsessed 
with changing the impressions of the West” (“Chance Happenings”).  
Moreover, Nwaubani treats her controversial subject with a humorous tone, rather 
than the solemnity of earlier Nigerian writers. In a 2010 op-ed for the New York Times, 
she reflected on some of her influences, “Achebe and Soyinka are certainly masters, but 
of an earnest and sober style. What about other styles? As a lover of humorous books, 
I’m often saddened that I can find hardly any by African authors” (“In Africa” WK9).35 
Though the novel takes Kingsley’s family’s problems seriously, it employs a dark humor 
to narrate their personal struggles. Early in the text, for example, Kingsley reflects on his 
father’s illness, “For a poorly paid civil servant to get caught up in an affliction like 
diabetes was the very height of ambitious misfortune” (16). Here, the text simultaneously 
conveys a health concern it consistently takes seriously, as well as a dark, ironic humor 
about the diagnosis. With such cynical humor, then, I Do Not Come to You continues to 
distinguish itself from earlier Nigerian nationalist literature. 
                                                 
35 One might contrast Nwaubani’s tone and attitude in dealing with systemic corruption in I Do Not Come 
to You with an anecdote that Achebe shares in The Trouble with Nigeria (1983), also focused on systemic 
corruption. The late author recounts a family road trip during which the Achebes saw a police officer 
urinating onto the road and even onto some moving cars. Where Nwaubani would almost assuredly have 
made a crass joke, Achebe only goes so far as to say, “It was almost humorous” (44, emphasis mine).  
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Finally, while I Do Not Come to You is not the only third generation Nigerian 
novel to adapt the moral decay narrative, it still stands out as the only novel where the 
protagonist continues to engage in systemic criminal behavior and remains an integral 
part of his community in Nigeria. Protagonist Tolani of Sefi Atta’s Swallow (2010), 
exhausted by ongoing sexual harassment at her mediocre job, considers working as a 
drug mule but at the eleventh hour backs out. She remains in Nigeria but is forced to cope 
with the fate of her best friend, who goes through with the plan to swallow cocaine and 
dies as a consequence. In Okey Ndibe’s Foreign Gods, Inc. (2014), the Nigerian-born 
New York City resident Ike is deep in debt due to a combination of factors: his obligation 
to send money back home to his family, the extravagant spending habits of his ex-wife 
(whom he had married to get a green card), and his gambling addiction. Like the 
overwhelmed Obi and Kingsley, Ike grows desperate, and his crime is to steal a god from 
his hometown to sell in New York. He does not face a formal legal punishment, as Obi 
does, but instead he is forced to cope with his own guilt and possibly, the novel implies, 
spiritual punishment as well. In this way, Ike faces punishment and is distanced from his 
home community in Nigeria, unlike Kingsley, who continues to operate as an integral 
part of his community without even a real threat of penalty. 
I Do Not Come to You thus stands out from its predecessors and its 
contemporaries: while other texts acknowledge the pervasiveness of corruption, they 
punish those who commit the crimes, but Nwaubani’s conclusion allows Kingsley’s 419 
outfit to thrive. As Nwaubani rewrites the ending of the moral decay narrative, what 
Nadaswaran has identified as “Kingsley’s journey towards moral deterioration” continues 
indefinitely (390). While Nwaubani does not encourage or condone Kingsley’s 419 
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schemes, the conclusion does treat them as an inevitable part of contemporary Nigerian 
life.   
 
THREE NATIONALISMS  
 Corruption does not stand alone in I Do Not Come to You; rather, we come to 
learn that it is integral to the rather cynical form of nationalism that Kingsley comes to 
embrace—a form of nationalism that is quite distinct from its predecessors. Early in the 
novel, Kingsley begins to seek a source of community that offers both practical help—he 
really needs a job—and ethical guidance. He has become so unmoored because, up until 
his early twenties, Kingsley has unquestioningly adhered to his father’s model of 
nationalism, which claims to offer both financial prosperity and personal fulfillment 
through hard work and allegiance to the state. Nwaubani’s novel depicts this variant of 
nationalism as perhaps well-intentioned but certainly irrelevant for members of 
Kingsley’s generation. In addition to this independence era nationalism still embraced by 
first generation Nigerians (those who came of age in the 1950s and 1960s, like 
Paulinus),36 the text also portrays two versions of nationalism that exist among 
Kingsley’s contemporaries: a simplistic and overly optimistic expatriate nationalism, and 
a cynical nationalism that is nuanced and adaptable.  
Especially with priorities like formal education and meritocracy, Paulinus 
emblematizes independence era nationalism. In order to seize power from colonizers and 
build equality throughout the nation, early Nigerian nationalists like Chief Obafemi 
                                                 
36 We know that Paulinus is an older father because he is already an adult when he first meets Augustina, 
who is still in secondary school (7). For this reason, Paulinus and Kingsley’s age gap is such that the former 
is old enough to be a prototypical member of the first generation and the younger is a typical age for the 
third generation.  
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Awolowo and Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe prioritized access to and quality of education 
(Coleman Nigeria 116; Adebanwi “The Cult of Awo” 337; Grundy 4). Calls for the 
handover of political power went hand in hand with critiques of the inadequacy of 
existing educational systems throughout Africa and especially in Nigeria, where leaders 
called for universal primary education and for as much as 20% of the state budget to go 
toward education (F. Cooper 111). Moreover, many Nigerians of this era widely saw 
education as a key credential for obtaining a desirable job and improving one’s economic 
standing, just as Paulinus believes (Coleman Nigeria 121; Nwaubani I Do Not 10). An 
engineer and civil servant, Paulinus prizes education above all else, always insisting that 
his four children excel in school, attend university, and get jobs for which they have been 
specifically trained at university (18, 79). As Kingsley explains, “To my parents, 
education was everything. She was the recipe for wealth, the pass to respectability, the 
ticket to eternal life” (18). This last phrase—“the ticket to eternal life”—is particularly 
ironic because, as the reader soon learns, Paulinus dies prematurely due to causes that the 
novel attributes to his nationalism.  
Before he meets his fate, however, Paulinus suffers a tremendous lack of dignity, 
which is particularly ironic because nationalism, and above all early anticolonial 
nationalism, has historically been so much about dignity (Greenfeld 487; Fanon 103). 
When Kingsley finds his unconscious father after a stroke, he says, “My father was 
sprawled like a dead chicken by their bathroom door” (84). This description does not 
merely note that Paulinus has collapsed: it dehumanizes him. He has lost control of his 
body and mind so completely that his son compares him to the most stereotypically 
stupid of animals. In this way, the basic dignity that Paulinus believes that a good 
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education and a career in public service can bring to an individual and a nation is thus 
undone: all that he has striven for leads to his literal collapse and complete loss of 
dignity. In broader terms, the novel thus contends that the ideals of his generation of 
nationalists, in the twenty-first century, do more harm than good to the dignity that 
nationalists believed would accompany their work (Coleman Nationalism and 
Development 125).  
Indeed, I Do Not Come to You depicts Paulinus’s fervent idealism—and thereby 
the enduring beliefs of members of his generation—as impractical and even fatal in the 
twenty-first century. First, his commitments to the nation and public service puts him in a 
place of financial uncertainty, as his once-generous salary looks increasingly meager due 
to “years of rising inflation without corresponding increase in civil servant wages” 
(Nwaubani 16).37 With diminishing resources, Paulinus is limited to a less healthy diet, 
which eventually contributes to his diagnosis with type 2 diabetes, which in turn causes a 
life-threatening stroke (16, 92). The novel thus depicts Paulinus as stuck in a dangerous 
cycle: his lack of financial resources causes his physical illness, which in turn causes him 
to spend more of his limited resources on preserving what remains of his health. The 
cycle ends only with his death. In her article on the novel, Shalini Nadaswaran argues, 
“Paulinus’s life of diabetes and high blood pressure, and death from the lack of proper 
medical care, stands for the wasted body politic of Nigeria” (388). Indeed, his body not 
only stands for the “wasted body politic,” as Nadaswaran says, but is also its direct 
                                                 
37 Unfortunately, Paulinus’s fictional circumstances echo many of the lived experiences of members of his 
generation. Following the economic crisis of the 1980s, the actual value of civil servants’ salaries 
deteriorated such that by 2001, minimum wage for federal government employees was approximately 
equivalent to $2 (USD) per day, and less than $1.50 (USD) per day for state employees (Igwe 23-24). 
Simultaneously, the payment of civil servants’ salaries was increasingly delayed such that by the turn of the 
millennium, they were paid as many as six months late (Igwe 98).  
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consequence. By calling attention to the relationship between Paulinus’s unquestioning 
commitment to public service, his financial straits, and his health problems, I Do Not 
argues that, despite the ostensible appeal of Paulinus’s earnest optimism, it can be 
impractical and even dangerous in the twenty-first century.  
To be clear, while the novel is unafraid to include humorous moments alongside 
its depictions of Paulinus’s suffering, it does not laugh at Paulinus’s death. When 
Kingsley’s Aunty Dimma comes to visit the family in the hospital, for example, Kingsley 
describes his revulsion at her beauty products in an amusing way. When she hugs him, he 
struggles not to recoil: “I felt a gooey substance on my right ear and hoped that it was 
simply some stray hair gel from her red-streaked pompadour” (101). Clearly, the reader is 
meant to smile through a cringe at the mysterious “gooey substance” dripping off the 
enthusiastic relative. In the same scene, however, Kingsley describes Augustina’s sorrow 
in a somber voice: “She always looked drawn. And […] her beautiful hair looked as if it 
had converted completely to gray overnight” (101). In this way, the text includes 
humorous characterizations alongside moments that genuinely mourn the family’s 
suffering.  
In addition to the extended consideration of Paulinus’s nationalism, ultimately 
cast as tragedy, the novel also offers another version of nationalism through Kingsley’s 
former classmate, Andrew Onyeije, who is visiting Nigeria from the United States when 
Kingsley runs into him at the airport. In the way that Paulinus is representative of the 
optimists of the independence era and Kingsley of the challenges of Nwaubani’s 
generation, Andrew is representative of those of Kingsley’s age group who, disappointed 
with available opportunities in Nigeria, have gone abroad to pursue their educations or 
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career. As Madhu Krishnan has argued, Andrew is representative of an overly simplistic 
version of nationalism that the novel wishes to reject (89); I extend Krishnan’s argument 
by going into further detail here.  
As many Nigerians would recognize, Andrew’s name makes reference to 
Nigerian short films that aired frequently in the 1980s, aimed at convincing Nigerians to 
remain in the country and to help improve it (Oberabor).38 Especially since “Andrew” 
subsequently became an informal nickname for Nigerians who hoped to “check out,” in 
the language of the films, Nwaubani’s Andrew clearly stands in for Kingsley’s peers who 
have left Nigeria for better opportunities overseas. Particularly with this context in mind, 
Andrew’s nationalism seems all the more superficial; he talks nonstop with “nationalistic 
fervor” until Kingsley “felt like tipping him over a cliff” (286). Shortly thereafter, 
however, when he realizes his passport has been stolen, Andrew’s “patriotism changed 
color. ‘This country is unbelievable!’” he exclaims (288). In contrast, Kingsley pooh-
poohs the theft, seeing Andrew as careless with his possessions (“‘Someone probably 
saw you putting it back into your pocket,’” Kingsley shrugs) (288). In this way, the novel 
portrays the “Andrews” of Kingsley’s generation as trapped in an outdated mentality and 
utterly unable to cope with the realities of present-day Nigeria. Neither leaving the 
country nor pursuing this type of zealous but superficial nationalism are real options for 
Kingsley, even though he likely faces comparable financial and professional frustrations 
to those that drove Andrew abroad—because he prioritizes family and wants to remain 
close to them. Indeed, unlike many of his fictional contemporaries (Adéèkó 12), Kingsley 
                                                 
38 Both Sefi Atta’s 2010 novel Swallow and Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie’s 2013 novel Americanah also 
contain references to this real historical campaign, which left a strong impression on those growing up in 
1980s Nigeria, as Atta (b. 1967), Nwaubani (b. 1976), and Adichie (b. 1977) all did (Atta Swallow 58; 
Adichie Americanah 234-235).  
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is committed to staying in Nigeria. In many other third generation novels, “Emigration to 
the United States saves protagonists painfully groping for tenable nationalist ways” 
(Adéèkó 23). Like Zilayefa and Boma, remaining within the contested geopolitical 
territory is key, though Kingsley does not risk his life in the same way that Agary’s and 
Habila’s characters do.39  
Although Kingsley does not embrace either his father’s or Andrew’s nationalisms, 
he does express his own form of patriotic nationalism. While angry about the theft of his 
passport, Andrew calls Nigeria “seriously fucked up.” In response, Kingsley thinks to 
himself, “No, this country was not fucked up. It was also not a place for idealizing and 
auld lang syne. Once you faced the harsh facts and learned to adapt, Nigeria became the 
most beautiful place in the world” (289). Here, Kingsley first critiques Andrew’s 
simplistic, vague criticism of Nigeria: “fucked up” is certainly a negative evaluation, but 
it is not one that can deal with any type of complexities or nuance. Kingsley further 
explains that Nigerians cannot expect their country to be as it was in “days long gone”; 
the historical moment for Paulinus’s ideals is over. Rather, understanding of Nigeria’s 
present-day circumstances is essential. As Kingsley argues, one must “adapt” and be 
willing to respond to contingencies, in this case anticipating crime before it happens by 
being savvy enough to keep one’s passport someplace more secure than a pocket. With a 
proper grasp of Nigeria’s realities, including the pervasiveness of crime, our protagonist 
concludes that his nation is “the most beautiful place in the world.” In this way, a 
simultaneously cynical and nuanced nationalism, characterized by its thread of 
criminality, guides Kingsley’s reaction toward the “Andrews” of his generation—those 
                                                 
39 Notably, Nwaubani is also unusual among her contemporaries for writing for a global audience from a 
home base in Lagos. She is the first contemporary African writer to have obtained an international book 
deal—with the New York-based Hyperion—while residing primarily in her home country (Dada). 
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who would leave Nigeria behind and expect it to remain as it was in some idealized 
vision of the past. The international airport—most likely Lagos’s Murtala Muhammed 
International Airport—thus becomes a “site where very different views of the nation 
contest and negotiate with each other” (Duara 2). I return to a this tension over diasporic 
Nigerians’ nationalism in Chapter 3.  
Elsewhere in the novel, Kingsley experiences another moment of patriotic 
nationalism when a North American scam target tells one of Kingsley’s colleagues to 
“watch out for diseases, especially HIV” in Nigeria, on the basis that “almost all of them 
[Nigerians] have got it” (191). Incensed by the lazy stereotype, Kingsley says, “All of us 
standing around the screen stopped giggling. In the ensuing silence, I could almost hear 
the whisperings of the National Pledge” (191). The 419ers who had been delighted to 
laugh at the American’s ignorance mere moments earlier are suddenly sobered, and the 
text correspondingly shifts in tone, as they all share a silent moment of patriotism. When 
someone informs the target, “‘It’s not like that in Nigeria […] It’s in South Africa that 
they’ve got it so bad,’” he replies with disinterest, “‘All them places are all the same 
thing to me’” (192). In response, Kingsley departs to send another 419 email with a 
stronger sense of urgency, as if to penalize Nigeria’s critics and particularly those who 
would deny its specificity (192). Here, 419 becomes a means for the protagonist to feel 
empowered in the face of the North American’s utter lack of concern for his nation. The 
fact that a whole group of Nigerian 419ers participates in this scene particularly 
underscores an image of a community working together to take action against this 
damaging ignorance. I Do Not Come to You thus warns against assumptions about 
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Nigerian (and African) disease even while welcoming assumptions about Nigerians as 
criminals.  
Kingsley’s version of nationalism, then, embraces criminality as an integral 
component. While the fading nationalism of his parents’ generation led to financial and 
medical tragedy, and the simplistic nationalism of his expat peers lacks any grasp of the 
country’s present realities, Kingsley’s nationalism becomes for him a guiding principle 
that helps him cope with his financial hardship and gives him a sense that he can disrupt, 
at least at an individual level, the global inequalities and ignorance that have put his 
country at a disadvantage.  
 
KINGSLEY ON RELIGION, ETHNICITY, AND FAMILY 
 Before he reaches the decision to depart from his father’s virtuous moral scheme 
and become a 419 scammer, however, Kingsley spends much of the novel questing for a 
source of community that can provide emotional support and solutions to his family’s 
financial struggles. His ideological commitment to his family—his sole inheritance from 
Paulinus—also drives this search. He considers religion, ethnicity, and family as potential 
networks that might help to support his multilayered national commitment. Early in the 
novel, frustrated by the limitations of his father’s philosophy, and intrigued by his Aunty 
Dimma’s newfound sense of belonging within her church, Kingsley attends a Pentecostal 
service (58). He grew up attending a Catholic church, but in adulthood he does not return 
to the church with which he is familiar. Rather, he is interested in investigating this new 
religious community that has such a pull on many of those around him.  
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 As in many other places around the world, religion has historically been a major 
source both of group identity and of division within Nigeria. The country has comparably 
sized Muslim and Christian populations (about ninety million each), with Islam 
predominant in the North and Christianity in the South (Paden 2). Many Nigerians 
practice indigenous religions as well, adding to the variety and complexity of these 
religious communities (Paden 7). While Islam grows in the North in both moderate and 
extremist camps, Christian Pentecostal churches have sprung up throughout the South.40 
Pentecostalism first took root in Nigeria in the 1970s, but it grew rapidly around the turn 
of the millennium, when Kingsley decides to investigate what it has to offer (Marshall 2). 
By 2009, Pentecostalism was arguably “the single most important sociocultural force in 
southern Nigeria,” particularly because it “deliberately” offered a response to the types of 
perceived political failures that frustrate Kingsley (Marshall 2, 3). Interestingly, 
Pentecostal churches are also more tied to global networks than are other Christian 
denominations in Nigeria, thanks to connections with US-based televangelists, for 
example (Meyer 448). As a result, if Kingsley were to commit to participation in a 
Pentecostal church, he would also be drawn into a type of global community very 
different from, for example, the 419 network that enables and is enabled by his 
communication with fellow 419ers and scam targets globally.  
Though the novel pokes fun at religion, it nonetheless depicts it as a real source of 
community for some people. During the service, Kingsley notes, “All over the hall, men 
and women, boys and girls, were engrossed in cheerful handshakes and happy hugs and 
merry verbal exchanges” (61). He thus depicts the church as a place where Nigerians of 
                                                 
40 Nwaubani’s fellow third generation writers Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie and Ayo Sogunro both address 
this trend in Purple Hibiscus (2003) and “The Apotheosis of Bishop Okikiola” (2013), respectively. 
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all ages and genders can come together in a joyful setting—“cheerful,” “happy,” and 
“merry” all emphasize a positive shared spirit. While the text quite obviously pokes fun 
of the congregants (the woman next to Kingsley eats a meat pie while making “soft, 
mushy sounds like footsteps on a soggy carpet”), it conveys a genuineness within their 
community (61). Clearly, for many people, the Pentecostal church—the only religious 
group that the novel examines up close—serves as the basis for a meaningful, positive 
community.  
After just one service, however, Kingsley decides that religion will not really help 
him—and thus the novels ends its brief exploration of religious community. Kingsley 
promptly rejects religion on the basis of its impracticality for his immediate purposes. 
When the preacher directs the congregation to focus on Jesus and to forget about such 
worldly aspirations as money, Kingsley is appalled. He wonders, “Did this holy man 
really know what he was talking about? My family was almost destitute” (65). Here, 
Kingsley makes clear that, given his struggle, he is looking for a community for practical, 
primarily financial reasons, in contrast with Dimma, who joins because of her spiritual 
anxiety about her multiple narrow evasions of death. Focused on his goals, Kingsley 
stops pursuing religion as a source of answers or help for his particular problems.  
In contrast, ethnicity takes on a role in Kingsley’s world that is relevant—
Kingsley, his family, and his 419 colleagues all identify as Igbo—but it is largely 
relegated to the background of the novel. With regard to her own identity, Nwaubani sees 
ethnic, national, and pan-African affiliations as coexisting. In an interview where she was 
asked if she felt “more Nigerian than Igbo” or “more African than Nigerian,” the author 
identified herself as equally “Igbo,” “Nigerian,” “an African,” and “God’s creation,” but 
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also emphasized her patriotism for Nigeria (“Chance Happenings”). Nwaubani’s 
portrayal of ethnicity as relevant but not primary is evocative of a stance toward which 
others of her generation have also gestured, as Sefi Atta has on multiple occasions 
(“Many Nigerian writers I meet feel that they are Yoruba, Igbo, or something else, but I 
actually feel Nigerian and it comes out in my writing”) (Atta “Interview” 123).  
Historically, however, and for a variety of reasons, ethnicity has been perhaps 
most significant of all Nigerian identity categories. Due in no small part to Nigeria’s 
exceptional ethnic diversity, interethnic conflict has, for example, lain at the heart of the 
catastrophic Nigeria-Biafra War (1967-1970), the country’s notorious series of military 
coups, and separatist violence that has continued and even escalated in the twenty-first 
century. To be sure, some of these conflicts have arguably been more about interregional 
or interreligious tensions—or even about individual power grabs—but they have all at 
least occurred in the name of ethnicity. In the 1980s, Achebe emphasized the primacy of 
ethnicity (in his usage, “tribe”) in Nigerian life: “Nothing in Nigeria’s political history 
captures her problem of national integration more graphically than the chequered fortune 
of the word tribe in her vocabulary” (The Trouble 5). This representative formulation 
emphasizes that ethnic lines formed, at least from the perspective of many older 
Nigerians, the primary obstacle to cohesive Nigerian nationalism. Interestingly, the 
Library of Congress subject headings on I Do Not Come to You by Chance’s copyright 
page imply that the novel prioritizes ethnicity, as they begin with, “Igbo (African 
people)—Fiction.” This detail seems to say more about non-African assumptions—and 
perhaps especially about the stereotype of 419ers as ethnically Igbo (Kperogi and Duhé 
276)—than it does about the novel’s actual priorities.  
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In any case, Kingsley’s relaxed attitude toward ethnicity becomes clear in one of 
his conversations with his younger sister, Charity. When Charity tells Kingsley about her 
plans for marriage, she points out to the unpersuaded Kingsley that her fiancé, Johnny, is 
also Igbo. She makes sure to include this fact in the relatively small amount of 
information that she chooses to convey to her brother, so she clearly knows that Johnny’s 
ethnicity is a significant factor in obtaining Kingsley’s approval. Later, Kingsley reflects, 
“Naturally, I would not want my sister to marry someone who was not Igbo, but right 
now, that was the least of my concerns” (316). His reaction here indicates that ethnicity is 
an essential factor in his consideration: the word “Naturally” evokes the idea that the 
desire for a relative to marry a member of the same ethnic group is innate, as if Kingsley 
were born with this desire, as well as the idea that this preference is part of a usual 
custom (“naturally, adv.”). Also noteworthy is that Kingsley’s framing of ethnicity is 
exclusionary of non-Igbo people, rather than inclusive of Igbo people: he says that he 
“would not” want “someone who was not Igbo” in his family (emphasis mine), rather 
than saying that he would affirmatively want Charity to marry someone who was Igbo. 
This phrasing suggests that Kingsley’s primary interest lies in keeping away outsiders, 
rather than maintaining a particular community.  
All that said, despite Kingsley’s feelings here, the place of ethnicity is not his 
primary focus; he says, “that was the least of my concerns.” Here, the place of ethnicity 
takes a backseat to Kingsley’s concerns about the well-being of his family. At the time of 
Charity’s engagement announcement, Kingsley is coping with ongoing concerns about 
whether Boniface will be arrested. If he, too, someday goes to prison, Kingsley worries in 
the same passage that his siblings would wind up “Losing their source of life and 
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sustenance”—that is, himself as their breadwinner (316). Though the text is making fun 
of Kingsley’s sense of self-importance, he is nonetheless quite serious in this statement, 
since he really is supporting their entire family, as his father is deceased, his mother’s 
alterations shop is struggling, and his siblings are still in school. In this way, Kingsley 
prioritizes material support of his family (through 419) over concerns about Charity’s 
fiancé’s ethnicity. While ethnicity is still a factor he considers—giving it greater 
importance in his life than religion, for instance—it nonetheless falls decidedly behind 
his commitment to his family. 
Indeed, responsibilities to family clearly drive Nwaubani’s young protagonist. 
Again, in contrast to what Daniel Jordan Smith has argued, Nwaubani’s novel depicts the 
connections that propel and are in turn propelled by 419 not as individualistic or 
exclusively selfish, but rather as meaningful and substantive. Kingsley finds in family a 
sense of belonging and purpose, as well as a means of solving his immediate problems—
from Boniface’s financial assistance in up-front contributions to Paulinus’s medical care, 
to Boniface’s help with getting Kingsley plugged into the world of 419.  
Throughout, I Do Not Come to You makes clear that Kingsley is operating in a 
context where familial obligations reign. In the first part of the novel, when Kingsley and 
Augustina worry about how they will pay for Paulinus’s medical treatment, Dimma 
suggests asking Boniface for financial help. Although she knows that Paulinus despises 
Boniface’s way of life, Dimma says, “‘Other rich people build houses for their relatives 
and train their siblings’ children. […] One of my friends, her elder brother is paying for 
her daughter to do a master’s degree in London…almost ten thousand pounds. How can 
you people have a brother who’s so rich and you’re struggling like this?’” (103). Here, 
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Dimma evokes a general, apparently widespread practice (we don’t know exactly who 
these “Other rich people” are, but they seem numerous enough) of familial financial 
support in at least two arenas: home construction and education. Paulinus’s immediate 
problem is even more basic; while lodging and education are important, he will die if the 
family cannot gather enough money to keep him in the hospital. Dimma also 
unknowingly foreshadows Boniface’s soon-to-be role in Kingsley’s life. While her 
phrase “train their siblings’ children” refers to traditional apprenticeships or tuition for 
formal education, as the example of the London master’s degree suggests, Boniface’s 
“training” of Kingsley as a 419er could also fall under this rubric. In any case, given the 
context of familial support that Dimma cites, she cannot understand how “you people” 
(Kingsley and Augustina, and perhaps anyone who upholds Paulinus’s outdated ideals) 
can continue to refuse to participate in a family network that will only help them. 
Dimma’s assertion here thus emphasizes the salience of kinship ties, with Kingsley and 
Augustina as foolhardy for not relying on this network, especially when the stakes are so 
high (Dimma adds, “‘We’re talking about Paulinus’s life here’” (104)). Dimma thus 
portrays kinship support systems as absolutely the norm. The novel makes clear that we 
should take her points here seriously, as even the deeply ethical Augustina encourages 
Kingsley to reach out to Boniface after this conversation with Dimma.  
Even Boniface, deceptive and manipulative in most parts of his life, takes family 
obligations quite seriously. Although his ideas about “helping” Kingsley sometimes 
include obnoxious advice about his shoes and shirt being too ugly (114, 134), elsewhere 
Boniface’s familial commitment is sincere and deep. For example, when Kingsley 
expresses gratitude to Boniface for helping with Paulinus’s medical costs, Boniface reacts 
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“as if [Kingsley] had just looked him up and down and called him a blob of fat”; he 
responds, “‘Kings, what do you mean by thanking me? What do you mean by that? 
There’s no need for you to thank me for anything. When the eye weeps, the nose also 
weeps. After all, you’re my brother. We’re family’” (147). Here, the reader is supposed 
to laugh—the idea of calling someone “a blob of fat” is certainly entertaining—but also 
to take Boniface’s underlying sentiment seriously. The “blob of fat” simile indicates that 
Boniface is actually offended by Kingsley’s gratitude, as if his nephew’s intended thanks 
were an insult (being called “a blob of fat”). This particular comparison also suggests that 
Boniface feels that Kingsley sees him as if he had unlimited resources (“fat”) that he 
shared indiscriminately (like a mindless “blob”), rather than thoughtfully with deserving 
relatives. Later, Boniface’s metaphor about the eye and nose weeping also emphasize that 
he views Kingsley as part of the same, interconnected family system; Kingsley’s 
suffering as the eye necessarily entails Boniface’s suffering as the nose, so Boniface will 
necessarily want to help address the eye’s weeping.  
In addition, by calling Kingsley his “brother” when he is actually his half-nephew, 
Boniface emphasizes the closeness of their relationship and minimizes the importance of 
measuring the exact degree of a family relationship in order to determine one’s 
generosity. Regardless of how much DNA they share, Boniface implies, Kingsley is part 
of his family and no less deserving of help than a technically closer relative.41 That 
Augustina is Boniface’s much older half-sister, with whom he spent almost none of his 
                                                 
41 In anthropology, Hamilton’s rule suggests that altruism in kinship networks largely depends on genetic 
relationships; the preservation of the maximum percentage of one’s genetic material is a guiding principle 
in decision-making. For example, a soldier would in this paradigm not risk his life to save one brother, who 
statistically would only carry about half of the first soldier’s DNA, but would do so to save three brothers 
(Cox and Fafchamps 3759-3760). Although Boniface does not risk his life with any of his financial 
contributions, he nonetheless gives willingly to support Paulinus, with whom he shares no DNA, and 
repeatedly helps Kingsley, with whom he shares approximately an eighth of his DNA—all indicating a 
broad, inclusive conception of family.  
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formative years, is no deterrent. This blurring of distinctions also helps to contribute to 
the type of family network that the novel depicts—one in which all family members 
mutually support one another. Finally, Boniface’s giving while expecting nothing in 
return constitutes, in anthropological terms, “pure altruism”—not exactly a phrase that 
most observers would associate with 419ers, but which is nonetheless the case in 
Boniface’s treatment of family (Cox and Fafchamps 3722-3723). Not only does his 
commitment to his family—and all of his family—endure alongside his 419 endeavors, 
but it is also strengthened by them. While almost everything that Boniface does in the 
novel is motivated by greed, his generosity with family and immediate community 
consistently lacks any perceptible selfish motive.  
With these kinship systems as backdrop, Kingsley also struggles to play his own 
role as the opara, the oldest son in the family and the “symbol of family authority” 
(Nwokocha 220). As Oluwole Coker notes in his analysis of the novel, the role of the 
opara is specifically grounded in Igbo practices (46), reminding us that these varied 
affiliations are never quite separable from one another. This role offers both perks and 
responsibilities, as Kingsley gets the best portion in family meals but also struggles to 
care for his aging parents and significantly younger siblings. Indeed, as Shalini 
Nadaswaran has noted, the pressures of fulfilling his prescribed role as opara contribute 
to Kingsley’s decision to get involved in 419 schemes. Struggling to shoulder his 
family’s tremendous financial burdens, Kingsley is desperate to earn lots of money 
quickly (Nadaswaran 387). Moreover, obtaining money through 419 scams helps 
Kingsley to feel he has fulfilled his role. When he starts to receive money from 
Mirabelle, his first 419 victim, he says that for the first time, “I felt like a real opara” 
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(182). This quote indicates that committing this type of crime actually does help Kingsley 
function as opara—he finally feels like he has begun to do his part only when he begins 
to reap the rewards of his scams. In this way, the novel depicts Kingsley as seeking out 
crime in order to complete his traditional responsibilities, since he can find no feasible 
ethical or legal option. The fact that his commitment to his family motivates his criminal 
activity particularly undermines Igwe’s and Smith’s assertions about 419 being driven by 
individual greed.  
In fact, I would further, continuing to engage in 419 only increases Kingsley’s 
commitment to his role as opara. As he proceeds, Kingsley starts to feel some guilt about 
the impact on his victims. He speaks with Boniface, who reminds him that family is his 
reason for pursuing 419. While underlying factors are certainly present—larger economic 
and political issues serve as obstacles to Kingsley’s getting a job as a chemical 
engineer—they are not the immediate factor that pushes Kingsley into 419. More 
specifically, Boniface creates a binary to convince Kingsley that he must choose between 
the victims’ suffering and his family’s suffering—if there is no other means to support his 
family, as the novel seems to suggest, then robbing scam targets is the only option. 
Finally persuaded, Kingsley reflects, using his uncle’s pompous 419 nickname, “Cash 
Daddy was right. Not being able to take care of my family was the real sin. Gradually, I 
had learnt to take my mind off the mugus and focus on the things that really mattered” 
(185). Here, Kingsley agrees with Boniface that he has been compelled to choose the 
lesser of two evils. Worrying about the victims, whom he does not even know personally, 
must take a backseat to “the things that really mattered”—his family. The more involved 
he gets in 419, the more he feels compelled to remind himself of this philosophy, which 
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in turn makes him all the more committed he becomes to his role as opara. While the 
novel is not sincerely asking us to believe that Boniface’s justification is valid, it is still 
highlighting the complex web of family loyalties, global imbalances, and criminality that 
is at play.  
Moreover, Kingsley’s eventual financial gain from 419 does not make him into an 
isolated criminal, but rather helps him to maintain and strengthen these networks. His 
relationship with Augustina most clearly illustrates this point. When Kingsley first gets 
involved in fraud, Augustina becomes increasingly upset with his fraudulent behavior, 
and their conflict escalates to the point that she threatens never to visit him again. 
Distraught over his declining relationship with his mother, Kingsley actually delves 
further into 419, becomes a kingpin (though one less ostentatious than Boniface), and 
opens a chain of cybercafés that provide a front for his continuing scams. With this 
apparently honest profession of café management as his cover story, Kingsley mends his 
relationship with the delighted Augustina. The text describes her pride for the son she 
believes to have completely reformed: “That was something Augustina loved about her 
son: Family always came first” (399). Ironically, Augustina is not exactly wrong here—
Kingsley’s prioritization of family is what led him into 419 in the first place, and his 
desire to maintain a strong bond with her led him further into 419, such that he both 
needed to and could afford to operate a cover business in order to please his mother (and 
to deceive authorities). Perhaps, too, Augustina’s obliviousness here suggests a 
comparable obliviousness on the part of some older, more idealistic Nigerians, who 
might, like Augustina, remain unaware of the criminality so pervasive in Kingsley’s 
world. In any case, the novel shows that Kingsley’s commitment to family strongly 
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reinforces his pursuit of 419 (as he needs money to support them and a cover story to 
appease them).  
In sum, then, family ties drive both Boniface and Kingsley in I Do Not Come to 
You; in contrast with what Smith has argued, Kingsley is not operating outside traditional 
networks. To the contrary, the Kingsley’s commitment to his role as the family’s opara 
largely motivates his decision to pursue 419 schemes, and at the same time, his profits 
from 419 enable him to support his family and strengthen that network. In this way, 
criminality proves inextricable from Kingsley’s intertwined familial and national 
affiliations.  
 
419 IN THE WORLD 
In addition to the more localized networks it explores, I Do Not Come to You also 
engages with 419’s context within a larger system of global inequality and corruption. 
Evoking this international dynamic, Boniface questions his apprentice Kingsley: “‘You, 
you went to school. Did they not teach you about slave trade? […] Who were the people 
behind it? And all the things they stole from Africa, have they paid us back?’” (185). 
Here, the 419 kingpin is responding with rhetorical questions to Kingsley’s expression of 
guilt over a particular victim. Boniface lumps all individual victims in with a larger 
community, responsible for atrocities against Africans and many others around the world. 
While the individual woman whom Kingsley frets over is not immediately responsible for 
slavery or theft from Africa, her community—North Americans—certainly are, and do 
continue to benefit from their nation’s imperialism. In this way, Boniface forces a 
generalization rather than permitting Kingsley’s specific question. Similarly, when he 
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says “us” (“have they paid us back”), he does not mean himself or Kingsley 
specifically—as neither of them have been forced into slavery or directly robbed by 
others—but rather, his “us” refers to Africans more generally. Moreover, “all the things 
they stole” also utilizes nonspecific terms; an informed reader will know that Boniface is 
referencing the theft of resources via colonial exploitation. He does so primarily to get 
Kingsley’s mind off the particular victim he is worrying about and convince Kingsley to 
continue his involvement in 419. As a result, though, this picture is one of overarching 
historical and geopolitical dynamics, and primarily about Euro-Americans’ historical 
wrongdoing. Moreover, Boniface implies that successful 419 schemes will help achieve 
some larger historical justice. Euro-Americans (“they”) have not yet repaid Africans 
(“us”) for imperialist pillaging of resources and human lives, so in Boniface’s paradigm, 
419 is facilitating that long-due repayment.  
Boniface’s rationale here satirizes an oft-cited claim among 419ers that their scam 
profits serve as fair recompense for Euro-American imperialism.42 As one online 
commenter noted, for instance, “I don’t realy call it cheating … Some body has to pay 
what we call retribution From what Africa went through during the Slave trade era … 
The west took all our resourses, Manpower, and our cultural and traditional wares … 
Some body will pay some how what your lineage owed [sic]” (qtd. in Rosenbaum). 
Shortly after Boniface makes his comparable claim, he critiques Kingsley in a humorous 
way that underscores that the scene should be read as satirical: “‘Your attitude is not 
money-friendly at all. If you continue talking like this, soon, whenever money sees you 
coming into a room, it will just jump out through the window’” (185). Boniface’s 
                                                 
42 In one famous case in the 1990s, for example, one of a series of self-styled “black Robin Hoods,” Fred 
Ajudua, held that the greater frauds at play were the histories of slavery and colonialism (Glickman 478). 
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amusing turn of phrase returns the conversation to his real focus—money—instead of the 
historical justice he claims to be seeking. In this way, the text emphasizes that Boniface is 
not particularly committed to these larger ethical matters. Rather, he is trying out a 
standard 419 justification on his nephew, trying to persuade his protégé to stay in what 
has recently become the family business. Although I Do Not Come to You is not actually 
trying to convince the reader of Boniface’s rationale, it is nonetheless serving as a 
reminder that such justifications are indeed prevalent in the world of 419, as the idea of 
righting historical wrongs is indeed part of the ideology that propels the scams.  
Another play on global dynamics has to do with the idea that people in the global 
north are foolish, while those in the global south are more clever—a reversal of dominant 
narratives about the global north’s economic prosperity deriving from its citizens’ 
superior intellectual merit. In another tutorial-like session with Kingsley, Boniface 
identifies the countries of potential victims—places with high “level of mugu,” where the 
people are not “as smart as we are”: “‘There are mugus in America, Britain, Germany, 
Russia, Argentina, France, Brazil, Switzerland, Spain, Australia, Canada, Japan, 
Belgium, New Zealand, Italy, Netherlands, Denmark, Norway,’” and “‘Even Israel’” 
(365). Boniface diligently includes countries from every inhabited continent except for 
Africa: eleven in Europe, two in North America, two in Asia, two in Oceania, and two in 
South America. Many of these countries have historically been major imperialist 
powers.43 In 2009, at the time of the novel’s publication, all of the countries on the list 
                                                 
43 Some of these countries stole directly from Africa (like France and Belgium), while others did not (like 
New Zealand and Norway). The extent of imperial activity differs greatly among these countries—the 
British empire is far more notorious than Brazilian regional imperialism—and the historical periods of their 
imperialism also varies tremendously, from early Dutch ventures beginning in the sixteenth century to 
Israel’s twentieth- and twenty-first-century endeavors. In some cases, like that of Switzerland, the country’s 
government was never officially a colonial power, but many of its citizens were involved in imperial 
enterprises like slavery (Hollenstein). Moreover, some of these countries competed with one another in 
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except New Zealand and Israel boasted one of the thirty-one largest economies in the 
world, and nine were in the top ten (“2000 and 2009 GDP Estimates”). Boniface’s 
depiction of a geopolitical community of “mugus,” waiting to be exploited by 419ers in 
the way that the one-time imperialists exploited Africans and many others, pits clever 
Nigerians and others from the global south against ignorant people in the global north. 
Again, while the texts invites us to be amused by Boniface’s picture, it also wants us to 
take seriously the notion that 419 enables at least an imaginary of some means of 
addressing global imbalances. In the way that crimes of imperialism created the wealth of 
the global north, the novel suggests, so might cybercrime do something similar on a 
smaller scale for Nigerians.  
The novel also plays up this idea through the scam targets’ names. In addition to 
Winterbottom, discussed earlier, other targets include Edgar Hooverson, a reference to 
former FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover; Condoleezza, a reference to former U.S. Secretary 
of State Condoleezza Rice; and Mirabelle Winfrey, a reference to television show host, 
businessperson, and billionaire Oprah Winfrey. By giving its most foolhardy, 
unsympathetic characters these names, I Do Not Come to You reimagines some of the 
historically most powerful Americans as dupes of Nigerian advance fee fraudsters 
operating out of Lagos cybercafés, reiterating a depiction of national criminality as 
empowering for Nigerians despite uneven global dynamics.  
A particularly humorous example that illustrates how 419 letters benefit from 
non-Africans’ ignorance—in the way that real-life 419ers also take advantage of others’ 
                                                                                                                                                 
their colonial efforts; in the sixteenth century, Denmark took Norway’s colonial holdings, and in the 1980s, 
Britain and Argentina fought over possession of the Falkland Islands (las Islas Malvinas). Despite the 
complexity and apparently thoroughness of Boniface’s list, however, some countries are conspicuously 
missing: Portugal’s absence is particularly striking, given its role as an early imperial power, the first site of 
the Atlantic slave trade, and colonizer of Africa, South America, and Asia. 
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lack of knowledge—occurs somewhat early in the novel, when Kingsley first visits 
Boniface. Kingsley comes across a 419 letter in his uncle’s fax machine. The message, 
signed by a Professor Ignatius Soyinka, details the plight of Air Vice Marshal Ojukwu, 
stranded in outer space since 1989. Apparently, when his Soviet co-astronauts returned to 
earth, poor AVM Ojukwu—as “a black man from a Third World country”—had to 
sacrifice his spot on the flight to cargo, “which the Soviet Union authorities insisted was 
too valuable to be left behind” (122-123). This letter, designed both to convince and to 
mock its targets, contains several absurdities. First, of course, is that the name “Professor 
Soyinka” should be widely recognizable, as globally renowned Nigerian writer Wole 
Soyinka was the first African to win the Nobel Prize in Literature and remains a major 
voice on the world stage. The name “Ojukwu” would also be a red flag to anyone with 
any familiarity with Nigerian history, since Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu led 
secessionist Biafra in the Nigeria-Biafra War (1967-1970), which captured the world’s 
attention with horrific photographs of starving children. Clearly, though, international 
memory of the tragedy was fleeting, if Boniface can convince his audience with such a 
letter. Finally, the idea of someone being stranded in space for twenty years (all the while 
remaining “in good spirits”) should be particularly hard to swallow, but apparently the 
detail that the Soviets chose their cargo over “a black man from a Third World country” 
provides sufficient rationale for Boniface’s target; the idea of whites choosing material 
goods over the life of a Nigerian is, horrifyingly, reasonable enough to some of 
Boniface’s audience. Boniface, a representative 419er, thus derives both amusement and 
financial reward from non-Africans’ ignorance of Nigeria.  
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In these ways, the novel casts criminality as a means of empowering Nigerians 
within an imbalanced global economic and political order. Boniface and his associates 
take advantage of the global north’s ignorance, using it to claim money and greater 
dignity for themselves, in contrast with Paulinus’s dignity being lost to lofty ideals. When 
Boniface describes the extent of Euro-Americans’ ignorance to Kingsley, the latter 
realizes, “It was my turn to laugh” (228). This line reflects Boniface’s, Kingsley’s, and 
even Nwaubani’s strategies in telling their various stories. While Boniface and Kingsley 
are laughing at their victims’ foolishness, Nwaubani is engaging in some reversals of her 
own with names like Winterbottom and Condoleezza, and offering international readers 
an unprecedented, humorously framed take on a serious matter in contemporary Nigeria.  
 
NWAUBANI’S YAHOOZE GENERATION 
By giving the rising 419 kingpin Kingsley a “turn to laugh,” I Do Not Come to 
You by Chance distinguishes Nwaubani’s take on the advance fee fraud phenomenon. 
Treating the fraudulent email schemes as humorous lets the novel frame them as 
empowering for regular Nigerians. Unlike siphoning oil or the other everyday forms of 
resistance that comprise Zilayefa’s and Boma’s limited options, 419 becomes extremely 
lucrative for Kingsley. With the exception of his unfortunate colleague Azuka, who 
disappears after traveling to Iran to pursue one of his targets, I Do Not Come to You 
focuses on all of the ostensible benefits and few of the consequences of 419 scams (365). 
This emphasis also separates the novel from most other writing on 419, which tends to 
explore the impact on victims, from Igwe’s and Smith’s concern for its limitations on 
other Nigerians’ opportunities, to Beukes’s reference to the exploitation of others’ 
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suffering throughout Africa, to countless articles that detail the financial and personal 
losses of victims around the world. Moreover, the forgeries continue to multiply both 
within Nigeria and elsewhere throughout the world, continuing to implicate and 
potentially endanger communities around the globe. Worth keeping in mind, then, is that 
Nwaubani’s novel’s empowerment of Kingsley through 419 risks obscuring the 
consequences for others in Nigeria and beyond—the schemes’ impact on global injustices 
is not as straightforward as Boniface’s strident assertions might suggest. His particular 
strain of narrow nationalism concerns itself with his family and with the image of Nigeria 
as a whole, but somewhat paradoxically, it leaves some groups of Nigerians pitted against 
one another. Moreover, embracing the status quo seems possible only with a certain type 
of privilege: Kingsley has access to essential connections and strategies within the 419 
industry only due to his relationship to Boniface.  
Among the most significant contributions of I Do Not Come to You, though, is the 
way in which it traces corruption within the Nigerian national fabric, ensuring that 
Kingsley pursues 419 even after Boniface’s gruesome murder. Indeed, state corruption 
appears in Nwaubani’s novel, recast, in everyday Nigerians’ criminality in an “infinite 
regress” of representations and fictions (Comaroff and Comaroff 15). More than a bridge 
for the gaps in government infrastructure, 419 becomes part of all aspects of Nigerian 
life—and the Andrews, the text suggest, will have to learn to “adapt” (289). Yet, the 
novel does not go so far as to suggest that criminality is quite necessary for survival; 
though Paulinus’s ethical commitments contribute to his death, we still see other 
characters—including the conspicuously named Merit—who survive without resort to 
criminal pursuits (383 As Oluwole Coker notes in his analysis of the novel, the role of the 
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opara is specifically grounded in Igbo practices (46), reminding us that these varied 
affiliations are never quite separable from one another.).  
In any case, I Do Not Come to You ultimately argues that, with a median age of 
just 18.2 years old, Nigeria must begin to address the challenges faced by its youngest 
generations (“Median Age”). The novel makes clear that Kingsley encounters limited 
options and faces a problematic impasse: the unquestioning commitment of his childhood 
role model, Paulinus, to his civil service job and the nation-state eventually leads to his 
death from preventable illness, but the political aspirations of his adulthood role model, 
Boniface, leads to his murder. Navigating the demands of his role as opara is a 
challenging but non-negotiable endeavor for Kingsley. That he sees 419 as his best bet, 
even after Boniface’s death, suggests both a profound commitment to supporting his 
family and tremendous frustration with the limited options available to educated 
members of his generation. While I Do Not Come to You deploys humor throughout, it is 
nonetheless quite serious in its concern for the predicament of young Nigerians.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3: “Checkin’ In”: Diasporic Networks and Return Migration 
in Sefi Atta’s A Bit of Difference and  
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Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie’s Americanah 
 
“I can’t believe you’re going back to Nigeria.” 
“I’m going home.”  
“But you’ve been here so long.”  
“I’m not getting anywhere, Tess.”  
“But you never said.” 
“Because you wouldn’t understand.”   
 
—A Bit of Difference 
 
 
“Everyone she had told she was moving back seemed  
surprised, expecting an explanation, and when she said she  
was doing it because she wanted to, puzzled lines would  
appear on their foreheads.” 
 
    —Americanah  
 
 Sefi Atta’s A Bit of Difference (2012) and Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie’s 
Americanah (2013) both culminate with their Nigerian-born protagonists’ decisions to 
leave the countries where they have lived for many years to return “home.” Unlike the 
Andrews of Nigeria’s 1980s propaganda campaign or Nwaubani’s I Do Not Come to You 
by Chance, the main characters of these novels choose to return to Nigeria permanently, 
despite the fact that they have achieved ostensible success overseas: Atta’s Deola works 
as a London-based auditor for an international charity foundation, and Adichie’s Ifemelu 
is a popular blogger posting from the northeastern United States. Knowing that Deola and 
Ifemelu can afford to stay abroad, the characters’ friends and families are shocked by 
their voluntary returns. Underlying their astonishment is the assumption that life in the 
United Kingdom or the United States must be inherently preferable, and a return to 
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Nigeria could only result from failure overseas—a successful life cannot, according to 
this narrative, conclude in Nigeria.  
As the epigraph indicates, when A Bit of Difference’s thirty-nine-year-old Deola 
Bello informs her best friend from British boarding school, Tessa Muir, about her 
impending move, the latter cannot wrap her mind around her friend’s decision. Born to an 
Italian mother and a Scottish father, reared in the United Kingdom, and engaged to an 
Australian, Tessa considers herself beyond—and above—national or racial affiliation 
(45, 40, 42, 43). The excerpt in the epigraph illustrates the disparity between Tessa’s and 
Deola’s perspectives on Deola’s return to Nigeria, as the six lines of dialogue offer two 
contrasting interpretations of each of three aspects of Deola’s experiences. First, the 
exchange frames the decision in geographic terms: where Tessa sees her friend as “going 
back,” Deola sees herself as “going home.” Tessa’s phrasing casts Deola’s return as an 
unnecessary and undesirable shift backward in Deola’s narrative, whereas Deola’s word 
“home” makes the move seem like the logical conclusion to her story. Then, taking up 
another line of argument, Tessa argues that remaining “here” (in the UK) for a long 
period of time is an encouraging consistency, but Deola reads the same fact as a 
problematic stasis, preventing her from “getting anywhere.” That is, Tessa sees life in the 
UK as the ideal conclusion to anyone’s story, but Deola does not see it as a site for her 
own conclusion. As I discuss later, Deola’s frustrated professional path plays a major role 
in contributing to her feeling of inertia. Finally, the friends reveal their disparate 
interpretations of Deola’s decision not to give Tessa advance warning of her decision. 
Where Tessa, as a longtime friend, feels she is entitled to know about Deola’s move, 
Deola keeps the secret because she knows her friend will be unable to relate to the 
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decision. Despite their longtime friendship, Deola feels that she and Tessa cannot truly 
relate—that her white, cosmopolitan friend cannot grasp her desire for retrieving a sense 
of nationally specific belonging. Seemingly proving Deola right, throughout the dialogue, 
rather than trying to ask questions to understand Deola’s perspective, Tessa combats her 
friend’s words with almost childlike “buts,” attempting to change her mind. Instead of 
trying to understand an ending to Deola’s story beyond the one she had imagined, Tessa 
tries to make Deola fit into the narrative with which she is familiar. In this way, A Bit of 
Difference confirms Deola’s belief that pursuing a genuine exchange of ideas with even 
the most well-meaning British friend is ultimately futile.  
Similarly, in Americanah, when Ifemelu informs her friends and family of her 
decision to move back to Nigeria, they are all—except for one high school friend—
“surprised.” In context, the novel’s reader knows that “Everyone she had told” at least 
includes Blaine, Ifemelu’s longtime African American boyfriend; her Aunty Uju, who 
lives in Massachusetts; and her New Jersey-based hairdressers, who are from Mali and 
Senegal (13, 7, 14, 11). Those from Africa and the US alike are baffled by Ifemelu’s 
choice, suggesting that audiences on both continents view the US as inherently 
preferable. Knowing Ifemelu well, as both Uju and Blaine do, also does not diminish 
their shock. Like Tessa, Ifemelu’s friends and family “expect” specific reasons to justify 
her return, as if she owes them a list. Ifemelu’s stated desire to live in Nigeria does not fit 
with their assumptions about what an educated young woman like herself should want, 
and so, like Tessa, they remain speechless, only wrinkling their foreheads, rather than 
pursuing a substantive conversation about Ifemelu’s decision.  
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The basis for Tessa’s, Blaine’s, and others’ confusion lies partly in the scarcity of 
narratives of return migration, in fiction and in sociological studies alike. Indeed, in 
defying the societal expectations that accompany their professional successes, Deola and 
Ifemelu offer alternatives to dominant narratives of educated Nigerians—and other 
Africans—abandoning their countries amidst the “brain drain,” never to return or 
contribute to the places where they grew up. In reality, however, as anthropologist Ellen 
Oxfeld and human rights expert Lynellyn D. Long have recently shown, “Contrary to the 
widespread perception that people want to settle in their new homes, especially in 
wealthy Western countries, many refugees and migrants want to return eventually, and 
they lead their lives in the new home always hoping and/or planning for that eventuality” 
(2). Nonetheless, the phenomenon of return migration has received notably little 
scholarly attention. Experts have lamented, “Unfortunately, return migration has been 
largely disregarded in the migration literature” and, as recently as 2012—the year of A 
Bit of Difference’s publication—“Return migration is probably the most understudied 
aspect of international migration” (Oucho 58; Docquier and Rapoport 707). In an effort to 
advance the conversation in this arena, I follow up on Oxfeld and Long’s assertion that 
“Diaspora literature is an excellent starting point for analyzing different experiences of 
return” by offering an analysis of A Bit of Difference and Americanah (5). The novels 
invite such readings by foregrounding their atypical moves in depicting return migration, 
through dialogues like those excerpted for the epigraph as well as structurally, by raising 
the question of return early in the novel, though the protagonists do not return 
permanently until near the end.  
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As the chapter will detail, the ways in which A Bit of Difference and Americanah 
portray return migration offer a distinct dimension to the oft-cited transnational trend in 
third generation Nigerian literature44—partly because Deola and Ifemelu return to Lagos 
permanently, but also very much because of the highly localized networks that they favor 
over broad, diasporic possibilities. As discussed in the dissertation’s introduction, most 
scholarship has framed the transnational shift in one of two ways: either as a move away 
from the nationalist emphasis of previous generations, or as a complication of previous 
understandings of nationalism. Like Yellow-Yellow, Oil on Water, and I Do Not Come to 
You by Chance, A Bit of Difference and Americanah embrace forms of nationalism that 
are clearly distinct from earlier Nigerian writing, but they are not wholly disinterested in 
nationalism. I show in the chapter how, echoing their predecessors in Anglophone 
African novels from Chinua Achebe’s No Longer at Ease (1960) to Ama Ata Aidoo’s 
Our Sister Killjoy (1977), Deola and Ifemelu return at least partly in the hope of 
contributing to Nigeria, though operating from a more local level.  
In addition to participating in this (small) lineage of African return migration 
narratives, these novels also set themselves up against “Afropolitan” figures. Where self-
identified Afropolitan Taiye Selasi characterizes her fellow Afropolitans as “Africans of 
the world” for whom “home” is “many things,” both Deola and Ifemelu repeatedly 
identify Nigeria, and only Nigeria, as “home” (Selasi “Bye-Bye Babar”). Where the 
Afropolitan characters of Selasi’s novel Ghana Must Go (2013) remain “stateless” and in 
“limbo” (Bhutto), Atta’s and Adichie’s protagonists have Lagos as the clear endpoint of 
                                                 
44 The story of Nigerians and other Africans moving overseas has become ubiquitous, to the extent that 
recently Siyanda Mohutsiwa, a young writer of Motswana and Swazi descent who describes herself as 
“pan-Africanist by birth,” has declared that she is “over” African fiction set in “America. Or France. Or 
Britain” (Mohutsiwa “I’m Done with African Immigrant Literature”; Mohutsiwa “Is Africa’s Future 
Online?”). 
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their journeys. Significantly, although Selasi has specifically named Adichie as a fellow 
Afropolitan, Adichie has rejected the label for herself, instead identifying herself as 
“happily African” (Barber), much like the semi-autobiographical Ifemelu.  
Even beyond the work that their most recent novels do, however, Atta’s and 
Adichie’s biographies are decidedly transnational. Although the protagonists of their 
diaspora novels choose to make Nigeria their one and only home, Atta and Adichie each 
maintain homes in both Nigeria and the US. Born into an educated and politically 
connected family in 1964, Sefi Atta grew up the third of five children in Lagos’s affluent 
Ikoyi neighborhood (Owomoyela 81; “Sefi Atta (Nigeria)”; Atta “In Conversation”). Her 
paternal grandfather had been a traditional ruler among the Ebira,45 a minority ethnic 
group whose population is concentrated in western and central Nigeria; her father was 
head of the Nigerian civil service until his death from cancer in 1972; and her mother, of 
Yoruba descent, worked as a secretary for the United Nations (Owomoyela 81; “Ebira 
(Igbira)”). After attending preparatory school in Lagos, Atta continued her education in 
the UK, with boarding school and later, undergraduate studies at Birmingham University 
(Owomoyela 81). After graduating, Atta worked as an accountant for about fifteen years, 
first in the UK and then in the US, where she moved in 1994 with her husband and gave 
birth to their daughter (Owomoyela 81). Three years later, her family moved from New 
Jersey to Meridian, Mississippi, where Atta completed an online degree in creative 
writing and began to write full time (Owomoyela 81). The author’s official website states 
that she “divides her time between Nigeria, England and the United States,” but other 
sources make clear that the majority of her time is spent in Meridian, Mississippi, where 
                                                 
45 The spellings “Ebira,” “Igbira,” and “Igbirra” are used interchangeably. I use “Ebira” here because it is 
used most frequently in the scholarship I cite.  
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her husband works as a doctor and where she has taught at Mississippi State University 
and Meridian Community College (“About the Author”; “Dr. Olugboyega Ransome-
Kuti”; Owomoyela 81).  
Prior to A Bit of Difference, Atta published two novels, Everything Good Will 
Come (2004) and Swallow (2010); a short story collection, News from Home: Stories 
(2010) (published in Nigeria as Lawless and Other Stories46); and several plays for radio 
and stage (“About the Author”; “Plays”). Most of her work is set in Nigeria, although 
global contexts clearly shape her characters’ experiences. Swallow, for instance, focuses 
on two young Nigerian women’s struggle to decide whether to work as drug mules. The 
international drug trade thus serves as the backdrop to a story that takes place within 
Nigerian borders. The stories of News from Home are more overtly global in setting, 
taking place in various locations in West Africa, London, and the United States, and 
thereby anticipating the transnational scope of A Bit of Difference. Atta’s writing has 
earned her numerous accolades; in addition to being shortlisted for the Caine Prize in 
2006, her honors include the Wole Soyinka Prize for Literature in Africa (2006) and the 
NOMA Award for Publishing in Africa (2009) (“Awards”; Nkem-Eneanya). Atta’s work 
has been translated into several languages, but she continues to envision Nigerians as her 
“primary audience” (Atta Interview by Elena Rodríguez Murphy).  
As Atta has noted, she borrowed from her own biography in shaping A Bit of 
Difference protagonist Deola Bello’s experiences. Like her creator, Deola grows up in the 
                                                 
46 Each of the collection titles’ highlights an eponymous story in the collection. Notably, the collection title 
published in the US and the UK—News from Home—comes from a story set in New Jersey, whereas the 
collection title published in Nigeria—Lawless—comes from a story set in Lagos. Despite the book’s 
transnational scope, then, its publishers clearly foregrounded stories with settings more familiar to each 
audience. Moreover, News from Home sounds neutral in comparison to Lawless, a title that evokes 
criminality—perhaps a framing that publishers do not want to promote among Atta’s non-African 
readership. 
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wealthy Lagos suburb Ikoyi, attends the prep school Queen’s College in Lagos, moves to 
the UK in the 1980s for boarding school and university, and is trained as an accountant 
(“About the Author”; Atta A Bit 54, 31, 67, 88). In a 2013 interview, Atta explained her 
reasons for these similarities: “I put her in places I’d been on purpose, in Lagos, Abuja, 
Atlanta and London, to get a strong sense of place. We don’t have the same biography 
though, and I would not make the choices she makes or react as she does” (Atta “In 
Conversation”). While Deola’s and Atta’s stories do diverge in certain ways—their 
family structures, for example, are somewhat different—the numerous parallels in their 
trajectories nonetheless function to assert Atta’s own “Nigerianness” (in contrast to 
Afropolitanism) by leaving open the possibility that she too will move back someday, just 
as Deola does after many years overseas.  
As a resident of London, where Atta lived until 1994, Deola is constantly 
negotiating her position as a legal British citizen, a “Nigerian expatriate in London” (in 
her own words), and an auditor for an international charity organization (5). Set in the 
mid-2000s, most of the text focuses on Deola’s interactions with her co-workers, in both 
the UK and the US; her Nigerian-born friends Subu and Bandele, both longtime London 
residents who would never consider a permanent return to Nigeria; Tess, her boarding 
school best friend; her family members, who live in Lagos; and later, her love interest 
Wale, a widower and hotel manager she meets while visiting Nigeria. Most of the action 
takes place while Deola is thirty-nine, but the narrative includes several flashbacks to 
Deola’s childhood and young adult years. Over the course of the novel, Deola’s desire to 
make a permanent move back to Lagos grows. She cannot explain her reasons to her 
friends and colleagues in London—or, as she puts it, attributing the communication 
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failure to them, they “wouldn’t understand”—but at heart, she seeks to be surrounded by 
people with whom she has a “shared history” and to remove herself from the “racialism 
rubbish” she constantly encounters in the UK (205, 44, 195). Her return to Nigeria, then, 
is largely about a reclamation of dignity. At the same time, her unexpected pregnancy 
also strengthens her relationship with Wale, offering further incentive for her return.  
 Like Deola’s creator Atta, Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie was one of many 
children—the fifth of six—and benefited from growing up in an educated and well-
connected family (Tunca “Biography”). Where Atta’s parents were politically connected, 
Adichie’s parents enjoyed intellectual and literary connections. Adichie was born to Igbo 
parents in 1977 in Enugu (Tunca “Biography”). When she was very young, her family 
moved to Nsukka, where the family lived in the former home of literary giant Chinua 
Achebe. Both Adichie parents worked at the University of Nsukka, her mother as the 
institution’s first female registrar and her father as a statistics professor and administrator 
(Tunca “Biography”).  
In Nsukka, Adichie attended secondary school and began her university studies, 
but partway through, she moved to Philadelphia, and later Connecticut, to finish her 
bachelor’s (Tunca “Biography”). After earning a master’s degree from a prestigious 
creative writing program at Johns Hopkins, Adichie began to publish her fiction, 
including short stories that have appeared in publications including African short story 
collections, The Guardian, and The New Yorker (Tunca “Biography”; Tunca 
“Bibliography”). Interestingly, Adichie’s publication record bears substantial 
resemblance to Atta’s: prior to her diaspora novel (Americanah), like the senior author, 
Adichie wrote two novels, Purple Hibiscus (2003) and Half of a Yellow Sun (2006), as 
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well as a collection of short stories, The Thing Around Your Neck (2009). Continuing to 
parallel Atta’s literary career, Adichie’s first two novels were primarily set in Nigeria, 
while the short stories take place in Africa and the US. Of the twelve stories, five occur in 
the US, six in Nigeria, and one in South Africa. The Thing Around Your Neck thereby 
marked a shift from a focus primarily on Nigeria to a transnational scope, much like 
Atta’s News from Home. Adichie continues to divide her time between Lagos and 
Baltimore, although she has stated that she would live full-time in Lagos if her husband, a 
doctor, did not live and work in Baltimore (Brockes; “Chimamanda Adichie Warns”).  
Adichie is now known internationally as a literary figure, pop feminist leader, and 
even a cultural icon. Her writing has earned international and US awards including the 
Commonwealth Writers’ Prizes for Best Book (Africa) and Best Book (Overall), both for 
Purple Hibiscus; the Orange Broadband Prize for Half of a Yellow Sun; a MacArthur 
Foundation “genius” grant; and most recently, the National Book Critics Circle Award 
for Americanah (Tunca “Awards & Nominations”). Nigerian writer and filmmaker Biyi 
Bandele made Half of a Yellow Sun into a movie starring Academy Award winner 
Chiwetel Ejiofor and British Film Academy Award winner Thandie Newton, and rumors 
circulate that a film adaptation of Americanah will feature similarly prestigious actors, 
Academy Award winner Lupita Nyong’o and Golden Globe nominee David Oyelowo 
(“Half of a Yellow Sun (2013)”; “Chiwetel Ejiofor: Awards”; “Thandie Newton: 
Awards”; Stampler). Though the reception of Half of a Yellow Sun was mixed, and the 
filmic Americanah has yet to move forward, the celebrity of those involved reflects the 
global hype surrounding the productions. Reflecting her popularity as a public 
intellectual, Adichie has even been nominated for a Grammy with Beyoncé, whose song 
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“***Flawless” (2013) samples part of Adichie’s 2013 TED Talk “We Should All Be 
Feminists” (Ayomide). During March 2015, she was the subject of Vogue’s “Today I’m 
Wearing,” a recurring feature in which a particular celebrity shares and discusses their 
outfits each day for a month (“Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie: Today I’m Wearing”). 
Especially since Americanah’s publication, Adichie has clearly been prominent in the 
public eye in several arenas. In contrast with Atta’s target audience of fellow Nigerians, 
Adichie’s primary audience, at least for now, seems to be American and other non-
African Anglophone readers.  
Like A Bit of Difference, Americanah is the most autobiographical of its author’s 
major works to date. In Americanah, protagonist Ifemelu moves from Nsukka to the US 
to complete her university education, which had been slowed by ongoing faculty strikes 
under the Abacha regime. Echoing the trajectory of her creator, Ifemelu first moves to 
Philadelphia to pursue her bachelor’s; while Adichie moved to Connecticut to join an 
older sister, Ifemelu often visits Massachusetts to see her Aunty Uju, who is like an older 
sister figure, and later moves to Connecticut to live with her boyfriend Blaine; both 
author and character live in Baltimore for a time; and both hold fellowships at Princeton 
(Adichie Americanah 100; Schoettler; Adichie Americanah 143, 311; Tunca 
“Biography”; Adichie Americanah 208, 16). In addition, several of the novel’s anecdotes 
derive from Adichie’s experiences upon first moving to the US. One of Ifemelu’s blog 
posts, for instance, discusses the specificity of American racist tropes using the example 
of watermelon. Ifemelu writes, “In undergrad a white classmate asks if I like watermelon, 
I say yes, and another classmate says, Oh my God that is so racist, and I’m confused” 
(Americanah 222). Revealing the inspiration for this example, Adichie once told an NPR 
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interviewer about her confusion upon overhearing a white student make a comment about 
watermelon to an African American student (“‘Americanah’ Author”). Her reveal of this 
personal experience just one month after Americanah’s release draws a clear connection 
between her public persona and her protagonist, perhaps further laying claim to the 
author’s emphatically Nigerian, rather than Afropolitan, identity—much like the 
implications of the biographical similarities between Atta and Deola.  
Americanah’s main timeline traces its protagonist’s decision to move to Nigeria 
around the year 2009, but the text also includes many flashbacks to Ifemelu’s childhood, 
university years, and earlier years in the US, as well as to her longtime boyfriend 
Obinze’s attempt to immigrate to the UK. Fragments of Ifemelu’s blogs also appear 
interspersed throughout. Due to this structure, the reader only gradually learns that 
Ifemelu’s life in the US is bleak at first—desperate for money, she suffers a traumatic 
sexual encounter that leads her to distance herself from family and friends, most notably 
Obinze—but eventually, her romantic and professional lives improve, culminating in a 
relationship with a handsome Yale professor and a successful blog, Raceteenth or 
Various Observations About American Blacks (Those Formerly Known as Negroes) by a 
Non-American Black. Where Nwaubani’s Kingsley uses email to obfuscate and to spread 
stereotypes, Ifemelu attempts through her digital publications to improve cross-cultural 
communications and correct misunderstandings. Despite Ifemelu’s apparent successes, 
she decides to return to Nigeria, where she starts a new blog, The Small Redemptions of 
Lagos, and reconnects with Obinze—who has, in the meantime, moved to and been 
deported from the UK, gotten a job in Lagos, gotten married, and had a daughter. By the 
end of the novel, Ifemelu has lived the full Bildungsroman, returning from a stint 
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overseas, moving into her dream neighborhood in Lagos, maintaining a thriving blog, and 
reentering a relationship with the newly single Obinze.  
By focusing on Deola’s and Ifemelu’s decreasing interest in diasporic affiliations, 
their professional trajectories, and their decisions to move back to Lagos, the chapter 
explores how these seemingly transnationalist texts—both set on three continents, with 
leaps back and forth in time and space—are in fact about increasingly narrow 
nationalisms. I trace how both characters’ personal and professional networks overseas 
shrink over the course of each novel, culminating in their decisions to focus on highly 
localized commitments. Throughout this process, they express nostalgia for the days of 
pan-African solidarity, which they place squarely in the past, and critique Afropolitanism 
as an unrealistic glorification of the present era of globalization. My argument therefore 
stands in contrast to the idea that third generation Nigerian literature turns away from 
nationalism, as these particular texts instead call attention to a reconfigured nationalism. 
In some ways, this move indicates a deep pessimism about Africans’ agency in the US 
and the UK, and a resignation in the face of apparently insurmountable global 
inequalities. At the same time, however, a pragmatism underlies these shifts; given the 
apparent impossibility of effecting top-down change at either federal Nigerian or 
globalized levels, Deola and Ifemelu elect to work from the bottom up. In this way, I 
argue, A Bit of Difference and Americanah suggest that our era of intensifying 
interconnectedness may, in contrast to prevalent assumptions about the digital age as a 
force for democratization, induce a sense of resignation to inequality in a transnational 
context and simultaneously strengthen highly localized nationalisms. This approach does 
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not deny other third Nigerian texts’ embrace of broad global networks, but rather aims to 
parse yet another dimension of the transnational shift. 
My argument invites various questions about literary studies, geography, 
technology, and political systems. First, thinking about the literary market, what does it 
mean that these authors who are part US-based are writing these semi-autobiographical 
characters who choose to return permanently to Nigeria full-time? How can critics 
reconcile the reality that books like A Bit of Difference and Americanah circulate more 
and more widely, with their protagonists’ focus on the highly local? And what role does 
the authors’—and their protagonists’—privilege play in telling these stories? Does 
geographical distance interfere with national participation and commitment? That is, 
given their distrust in the possibilities of international charity and the digital sharing of 
ideas, do A Bit of Difference and Americanah make the case that Nigerians must be 
physically present in order to make meaningful contributions? In what ways might an 
emphasis on highly localized nationalisms preclude or overlook possibilities for broader 
alliances, especially those enabled by the digital age? And conversely, to what extent are 
the types of small-scale contributions embraced by Deola and Ifemelu even effective? In 
what ways do these texts’ pessimism about opportunities for genuine global exchange 
and equality reiterate or rewrite earlier narratives of pessimism about the future of the 
African continent? Finally, given that Nigeria is already fragmentary in terms of its 
ethnic, religious, political, and geographical tensions, might the emphasis on the local 
risk that an inward turn will foster internal divisions, thereby strengthening threats from 
exploitative multinational corporations, the reign of Boko Haram, and other challenges to 
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the stability of the state? Before exploring these inquiries, however, the chapter first 
offers some historical context for Deola’s and Ifemelu’s journeys abroad.  
 
AFRICAN DIASPORA AND “BRAIN DRAIN” ANXIETIES 
 Today, more writers who identify as Nigerian live overseas than ever before, a 
factor that Habila has highlighted for its role in shaping the transnational shift (Habila 
“Introduction” viii). This relatively new statistic is only the most recent development in 
the complex history of the modern African diaspora (Tanner 85). The slave trade between 
Africa, Europe, and some Atlantic islands was well underway by the middle of the 
fifteenth century, but it was not until 1519 that the first Black Africans arrived as slaves 
in the Americas—specifically, in Puerto Rico, which remains a de facto colony of the US 
(Rawley with Behrendt 2; Capps, McCabe, and Fix 2; Malavet 3). From then until the last 
slave ship crossed the Atlantic in 1867, approximately ten million Africans were forcibly 
removed from Africa; of this horrifying number, only 360,000 survived the journey to 
become slaves in the present-day United States (Eltis 371; Capps, McCabe, and Fix 2). 
Aside from occasional voluntary emigration to pursue employment, little emigration from 
Africa to Europe and the United States occurred between 1867 and the 1960s, 
approximately the era of formal European colonialism in Africa (Capps, McCabe, and 
Fix 2). Nonetheless, the diaspora has never been static and has never moved only in one 
direction: from resettlement schemes in Sierra Leone and Liberia, to educational 
exchanges, to the spread of cultural ideas in fields like religion and music, diasporic 
circulation has remained in motion throughout the centuries (Zeleza “Diaspora 
Dialogues” 47, 50-52).   
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 Then, for several reasons, the 1960s saw an rise in African emigration overseas. 
First, amidst the process of formal decolonization, the continent’s leaders prioritized 
formal education, the imagined pinnacle of which entailed universities overseas like 
Oxford and Cambridge. As I Do Not Come to You by Chance’s Paulinus exemplifies, 
Nigeria—independent as of October 1960—was no exception to this pattern (Arthur 49). 
At the same time, political turmoil throughout the continent provided further incentive for 
young Africans to pursue their studies elsewhere (Tanner 87). Most notably, the 
instability and violence preceding and throughout the Nigeria-Biafra War of the late 
1960s led to the departure of many educated Nigerians (Hagher 68). Finally, in the case 
of the US, changes in immigration policies in 1965 enabled more Africans to enter the 
country: policymakers eliminated national origin quotas that disadvantaged non-
Europeans and created more immigration opportunities benefiting families (Capps, 
McCabe, and Fix 2). In part as a result of greater emigration from Africa, the term 
“diaspora”—previously utilized primarily in the post-World War II European context—
began to be widely used to apply to African peoples (Rapoport 90; Zeleza “Diaspora 
Dialogues” 31). Especially because many experts anticipated that African-born students 
would return to their countries of origin after completing their degrees, economists in the 
1960s largely agreed that the “brain drain” would benefit all parties (Docquier and 
Rapoport 682). Residents of all countries involved, these economists argued, would share 
ideas and skills.  
 The oil boom of the 1970s made Nigeria an appealing destination for migrants 
from elsewhere in Africa, but starting in 1981, the decrease in oil prices caused a 
dramatic turnaround in this trend (de Haas 162). Educated Africans increasingly 
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remained in “recipient” countries, and living standards throughout the continent declined 
(Sako 25). As a result, with regard to Nigeria and Africa as a whole, analyses of the brain 
drain took a pessimistic turn (Rieff 10). The second wave of studies on the brain drain 
determined that “source countries” necessarily lose financial, educational, and medical 
resources when their most educated go overseas. It was a vicious cycle, the prevalent 
narrative held, amplifying the effects of a “zero-sum game, with the rich countries getting 
richer and the poor countries getting poorer” (Rapoport 90). This era of heightened 
concern over the brain drain promoted campaigns like Nigeria’s short film series about 
Andrew, later satirized by Nwaubani’s nationalistically fickle Andrew Onyeije and 
unironically embraced by Americanah’s Obinze, Ifemelu’s US-infatuated boyfriend.   
 Despite Nigeria’s efforts to prevent its educated youth from “checking out,” 
unprecedented growth in voluntary emigration from Africa began in the 1990s and 
continues into the present.47 Reasons for emigration today have remained largely 
consistent. “Push” factors (those encouraging emigration from Africa) include low wages, 
poor working conditions, concerns about physical safety, and poor infrastructure and 
social services, and “pull” factors (those encouraging immigration to specific countries) 
include better professional opportunities and working conditions (Sako 26; Kaba 117; 
Sako 27; Kaba 118; Levinson). The US Immigration Act of 1990 further facilitated 
migration, permitting more immigration from “underrepresented” countries, including 
Nigeria; 19% of sub-Saharan African immigrants between 2000 and 2013 entered the 
country through the program (M. Anderson 7, 8).  
                                                 
47 Reliable statics are difficult to come by, as not all countries keep precise track, and many migrants travel 
outside legal channels (Oxfeld and Long 2). Nigeria, for one, does not record or estimate emigration rates 
(de Haas 165). Nonetheless, I include here the most reliable figures available.  
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Today, more Nigerians—writers and otherwise—live overseas than ever before. 
More Nigerian emigrants move to the US than to any other country; approximately 
213,000 people born in Nigeria are now residents of the US (“The Nigerian Diaspora” 
2).48 This development is quite recent, as 49% of all Nigerian immigrants currently 
residing in the US arrived between 2000 and 2015 (“The Nigerian Diaspora” 2). Reliable 
numbers for Nigerian migrants to the UK are particularly hard to come by, but studies 
show that overall, African migration to the UK is undoubtedly on the rise. In 2001, 
809,000 people born in Africa were residing in England and Wales; just ten years later, in 
2011, that number had risen by 62% to reach 1.3 million (Chothia). Though the US and 
the UK are the most popular destinations for Nigerian emigrants, other countries with 
growing Nigerian-born populations include Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, 
Spain, Italy, and Ireland (de Haas 162-163).   
Moreover, African—and especially Nigerian—immigrants to the US and the UK 
are among the most educated immigrants (de Haas 163). Out of the West African 
countries that send the most migrants to the US, according to sociologist Baffour Takyi, 
Nigeria “sends the highest percentage of people with bachelor’s or higher degrees”; an 
impressive 47.9 percent hold such qualifications (247). Further, highly educated women 
from Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa are increasingly moving overseas to pursue their 
own professional opportunities, rather than migrating to join their husbands, as used to be 
the predominant trend (Adepoju 2). (Indeed, both Deola and Ifemelu move back to 
Nigeria to commit to their primary love interests, in a reversal of the historical trend.) As 
                                                 
48 A somewhat sensational and oft-cited New York Times article in 2005 declared: “Since 1990, according 
to immigration figures, more [Africans] have arrived voluntarily than the total who disembarked in chains 
before the United States outlawed international slave trafficking in 1807” (Roberts). As the author 
acknowledges later in the article, this statistic refers only to the slaves who survived the journey.  
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a result, at least in the US and the UK, “highly skilled women are overrepresented among 
international migrants” (Docquier and Rapoport 688). With regard to emigrants of all 
genders, widely considered the most serious problem is the flight of medical doctors, 
although that of trained teachers has also become a subject of serious concern (Sako 26; 
Tanner 50).  
While Nigerian and other African immigrants’ level of education is likely of net 
benefit to recipient countries, debates over the impact on source countries rage on. Many 
experts express deep concern about the damage to source countries, including the 
shrinking of the middle class and the loss of capital (Tanner 96; de Haas 171). The 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has determined that 
Africa is the continent most afflicted by brain drain (Levinson). Evoking a growing panic 
about these statistics, in 2005 political scientist Arno Tanner asserted, “the Nigerian 
diaspora in the US has enough doctors, nurses, lawyers, professors, scientists, 
administrators, and business manages to run a first class 21st century African country” 
(91). This sweeping claim seems difficult to back up, but it still emblematizes the grave 
concern with which many stakeholders view African emigration.  
Yet, other methodological approaches to the study of African migration suggest 
that other aspects of emigration can be of substantial benefit to source countries. 
Economist Hillel Rapoport, for instance, has argued that what seems like a “drain” often 
results in a “social gain” (90). The pervasiveness of the desire to emigrate, he argues, can 
motivate significant numbers of would-be emigrants to pursue higher education to boost 
their qualifications overseas. Not all of these students will ultimately emigrate, endowing 
the country with more “brains,” and a higher value will generally be placed on domestic 
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education (90). In addition, those who do emigrate often help their countries of origin 
“through the creation of business and trade networks” (94). In the case of Nigeria, 
following its return to democracy in 1999, the federal government has redoubled its show 
of enthusiasm for international migration, framing it as beneficial to national 
development and engaging diaspora organizations (de Haas 174). Further, some experts 
assert that, with such a huge population—coming in at over 180 million as of July 
2015—Nigeria hardly has to worry about a relatively small fraction of its people living 
elsewhere (“Nigeria”; de Haas 177).  
 Though return migration might seem to be a solution to some of the concerns 
expressed by UNCTAD, it is not always a quick fix to the problems created by mass 
emigration. Skilled labor and financial investment are doubtless boons, but return 
migration can, for example, disrupt social and professional hierarchies of existing 
communities (Oxfeld and Long 3). Some have also expressed concern about growing 
conspicuous consumption accompanying return migration, which, besides being socially 
undesirable, also means that returners’ investments are unlikely to be going toward 
macroeconomic ends (Oxfeld and Long 3). Finally, and tragically, losses sustained by 
emigration may be “permanent,” especially in smaller countries; setbacks in access to 
good healthcare and education—exacerbated by the flight of qualified doctors and 
teachers—can be difficult or even impossible to bounce back from (Tanner 46).  
  
“TOO HUGE AND FRACTURED”   
 With these anxieties about brain drain as a backdrop, both A Bit of Difference and 
Americanah use their protagonists’ (failed) quests for community overseas to convey a 
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nostalgia for the heyday of pan-Africanism—a movement whose achievements they 
locate only in the past. In so doing, they call for some sort of group identity to take its 
place. Where Kingsley rejects his father’s nationalism as impractical, these novels recall 
those attitudes more fondly, perhaps because their characters’ relative socioeconomic 
privilege enables them to do so.  
Prior to the novel’s main timeline, though, Deola feels at least loosely connected 
to African diasporic communities. She recalls:  
As a student, she had an approximate sense of belonging while walking through 
Brixton Market or dancing to calypso music at the Notting Hill Carnival, or 
hanging around Speakers’ Corner on a Sunday. She went to Hyde Park for Nelson 
Mandela’s seventieth birthday and for the Pavarotti concert when she worked in 
the city. Afterward she walked to the tube station with other Londoners singing 
‘Free Nelson Mandela’ the first time around and ‘O Sole Mio’ the next. Now, she 
is not even part of the Nigerian community in London. It is too huge and 
fractured. (164) 
Qualifying Deola’s “sense of belonging” with the word “approximate” lets the reader 
know right away that Deola never felt like she was fully part of any community in 
London, either at as a student as the London School of Economics (LSE) or as a young 
professional. The narration of these memories, however, is as close as the novel gets to 
linking Deola to any diasporic community.  
The specific sites the passage mentions clearly associate Deola not with a Nigeria-
specific immigrant network, but rather with deeply historically rooted communities of 
immigrants from throughout the African diaspora. Located in a neighborhood 
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predominantly populated by immigrants from Africa and the Caribbean, Brixton Market 
is famous for its African and Caribbean produce shops (“Brixton Market”).49 The annual 
Notting Hill Carnival is also led by Afro-Caribbean immigrants (Burr 84). Its festivities 
are largely inspired by Trinidad’s Carnival, in which participants buck city rules and 
recall the days when the festival meant that slaves were, just briefly, free to roam the 
streets (Burr 88, 89). The history of calypso music, overlapping with that of Carnival, 
also evokes layers of African diasporic history. It was inspired by West African musical 
tradition, was developed by slaves in the Caribbean (particularly Trinidad), has been 
utilized as a mode of contesting political power from the era of slavery to the present, and 
appears in A Bit of Difference in London (Guilbault 41, 44, 45). Bringing together these 
various diasporic elements calls to mind a powerful transnational celebration of 
resistance. Yet, Deola’s connection to these histories is vague—she “walks through” and 
“dances” in these celebrations, but the depth of her “approximate” connection is 
questionable, as is how the less economically privileged residents of Brixton, for 
example, might feel about a highly educated administrator “belonging” to their 
community.  
The passage’s mention of Speakers’ Corner also calls to mind histories of pan-
African and other resistance. At the edge of London’s Hyde Park, Speakers’ Corner has 
been a site for activists to exercise free speech since the nineteenth century. Famous 
Speakers’ Corner orators have included, in the 1930s, Trinidadian writer C.L.R. James, 
                                                 
49 Since the time of A Bit of Difference’s publication four years ago, Brixton has become a site for 
controversy about gentrification (Hancox). With its longtime Caribbean and African immigrant residents at 
greater and greater risk for losing their housing, the neighborhood that was so recently the epitome of 
immigrant community for Atta may be unrecognizable in a few years—suggesting that such networks, 
often considered essential for immigrants without Deola’s educational and financial advantages, may be at 
risk.  
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Kenyan activist (and later, the first president of Kenya) Jomo Kenyatta, and Jamaican 
political leader Marcus Garvey; and in the 1960s, the Trinidadian American civil rights 
activist Stokely Carmichael and Guyanese activist and writer Walter Rodney (Worcester 
32; Hill 394; Walters 180; Mwari). Like “walking through Brixton Market,” the phrase 
“hanging around Speakers’ Corner” does not exactly suggest active participation, but 
Deola may well be listening in on contemporary public debates; this connection, though, 
is even weaker than her connections to Brixton and Carnival. Despite Speakers’ Corner’s 
storied history of pan-African solidarity, in the last twenty years the numbers of speakers 
and listeners has shrunk and the space has increasingly become a site for anti-immigrant 
and theologically conservative Christian and Muslim speakers (Coomes; Jordon; R.B.). 
As a result of this reality, even Deola’s effort to “hang around” the area suggests 
nostalgia for a bygone era in which Speakers’ Corner debates were more likely to be 
about the forging of revolutionary alliances than about “promising a fast track to heaven” 
(R.B). Through the examples set Brixton Market, the Notting Hill Carnival, and Hyde 
Park, A Bit of Difference raises the possibility of Deola’s connection to others within the 
global African diaspora in London but remains ambiguous about the substance of that 
connection.  
The structure of the sentences describing Deola’s trips to “Hyde Park for Nelson 
Mandela’s seventieth birthday and for the Pavarotti concert,” in the years immediately 
following her university graduation, blurs the distinction between the “African” and the 
“European” events. The events occurred three years apart (in 1988 and 1991, 
respectively), and the information is not conveyed in chronological order. The first of the 
two sentences mentions the events, and the second describes the activities she 
 169 
remembers: “singing ‘Free Nelson Mandela’ the first time around and ‘O Sole Mio’ the 
next.” By blurring the lines between these memories, the text perhaps indicates that 
Deola’s pan-African and European affiliations are inextricably linked, in a move that 
resonates with Krishnan’s argument that contemporary African nationalisms have 
become a “site of plural belonging” (75). In June 1988, Mandela’s seventieth birthday 
event in Hyde Park was aimed at getting the famed activist out of prison and spurring the 
end of apartheid (Hawksley), so Deola’s participation is legible as an act of political 
solidarity. The performance by iconic Italian opera singer Luciano Pavarotti to which the 
passage refers took place in 1991 and was famously attended by Prince Charles and 
Princess Diana, symbols of the monarchy that once controlled so much of Africa and 
their world (and whose marriage was then crumbling as infamously as had the empire for 
which they stood) (de Jongh). The most recent “sense of belonging” Deola has 
experienced, then, was approximately fifteen years prior to the main storyline and took 
on a quintessentially European character. The shift from Deola’s visits to Brixton Market 
during her university years to the occasional mass event in her early working years 
conveys a broadening but perhaps increasingly detached attachment to these 
communities, as these events seem to decrease in intimacy and frequency over the years.  
Further supporting that line of reasoning, the text clearly emphasizes these events 
as having taken place a significant amount of time into her past, as the main part of the 
novel’s action takes place during in the mid-2000s, and the narrator distances them by 
concluding that narrative about her past sense of “belonging” and transitioning with the 
word “Now.” She no longer feels even an “approximate sense of belonging” to any 
community, “not even the Nigerian community in London.” The word “even” here is 
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striking, since it hints that “the Nigerian community” would be Deola’s last resort, but the 
narrator offers no sign that Deola had ever belonged to such a network. Moreover, the 
fact that Deola no longer attends these events, from the Notting Hill Carnival to shows in 
Hyde Park, seems like a voluntary drifting away—surely she could still attend such 
events if she so desired, since she still lives in London. Instead, she focuses on how the 
Nigerian community is “too huge and fractured,” without clarifying whether it has always 
seemed that way to her, or whether it is a more recent development. Either way, the 
phrase foreshadows her eventual engagement with narrow nationalisms, fostered by her 
perception of the practical improbability of broad solidarities. The implication, too, is that 
if it were either less populous or more unified, then Deola thinks she might be more 
likely to get involved.  
The text reveals, however that socioeconomic differences also play a role in 
Deola’s relationship to diasporic communities in London, even if she is not conscious of 
this factor. The narrator explains, “There is a Nigerian crowd in London that Deola is not 
part of. People who came in the nineties when the naira-to-pound exchange rate plunged. 
They came to work, not to study or to get professional training. They settled in 
Lewisham, Peckham, Balham and any other ‘-ham’ they could transform into a mini-
Lagos” (23-24). While this group does not comprise the only Nigerian community in 
London—it is “a Nigerian crowd,” not “the”—it nonetheless seems to dominate, at least 
in Deola’s perception. In contrast with Deola, who arrived in the UK as a high school 
student, the members of this group moved to London more recently, as adults, and 
brought with them a strong sense of community, “transform[ing]” each of these London 
neighborhoods “into a mini-Lagos.” The fact that the excerpt mentions “a mini-Lagos,” 
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instead of “a mini-Nigeria,” means that these immigrants are likely from Nigeria’s urban 
center, rather than from all over the country—so they, too, are a specific subgroup. 
Though Deola is also from Lagos, she feels she would have little in common with them, 
given their socioeconomic differences. In addition to the fact that this “crowd” came to 
London due to financial hardship in Nigeria, the “-hams” that the narrator lists also call 
attention to a class difference: while all three have recently undergone gentrification, they 
were historically working class (Misra; Ball; Merry). While immigration is diversifying 
almost all neighborhoods in London, Peckham has become particularly diverse—yet, the 
Nigerian “crowd,” at least in Deola’s vision, remains insular (Jeffries). The way that this 
passage distances Deola from the “mini-Lagoses” of the “-hams” emphasizes that, when 
she elsewhere tells Tessa she wants to marry “a Nigerian” because they will have a 
“shared history,” she means a particular type of Nigerian—someone who likely shares 
her educational and economic background and who fits within a particular social stratum 
in Lagos. Given that immigrant associations overseas play a key role in supporting new 
immigrants in their new home and in maintaining connections to their country of origin, 
Deola’s gradual rejection of these diasporic networks indicates a distance between her 
and not only other Nigerians and members of the African diaspora in London, but also 
perhaps a distance between her and Nigerians “at home” (Arthur 19). In this way, A Bit of 
Difference implies that not only the size and fracturing of diasporic communities 
complicates potential for pan-African solidarity—class, too, is an obstacle to pan-African 
solidarity. Decades ago, inclusive pan-Africanist movements were coopted by relatively 
privileged nationalist leaders who glossed over class differences in their emphasis on the 
shared struggle against colonizers (Rodney). Perhaps, then, Deola’s apparent lack of 
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awareness that she does not see Nigerians of all socioeconomic backgrounds as sharing a 
history, makes the case that ongoing constructions of Nigerian nationalism continue to 
suffer from class-related blind spots.  
At first, to a greater extent than Deola, Ifemelu connects with local diasporic 
networks while a student. At Wellson, her fictional university in Philadelphia, Ifemelu 
attends African Students Association (ASA) meetings, directed by her Kenyan friend 
Wambui. At the first meeting, the narrator conveys the scene by identifying the different 
African nationalities represented: “Nigerians, Ugandans, Kenyans, Ghanaians, South 
Africans, Tanzanians, Zimbabweans, one Congolese, and one Guinean sit around eating, 
talking, fueling spirits, and their different accents formed meshes of solacing sounds” that 
instill in Ifemelu a “sense of renewal” (140). At home in Lagos, Ifemelu was never 
surrounded by such a diverse group of people. In fact, most of her friends were not only 
Nigerian, but also specifically Igbo. Although hearing so many “different accents” at 
once must be new to her, the phrase “solacing sounds” demonstrates that Ifemelu derives 
a sense of comfort from the pan-African solidarity that the ASA seems to provide. The 
thorough listing of all the (sub-Saharan) nationalities represented at the meeting offers a 
lot of the specificity unprecedented in Ifemelu’s US experiences (as most Americans she 
encounters cannot distinguish among African countries, let alone different accents), yet 
their range of accents combine to a soothing effect. While acknowledging the specificity 
of each country, the passage suggests a continental pan-African solidarity that seems easy 
for Ifemelu to access, at least in a diasporic context. The idea of Ifemelu experiencing “a 
sense of renewal” not only signifies that her mood has improved, but it also implies that 
there is something new about her identity as an immigrant as a result of this meeting—as 
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if she newly identifies with a pan-African dynamic that builds on their shared experiences 
to form community without erasing national differences.  
Soon, though, Ifemelu’s—and Americanah’s—attitude toward the ASA grows 
less favorable. While the novel’s reviewers have rightfully noted the novel’s examination 
of the peculiarities of race in the US,50 so far no one has drawn attention to the novel’s 
substantial critique of Africans’ representation of African Americans and themselves 
within the US. At an ASA meeting, for example, Wambui pontificates, deploying some 
irony:  
‘Try and make friends with our African-American brothers and sisters in a spirit 
of true pan-Africanism. But make sure you remain friends with fellow Africans, 
as this will help you keep your perspective. Always attend African Students 
Association meetings, but if you must, you can also try the Black Student Union. 
Please note that in general, African Americans go to the Black Student Union and 
Africans go to the African Students Association. Sometimes it overlaps but not a 
lot. The Africans who go to BSU are those with no confidence who are quick to 
tell you “I am originally from Kenya” even though Kenya just pops out the 
minute they open their mouths. The African Americans who come to our 
meetings are the ones who write poems about Mother Africa and think every 
African is a Nubian queen.’ (141)  
At first, when Wambui begins speaking, she seems to encourage a dynamic, two-way 
relationship between the ASA and the BSA, but her increasing irony makes clear that she 
is actually quite critical of exchange between the African and the African American 
                                                 
50 See especially Subashini Navaratnam’s review “Race-in-America is a Central Character in 
‘Americanah’” (2013) and Bret McCabe’s review “In ‘Americanah,’ Adichie Explores How We Talk (And 
Don’t Talk) About Race” (2013).  
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student groups. Her opening with “Try”—and “true pan-Africanism”—proves to be 
disingenuous. Indeed, she immediately says that friendships with fellow ASA members 
will be more important; without them, she cautions, African students can lose 
“perspective.” She is not specific about what she means by this word—is she prioritizing 
maintaining a specifically African “perspective”? Given the national specificity that the 
organization seems to recognize, what would a continental perspective look like? 
Wambui’s words continue to be cagey: her command to “always” go to ASA, but only go 
to BSA “if you must,” sounds like it would be delivered in a humorous tone but with its 
message in earnest. Her reference to “true pan-Africanism” reads as ironic—while she 
celebrates experiences shared by African immigrants to the US, as evidenced by her role 
as president of the ASA, Wambui quickly belittles attempts at exchange between the 
predominantly African and the predominantly African American student groups. 
Apparently without exception, Africans who go to BSA are, in her analysis, ashamed of 
being insecure immigrants trying to mask who they “really” are—as if they cannot ever 
become “really” American—and African Americans who go to ASA are ignorant, more 
interested in mythologizing the continent than learning about its realities. In both cases, 
in Wambui’s scheme, anyone who visits the “wrong” meeting exhibits a poor grasp of 
their “true” identities. Wambui believes that pan-Africanism in the broadest sense is 
humorously obsolete, as she sees the gap between African and African Americans is too 
wide ever to bridge, yet she still upholds the idea of solidarity among those who grew up 
on the African continent.  
Most of the members of ASA laugh uproariously in response, indicating a 
widespread acceptance of the rigid distinction between the two groups. Ifemelu, however, 
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walks away with concern about the line that Wambui has drawn in the sand, even though 
she has done so with humor, and even though the novel otherwise portrays Wambui 
favorably. As an educated person who grew up in Nigeria, Ifemelu herself fits in, but she 
remains alarmed about what these divisions will mean for Dike, her Aunty Uju’s son who 
was born in Lagos but can only remember his life in Massachusetts, brought up by his 
Nigerian mother. Her concern turns out to have been very much warranted, as many years 
later Dike attempts suicide due to depression that has, according to the novel, been 
exacerbated by anxieties about his racial and national affiliations. Wambui’s assertion of 
the separation between the ASA and the BSA thus raises concern both about the apparent 
impossibility of “true pan-Africanism” (solidarity between Africans and African 
Americans) and the dangers of this type of thinking to individuals who do not fit neatly 
into either category, like Dike. By raising concern about this seemingly innocent and 
humorously executed distinction between two student groups, Americanah also portrays a 
less glamorous side of “Afropolitanism”—the danger of potentially being excluded from 
all groups, as happens to Dike, who grew up knowing “what he wasn’t” but never “what 
he was” (380). Though Americanah sets itself up in opposition to narratives of 
Afropolitanism, both through Ifemelu’s repeated assertion of Nigeria as her only “home” 
and later through her criticism of the “Nigerpolitan Club” in Lagos, Dike’s predicament 
suggests that Afropolitanism might yet be a very useful concept for those whose 
experiences do not readily fall into Wambui’s tidy categories. In any event, where Deola 
only gradually drifts away from loose diasporic affiliations, Ifemelu quits attending ASA 
meetings, at least partly because she is so troubled by the problematic divisions created 
and fostered by organizations ostensibly aimed at building solidarity. The revelation that 
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Wambui’s mention of “true pan-Africanism” was merely ironic suggests once again 
nostalgia for a past era of constructive pan-African solidarity, now transformed into a 
means of boundary-drawing and exclusion.   
 
“THE TARZAN COMPLEX” 
 As in their professional lives, both Deola and Ifemelu also attempt to engage 
transnational networks through their professions, the main focal points of each novel. An 
auditor for an international aid organization, Deola travels from London to the US to 
standardize the auditing system and to places like India and Nigeria to evaluate the 
legitimacy and efficiency of potential aid recipients. Her employer is a fictional 
organization named LINK, an acronym whose meaning the novel never reveals, though it 
vaguely hints at an equal partnership between the organization and its aid recipients, and 
also evokes the opaqueness in purpose and strategy of many such NGOs. Indeed, while 
Deola’s job initially might suggest a commitment to improving the lives of those “back 
home” and around the world—especially as her main assignment in the text is to visit two 
NGOs in Nigeria—A Bit of Difference reveals both the profound inequalities inherent to 
LINK and Deola’s disinterest in working at the macro level to help others. Tokenism, 
enforced dependency, and racism are endemic to LINK’s interpersonal office dynamics 
and overarching policies alike. Like Nigeria’s position within the system of international 
aid, Deola is meant to stay in a subservient role within the office, despite her 
qualifications. Significantly, while numerous critiques of international aid have been 
launched from stakeholders on all sides of the issue, pervasive racism is rarely explicitly 
listed among them. Oft-cited flaws of charitable giving systems include excessive 
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attention to “symptoms,” rather than underlying causes; benefit to the recipient state, 
rather than those most in need; favoritism in selecting recipients; and inefficient use of 
funds (“Ethics Guide”). As I show here, A Bit of Difference makes the case that the issue 
at the root of all of these problems is systemic racism—which, in turn, suggests that 
meaningful improvement to international aid cannot take place without addressing race.  
  At first, though, Deola defends LINK against some of the standard critiques of 
international charity organizations. Three months into the job, she reflects on the 
advantages and the disadvantages of “Africa Beat,” a similarly nondescript title that 
describes a project partnered with LINK with the vague goal of combating HIV/AIDS 
throughout Africa: “Africa does suffer, unduly, unnecessarily, and if all she has to cope 
with is the occasional embarrassment about how Africans are portrayed, then she is 
fortunate” (3, 27). The mention of “Africa” and “Africans” emphasizes the general nature 
of charities’ marketing schemes. Rather than taking the opportunity to inform audiences 
about specific histories and problems, the narrator implies, Africa Beat—and programs 
like it—continue to depict the continent in broad terms. Deola is also aware that such 
terms are often damaging stereotypes, but she dismisses them as “the occasional 
embarrassment.” The use of passive voice in the phrase “are portrayed” deemphasizes 
LINK’s (and therefore, LINK employee Deola’s) role in disseminating these 
representations of Africans. Assuming that “she” refers to Deola, then the line reflects a 
rather self-absorbed sentiment on her part, unconcerned with the larger impact of 
problematic depictions of millions of Africans. That is, Deola would be considering the 
benefits of Africa Beat in terms of the entire continent, but the drawbacks only in terms 
of herself. This moment of self absorption drives home that for Deola, LINK is just 
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another job, not necessarily an opportunity to help those at “home.” The ambiguity of 
“fortunate” also underscores this point—in what way is Deola fortunate? Is it just that she 
only has to deal with the indignity of these representations in order to keep her job? Does 
her fortunate lie in the fact that she is not dependent on charitable aid? Finally, worth 
noting is that the sentence never outright says that LINK helps “Africa,” only that “Africa 
suffers” and Deola withstands “occasional embarrassments.” This evasion of the purpose 
of LINK—ostensibly to minimize suffering—serves as a reminder that such “occasional 
embarrassments” do not necessarily translate into tangible benefits for those being 
represented.  
 Despite her claim that “embarrassing” portrayals of Africans are only 
“occasional” among these organizations, Deola eventually discovers that these 
problematic representations are inextricable from the existing system of international aid. 
Deola is throughout the novel frustrated by LINK’s choice of spokesperson for Africa 
Beat, a Nigerian hip hop artist named Dára who comes to embody LINK’s inaccurate and 
often racist marketing schemes (5). At first, the choice of someone actually from the 
continent as a representative might seem preferable to, for example, Bono,51 but the 
problems with Dára as a representative of Africa are myriad: he claims to have grown up 
on the streets, but his parents were university lecturers, and he is cast as an authority on a 
global health crisis, but “In Nigeria, no one would have paid him any mind” (26, 147). 
The consequences are substantial, as LINK has endowed this man with the ability to 
speak on behalf of an entire continent to potential donors. Eventually, LINK discards 
                                                 
51 In a quintessential remark, Bono once stated, “I represent a lot of [African] people who have no voice at 
all… They haven’t asked me to represent them. It’s clearly cheeky but I hope they’re glad I do” (qtd. in 
Richey and Ponte 721). This awfully bold assertion, of course, fails to consider why all these Africans seem 
to “have no voice”—they might be hard to hear with Bono talking over them.  
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Dára as quickly as they signed him on, due to his poorly informed assertion that 
polygamy helps combat HIV/AIDS, which happens to be unsavory to UK and US 
audiences (147). The organization immediately moves on to find another token 
representative who will appeal more readily to its target audience (131). His prompt 
replacement emphasizes the superficiality of LINK’s commitment both to Dára and to 
working with Nigerian organizations—for LINK, Dára is a mouthpiece, not a true 
spokesperson, and as the rest of the section shows, Nigeria is a country to be “helped” by 
LINK, not a true stakeholder.   
Deola knows from the beginning that Dára is being used as a token, but she does 
not realize until later in her LINK tenure that she, too, is just as much of a token to the 
organization, despite her competence and qualifications. She is ideal for the job because 
of her professional and educational background and because of her familiarity with 
Nigeria, where LINK is looking to expand its aid programs. Yet, when she tries to make a 
recommendation—a much more informed one than what Dára might offer—she faces 
condescension and silence. Deola visits Nigeria to audit two small NGOs, and as happens 
in any country, one turns to be legitimate, and other seems to divert funds to the CEO and 
her family. She warns her LINK colleague Kate that the suspicious organization—
Widows in Need (WIN)—will not be reliable, but Kate ignores her and proceeds to 
negotiate with WIN’s CEO (158). Despite being in title the director of internal audit, 
having grown up in Nigeria, and being the only LINK employee to have visited WIN’s 
headquarters, Deola is not taken as an authority. She realizes, finally, that she was only 
hired at LINK “because she is Nigerian—a Nigerian to match Dára” (159). Deola realizes 
her qualifications and experience are meaningless to LINK, whose staff has hired her 
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only in a blatant instance of tokenism. This realization becomes a major part of her 
decision to leave London.  
In the same way that LINK shoos Dára out as soon as he makes a statement 
unfavorable to their organization, Kate sends Deola a cruel email as soon as she learns of 
Deola’s report questioning LINK’s vetting strategies. Kate calls Deola’s honest 
assessment “a gross betrayal,” as if Deola should have served her loyally and without 
questioning the best interests of the organization and the people it claims to serve (207). 
LINK’s treatments of Dára and Deola thus suggest that even twenty-first-century 
philanthropic organizations can still proceed as their colonial predecessors did, claiming 
to be helping Africa without meaningfully engaging any African people. Racism 
continues to preclude Deola from making a substantive contribution even to an 
organization aimed at impacting her own country of origin. In the way that Kate wants 
Deola only to serve her interests, so LINK seems only to want Africa to serve its 
institutional interests. 
As Deola’s friend Subu, another Nigerian living in London, sees LINK’s attitude: 
“‘It’s the Tarzan Complex. You have to make them feel useful to get ahead. If you ask 
for respect, they don’t want to know. Forget about getting through to these people’” 
(153). Subu’s term “Tarzan Complex” refers to the conclusion of American writer Edgar 
Rice Burroughs’s Tarzan of the Apes (1912), when Tarzan forfeits his rightful property 
inheritance and allows his love interest Jane to marry the same man who has taken that 
inheritance. In this reading, the African-born Deola, like the African-born (though white) 
Tarzan, would be expected to sacrifice her financial and emotional well-being to the 
financial and emotional well-being of her white colleagues. Subu’s assertion also 
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includes another catch-22, “You have to make them feel useful to get ahead.” In practice, 
however, Deola can never “get ahead” if she spends all of her time being subservient and 
telling others what they want to hear. This impossibility, and the sense of resignation that 
Subu expresses, are especially disturbing coming from a character who repeatedly insists 
that she will never return to Nigeria. While Deola’s “not getting anywhere” in the UK 
spurs her return to Nigeria, Subu will live the rest of her life in London, apparently 
acquiescing to “making them feel useful” indefinitely. Although Deola frequently argues 
with Subu, including earlier in this same conversation, the text here gives Subu the last 
word—for once, Deola (and therefore the novel as a whole) apparently cannot disagree 
with her. In this way, the novel ties LINK’s employees’ personal disrespect for Deola, to 
the organization’s lack of respect for all Africans, to contemporary global dynamics that 
deprivilege African voices in general.  
Finally, A Bit of Difference ties LINK’s racism to its dependence on Africans’ 
dependency. Kate ignores Deola’s idea to look into microfinance schemes in Africa—an 
idea that came from a Nigerian NGO worker, the very type of person with which LINK is 
ostensibly partnering—and when Deola presses, Kate dismisses it immediately. “[W]ithin 
Africa we focus on charity,” she says, as if outside of Africa LINK might consider 
pursuing microcredit or other programs more clearly aimed at enabling self-sufficiency 
(147). Deola realizes, “LINK is not in the business of making their beneficiaries look 
self-sufficient. They must evoke sympathy to raise money” (147). That is, in order to 
survive, LINK must ignore the voices of Africans, even those it superficially involves—
like Dára and Deola—and maintain systems of dependency. As Kate’s assertion about 
microcredit makes clear, Africa stands at the bottom of the hierarchy of dependency that 
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perpetuates these forms of charity. While these arguments about international aid are 
neither new nor obscure, they call attention to LINK’s pervasive racism, both in terms of 
disregarding Deola’s opinions and in terms of not wanting those it “helps” to become 
self-sufficient. If, as Executive Director of the World Peace Foundation Alex de Waal has 
argued, international aid can be made more effective by “giving control of the aid to its 
recipients,” making the process more transparent, and getting more people involved on 
the ground, then A Bit of Difference adds that systemic racism must be addressed first, or 
else these goals will be impossible (de Waal 638). Indeed, Deola and Subu seem resigned 
to the catch-22 that no one within the system wants to combat racism, while racism bars 
from entry those most able to combat it. “All she has to cope with,” then, turns out to be 
much more than an “occasional embarrassment.” Even for a wealthy, educated Nigerian, 
A Bit of Difference indicates, global system inequalities prove insurmountable.  
In contrast with the racist depictions that propagate and are propagated by LINK’s 
activity, Ifemelu’s blog Raceteenth initially seems to offer a platform for representing her 
experiences to a global audience, but as I demonstrate, Ifemelu’s authorial control over 
the US-based blog is always limited. As with Deola’s position as LINK’s “Tarzan,” 
Ifemelu also finds herself subservient in her overseas endeavors, even when she is 
ostensibly in a leadership role. Literary scholar Serena Guarracino has argued that the 
blog first conveys Ifemelu’s voice “raw and true,” in Wambui’s words, and ceases to do 
so when she begins to earn income from the blog, but I argue here that the novel never 
assigns Ifemelu full control over her intellectual process or product while she writes 
about race and from within US borders (Guarracino 16). The blog’s title, the novel’s 
figurative language describing the blog, and the role of Ifemelu’s boyfriend Blaine 
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together portray global racial and geopolitical hierarchies as precluding Ifemelu’s voice 
from being fully authoritative even on her own experiences. My argument therefore 
counters the prevalent belief that the internet, especially due to anonymity and relative 
affordability (for those who have access), can enable otherwise disenfranchised voices to 
set agendas, lead conversations, or otherwise challenge Eurocentrism (M.O. Okome 296; 
Nzegwu 379). Ifemelu’s lack of agency with regard to Raceteenth, then, foregrounds 
limitations of the internet; if it is, indeed, “an essential space for the intellectual 
construction of the diaspora,” then at least in Americanah, it is a space that continues to 
deprivilege African voices in global contexts (M.O. Okome 294). Where Kingsley feels 
that his digital endeavors are in some small way correcting global imbalances of power 
and wealth, Ifemelu experiences the opposite—her blog only reinforces her less 
privileged position in global intellectual conversations. In this sense, my reading of 
Americanah supports political scientist Jodi Dean’s idea that “blogipelago” is a more apt 
term than “blogosphere,” due to inequalities that pervade even the blog, seemingly one of 
the most democratic forms of digital communication (Dean 38). Dean explains that while 
blogging can undoubtedly offer new platforms for exchanging ideas, the form enables 
new types of hierarchies among and within blogs, creating distances between disparate 
conversations and imbalances in visibility and authority—more akin a series of different 
islands than a limitless “blogosphere.” 
 Ifemelu is first inspired to start Raceteenth thanks to a series of conversations 
with Wambui. Midway through Americanah, Ifemelu starts relaxing her hair to look more 
“professional” at work. (Getting the treatment in the first place constitutes a concession to 
American expectations. Earlier, upon first moving to the US, Ifemelu is appalled that this 
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sort of treatment is expected of Black women in the US (205).) Soon, Ifemelu’s hair and 
scalp suffer serious damage from the treatments, so she cuts her hair very short (210). 
Distraught about her new appearance, Ifemelu follows Wambui’s advice and visits an 
online community dedicated to natural hair issues, HappilyKinkyNappy.com (211). 
While this particular site is fictional, many real sites much like it exist. Exchanging ideas 
on these forums completely changes Ifemelu’s attitude toward her hair. The narrator 
explains, “Posting on the website was like giving testimony in church; the echoing roar of 
approval revived her” (215). The word “revived” here echoes the idea of “renewal,” the 
word describing Ifemelu’s initial feelings at the ASA meetings. Sharing her ideas with a 
community of people who have shared her experiences—with whom she has, as Deola 
says, a “shared history,” though here based on racial experiences—energizes her and 
instills in her a sense of belonging. Participation in a digital community, comprised of 
Black women who have faced similar threats to their physical health in efforts to meet 
beauty standards enforced by white-dominated culture, provides meaningful support to 
Ifemelu that she cannot replicate elsewhere and gives her a platform to convey her 
experiences. Moreover, the fact that this first online community that inspires Ifemelu is 
specifically about hair signals connections to Black women’s histories of discrimination 
and resistance in the US as well as in Africa.52  
                                                 
52 For a detailed historiography of Black women’s hair from the fifteenth century to the twenty-first, see 
Ayana Byrd and Lori Tharps’s Hair Story: Untangling the Roots of Black Hair in America (2002).  
Adichie has more explicitly called attention to Black women’s hair as a site for resistance elsewhere in her 
fiction. Published in The Guardian in 2007, her heavily allegorical story “Hair” narrates the story of a 
Nigerian girl who quits relaxing her hair due to her family’s financial crisis. Once natural, the girl’s hair 
speaks to her, laying out a plan to undo the scam that bankrupted the family—a scam that deprives the 
family of its rightful properties and is executed by an alleged family friend named Lugardson, a clear 
reference to Lord Frederick Lugard, the first Governor-General of colonial Nigeria (Nwankwo and Ifejika 
21-22). The hair’s plan succeeds, conveying the message that the embrace of natural hair can offer 
possibilities for combating oppression and discrimination.  
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Inspired by her engagement with HappilyKinkyNappy.com and by Wambui’s 
praise (“You should start a blog”), Ifemelu opens her blog, first called Raceteenth or 
Curious Observations by a Non-American Black on the Subject of Blackness in America 
(298). The first word of the title, Raceteenth, refers to Juneteenth, the holiday 
commemorating the end of slavery in the US on June 19, 1865—a major celebration 
specific to African American history and culture, which Ifemelu is attempting to 
understand and describe through her blog. As many readers of Adichie’s work would 
know, the holiday’s name also provides the title for African American author Ralph 
Ellison’s posthumous novel, Juneteenth (1999), comprised of decades’ worth of notes 
compiled by Ellison’s friend and literary executor, John F. Callahan. Though the novel 
was highly anticipated, many readers were disappointed; as a New York Times reviewer 
summarized, “The resulting book provides the reader with intimations of the grand vision 
animating Ellison’s 40-year project, but it also feels disappointingly provisional and 
incomplete. Given all the cutting and tidying up Callahan has done, the book’s 
opaqueness and attenuation come as little surprise: after all, he has effectively changed 
the book’s entire structure and modus operandi” (Kakutani E1). Though Adichie is surely 
not comparing Ifemelu’s blogging to the work of literary great Ralph Ellison, the idea 
that someone else—even an apparent ally like Callahan—could, in an editorial role, 
change a work so dramatically, perhaps evokes Ifemelu’s boyfriend Blaine’s well-
intentioned but problematic role in reshaping Raceteenth, which I examine below.  
Though “Raceteenth” remains in the blog’s title throughout its existence, Ifemelu 
changes the title from the original, Raceteenth or Curious Observations by a Non-
American Black on the Subject of Blackness in America, to Raceteenth or Various 
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Observations About American Blacks (Those Formerly Known as Negroes) by a Non-
American Black (298, 316). Several changes appear, and only one receives an 
explanation: she adds the parenthetical “Those Formerly Known as Negroes” because of 
a conversation with her father in Nigeria, who has no idea that the word “Negro” is no 
longer a preferred term to describe African Americans. This extra information thus 
demonstrates that Ifemelu is tailoring her blog to a non-American audience, who are 
likely less familiar with appropriate contemporary identity terms—an issue that reiterates 
the specificity of American Black history.  
Taken together, the other three revisions to the blog’s title work together to 
rhetorically minimize Ifemelu’s role in the intellectual labor behind Raceteenth. On the 
one hand, the change from “Curious” to “Various” might seem to indicate a greater 
objectivity on Ifemelu’s part. “Curious” might be describing what she encounters, 
emphasizing the singularity of Blackness in the US, whereas “various” seems more 
neutral in its evaluation (“curious, adj.”). On the other hand, “curious” might also 
describe Ifemelu, a “curious observer” of American racial dynamics—a reading that 
suggests that, with the elimination of “curious,” Ifemelu’s perspective fades from the 
title. Then, the revised placement of “by a Non-American Black” diminishes the 
prominence of her role in writing the blog by pushing the phrase that identifies her from a 
prominent position in the title to the end. Finally, the shift from “on the Subject of 
Blackness in America” to “About American Blacks” changes the focus from a concept 
(race) to a particular group of people (American Blacks). Ifemelu’s identity again shifts 
toward invisibility, as she herself experiences “Blackness in America” daily for many 
years, but a blog “About American Blacks” must necessarily be about people other than 
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herself. Though Ifemelu’s revisions to the title seem innocuous upon first read, they 
ultimately push her authorial role to the background.  
Like the changes to the blog’s title, the novel’s figurative language describing 
Raceteenth subtly attributes greater agency to the site than they do to Ifemelu, its creator. 
That is, from the time Ifemelu begins the blog—not from the time that it begins to 
provide her income, as Guarracino argues—the novel consistently characterizes 
Raceteenth as a living being, operating increasingly independently of its creator. When 
she first creates it, the text says, “she signed on to WordPress, and her blog was born” 
(298). A close reading of this phrase in context reveals that it sets up, from the beginning, 
the depiction of Raceteenth taking on a life of its own, sometimes to Ifemelu’s benefit, 
but often to her detriment. The use of the possessive “her” (“her blog” rather than “the 
blog”) portrays the project as under her control, but already the use of the passive voice 
(“was born,” rather than, for example, “she gave birth to” or “she created”) removes 
Ifemelu from the active role of author. Finally, the verb choice—“born”—introduces 
Raceteenth right away as something living, and something that will grow. It may be 
Ifemelu’s idea, and it may still be shaped by her efforts, but the idea of “birth” 
emphasizes that it will always be its own independent entity.  
Shortly after the “birth” of Raceteenth, the text advances the characterization of 
the blog as a living being:  
The blog had unveiled itself and shed its milk teeth; by turns, it surprised her, 
pleased her, left her behind. Its readers increased, by the thousands from all over 
the world, so quickly that she resisted checking the stats, reluctant to know how 
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many new people had clicked to read her that day, because it frightened her. And 
it exhilarated her. (305)  
In this passage, Ifemelu is completely absent from all the subjects of each independent 
clause—in contrast with “her blog,” earlier—and at the same time, Raceteenth becomes 
part of the subject of every independent clause. The only time that Ifemelu is the subject 
occurs when “she resisted” learning more about the responses to her work. Everywhere 
else that Ifemelu appears in the passage, she is the object of the blog’s actions: “it 
surprised her, pleased her, left her”; “it frightened her”; “it exhilarated her.” This 
structure implies that the blog does not only take action independently of her, but is also 
independently responsible for the impact on her, as if she were not the creator behind all 
of the blog’s activity. Most of the verbs in the passage have to do with Ifemelu’s 
emotional state, from the negative (“frightened”) to the positive (“exhilarated”), except 
for the action of having “left her behind,” which suggests that Raceteenth is becoming 
capable of excluding or abandoning its own creator. Responses to the blog, then, seem to 
have greater influence than Ifemelu’s posts, which initiate and provoke each 
conversation. The word “unveiled” insinuates that something is hidden from Ifemelu at 
first, as if she does not quite understand the nature of her own intellectual product. The 
image of Raceteenth getting its adult teeth characterizes it as a growing animal, maturing 
and gradually able to operate on its own. The text’s language here also conflates Ifemelu 
with her blog: the phrase “clicked to read her” makes the author, rather than the blog, the 
object. Finally, the last two uses of “it” are somewhat ambiguous—they might refer to the 
blog’s stats or the idea of a large readership, but “it” could also arguably be the blog, 
instilling these seemingly unpredictable emotional reactions in her. Even in the blog’s 
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early stages, then, she never seems to exercise full control over her work, which is 
growing as if of its own accord and exercising intensifying control over her instead.  
One might imagine that Ifemelu earning an income from the blog would make her 
feel more empowered, but she reads the development in exactly the opposite way. When 
she receives offers for financial support, the text conveys her reaction: “Support. That 
would make the blog even more apart from her, a separate thing that could thrive or not, 
sometimes without her and sometimes with her” (305). Once again, Raceteenth occupies 
a more dominant syntactical position: though “the blog” is an object of the “support,” the 
pronoun that describes Ifemelu only appears as the object of prepositional phrases that 
convey the blog’s apparently ambivalent relationship to its creator—“sometimes with,” 
“sometimes without.” In addition, the uses of the words “apart” and “separate” for the 
first time explicitly delink Ifemelu from her work. These words choices are striking, since 
one would think that earning an income from a blog would make it more integral to a 
writer’s life, but in contrast with the conflation of Ifemelu and Raceteenth earlier (the 
audience “clicked to read her”), the blog’s financial viability further alienates creator 
from product.  
As Raceteenth’s popularity grows, and more and more users contribute their own 
responses to Ifemelu’s site, she feels not only increasingly distanced by the blog, but 
worse, also victimized by it and its readership. That is, once “grown,” her blog seems as 
if it starts to feed off her:  
Now that she was asked to speak at roundtables and panels, on public radio and 
community radio, always identified simply as The Blogger, she felt subsumed by 
her blog. She had become her blog. There were times, lying awake at night, when 
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her growing discomforts crawled out from the crevices, and the blog’s many 
readers became, in her mind, a judgmental angry mob waiting for her, biding their 
time until they could attack her, unmask her. (308)  
The nature of her blog binds her to anonymity, as she must remain “careful not to let on 
whether she was African or Caribbean,” so that her writing will seem equally applicable 
to all of her “Non-American Black” readers (208). Without her own public identity apart 
from that of “The Blogger,” however, Ifemelu loses any semblance of identity even in her 
personal life (“she had become her blog”). Indeed, her title as “The Blogger” ties her 
even more tightly to her work—she could have, for example, gone instead by a title like 
“a Non-American Black.” This passage makes her necessarily anonymous work identity 
simultaneously both a threat and a source of protection. The violent-sounding verbs 
“Attack” and “unmask” imply that removing her anonymity—which is part of what 
enables the monstrous, unveiled, toothy blog to consume her—is also a dangerous threat 
that seems almost to put her at physical risk. Expanding on the image, the word 
“subsumed” suggests not only that Ifemelu had no sense of self beyond the blog, but also 
that the blog has grown both vast and parasitic, if it can “absorb” or “incorporate” her 
into itself (“subsume, v.”). This language portrays Ifemelu as both inseparable from and 
being destroyed by her blog, leaving her no escape. At the same time, however, she is 
afraid to lose her anonymity, as it provides her with protection from one of her greatest 
fears, that “the blog’s many readers” will “unmask her,” which appears alongside the idea 
of them “attack[ing] her.” Some of these fears are rooted in negative reader and listener 
responses, but some of them seem to arise from the blog’s inherent unpredictability—
even if it does not go in an undesirable direction, the many participants seem to have 
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more control over Ifemelu’s work, and by extension her personal life, than she does. In 
any event, her growing readership, instead of rewarding her with respect and financial 
resources, becomes a waking nightmare in this passage.  
 Exacerbating these problems is the role of Blaine, Ifemelu’s African American 
boyfriend and a Yale professor in comparative politics. The two meet on a train ride, but 
they do not reconnect until a “Blogging While Brown convention” (309). Once again, 
attributing agency to the blog, the texts frames this event by saying: “Her blog brought 
Blaine back into her life” (309). The coincidence initially seems like a positive 
development in Ifemelu’s personal life, as their romantic relationship quickly blossoms, 
and she moves into Blaine’s home in New Haven. Blaine is impressed by Raceteenth and 
comes to serve almost as a patron for her work; yet, his growing, ostensible support role 
turns out to be yet another source of oppression for Ifemelu. She  
wrote her blogs from his apartment, at a desk he had placed for her near the 
bedroom window. At first, thrilled by his interest, graced by his intelligence, she 
let him read her blog posts before she put them up. She did not ask for his edits, 
but slowly she began to make changes, to add and remove, because of what he 
said. Then she began to resent it. Her posts sounded too academic, too much like 
him. (313)  
Perhaps even genuinely perceiving himself in a supporting role, Blaine gradually seizes 
control over various aspects of Ifemelu’s blogging. The couple is living together, so 
technically the apartment is “theirs,” yet the passage describes it as “his,” indicating his 
dominance over the space. Blaine’s placement of her desk might initially seem like an act 
of support—perhaps he is helping Ifemelu focus on her intellectual work by shouldering 
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the responsibility of setting up her creative space—but in context, this move reads as yet 
another aspect of his effort to shape her intellectual and creative output. The text pokes 
fun at Ifemelu’s admiration of Blaine: the phrases “thrilled by his interest” and “graced 
by his intelligence”—particularly the latter—read as ironic, meant to key the reader in to 
the fact that Blaine’s intelligence, while real, is not the godlike force he believes it to be. 
Significantly, the text specifics that Ifemelu “did not ask” for his input, yet he offers it 
anyway, presumably knowing that she will revise her work accordingly. While some read 
this portrayal of Blaine as anti-intellectual, I hold that it is instead critical of American 
arrogance; while Blaine allows his voice to overpower Ifemelu’s, his colleague 
Boubacar—a Senegalese professor at the same institution—is able to support Ifemelu 
without dominating her. Where Blaine inserts his words and opinions into individual 
posts, Boubacar invites Ifemelu to his lectures for ideas for the blog and encourages her 
to apply for a fellowship at Princeton, where she would have the opportunity to expand 
Raceteenth outside Blaine’s unsolicited tutelage (341). Although Ifemelu is the one doing 
all the writing, she feels that she has lost control over her authorial voice, which in turn 
causes conflict for the couple, rendering Ifemelu’s personal and professional lives 
unhappy. To remain in the relationship, she has to make Blaine “feel useful” as Deola 
would have to do for Kate at LINK, even though Ifemelu and Blaine share many similar 
experiences as with blackness in the US.  
Ifemelu’s deteriorating relationship with Blaine, as emblematized by his control 
over her intellectual production, is also legible as an allegory for her relationship to the 
US. In the novel’s first chapter, narrating her thought process during their breakup, the 
text says that “her relationship with him was like being content in a house but always 
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sitting by the window and looking out” (7). The comparison emphasizes that Ifemelu 
observes her relationship—and her life in the US—from a distanced, observational 
(rather than evaluative) perspective, as if she is less fully a participant. It also depicts 
Ifemelu as trapped in some way, unable to escape the walls of the pleasant but 
nonetheless confining house. What is unclear is whether the simile places Blaine in the 
house with her, outside the house being watched by her, or as the house itself. If Blaine is 
in the house, then the implication is that his ideological perspective has confined them 
both in some way, and she is gazing out to see other possibilities; if he is outside, then 
she feels trapped and (emotionally and intellectually) distant from Blaine, isolating her; 
and if he is the house itself, then that most of all portrays him as controlling and 
confining her with his well-intentioned and specifically American efforts to shape her 
thinking. The fact that the simile is about looking out of a window, too, evokes Blaine’s 
placement of Ifemelu’s writing desk by the window, which happens chronologically 
years earlier but which we only learn about later in the novel. In drawing this connection, 
the simile links Ifemelu’s feelings about her relationship with Blaine, her identity in the 
US, and her blog Raceteenth. Already in the first chapter, then, the novel underscores 
Ifemelu’s feeling of being an outsider in the US. Although this moment is near the end of 
the story chronologically, its placement so early in the text heightens the reader’s 
awareness of Ifemelu’s outsider status, inviting the careful reader to watch out for the 
issue throughout Ifemelu’s time in the States.  
 In these ways, Raceteenth’s gradual “subsuming” of Ifemelu is a result of its 
situation in an American context, where Ifemelu realizes she can never speak truly 
authoritatively. Rather than empowering her, the blog serves to make Ifemelu 
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increasingly aware of her position within the conversation on race in America, in which 
Americanah emphasizes that she will remain an outsider, no matter how many Nigerians 
make their homes in the US. That she feels “an early morning disease of fatigue, a 
bleakness and borderlessness” suggests that something inherent in her transnational 
personal and professional paths can be damaging; the inclusion of  “borderlessness” here 
is striking, since it is often used in a positive and even glamorous sense, talking about 
Afropolitans, the possibilities of the internet, and so on. True Afropolitanism, 
Americanah contends, can be a potentially dangerous myth.  
 
COMING HOME 
Similarly resigned to racism’s control over her individual career and her country’s 
position within global humanitarian aid structures, Deola leaves London in part to evade 
what her brother Lanre calls “that racialism rubbish” (195). Exhausted from having her 
possibilities limited by her race, Deola realizes during a visit to Nigeria, “Here, she is 
virtually color free and she hopes to remain that way” (57). While racism made legible by 
LINK is clearly a factor in her decision, at the same time Deola also chooses to return 
because of her realization that she would rather try to help others on a more localized 
scale. She transitions from the breadth of “Africa Beat” to focusing on HIV/AIDS 
awareness among those she knows personally.   
  Explicitly emphasizing her commitment to a more and more narrowly defined 
community, Deola declares outright that working at a global level is the wrong choice for 
her: “She is in the wrong business anyway. She has never wanted to save anyone but the 
people she loves. Isn’t this enough? Don’t organizations like LINK do the same when 
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they decide who to give what and for how long?” (160). By spending so much time on 
personal interactions between the characters, A Bit of Difference makes clear that this 
network (that of “the people she loves”) is quite small: she has exactly three friends in 
London—Tessa, Subu, and her writer friend Bandele—and in Lagos, outside of work 
obligations, she only interacts with her mother, her two siblings’ families, and Wale. Her 
question about whether helping only those she knows personally is “enough” may or may 
not be rhetorical. If it is, then it is confirming that Deola’s engagement with her personal 
network is sufficient, possibly even more effective than her work with LINK, but if the 
question is not rhetorical, then it is opening up space for debate. Her comparison of her 
narrow selection of whom to help to LINK’s process of selecting aid recipients calls 
attention to the pitfalls of favoritism in systems of international aid, highlighting ways in 
which the system is biased and therefore less widely effective than it portrays itself. Even 
seemingly equitable, international networks, then, with standardized systems for 
decision-making—as evidenced by the fact that part of Deola’s job is to standardize 
LINK’s manuals for the auditing process—can be as subjective as any individual, in 
Deola’s reading.  
Further, the strategy that Deola employs to help “the people she loves” also 
operates as a direct criticism of international aid. That is, the specific project on which 
she embarks at the end of A Bit of Difference is to encourage her friends to get tested for 
HIV. She is inspired to do so because of her own fear of HIV after her one-night stand 
with Wale—a fact that suggests that motivation to take action against the epidemic, or 
any other crisis, comes first and foremost from personal experience, rather than 
awareness of “numbers.” The fact that she feels she can make a real difference just by 
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telling her friends to get tested for HIV is a dig at large charitable organizations as well as 
governmental aid, as the vast majority of humanitarian aid sent to the continent is 
HIV/AIDS-related (Richey and Ponte 715). Her success in getting Bandele to agree to get 
tested confirms that her individual-level efforts have had some impact. In the final scene 
of the novel, Deola visits Subu and is uncertain as to whether her friend has been tested. 
Subu’s mother is also present, which both prevents Deola from asking Subu directly and 
leads Deola to believe that Subu may have tested positive for HIV, since her mother was 
not planning to visit from Nigeria until “Christmastime” (219). The text does not confirm 
either way—whether Subu has been tested, and if so, what her results were—but the fact 
that the tension affects Deola so deeply—her “legs give way,” she is “panicking,” and her 
hands are “trembling”—underscores how critical the issue is, and how much impact an 
individual act can have (219, 220). The placement of this critical scene at the book’s 
finale highlights its importance, too, even just the importance just of the act of getting 
tested, which we know Deola has already convinced Bandele to do. In addition the fact 
that the people to whom she reaches out are both Nigerian helps articulate what she is 
doing as a form of nationalism, rather than an effort to help an arbitrary personal 
network. Presumably because Deola assumes Tessa, her other friend in London, is 
unthreatened by HIV because of the latter’s monogamous relationship (a flawed 
assumption, to be sure), Deola does not try to “save” Tessa by encouraging her to get 
tested. The novel could have included a non-monogamous non-Nigerian character among 
Deola’s friends, or it could have had Deola ask Tessa to get tested even despite her 
assumptions about monogamy—but it does not do either, maintaining Deola’s 
commitment specifically to Nigerians.  
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At the same time, however, A Bit of Difference also invites the reader to question 
the limitations or drawbacks of Deola’s narrowing of community. While HIV/AIDS is a 
global epidemic that she can help combat on a small scale, by encouraging her friends to 
get tested regularly, her narrow focus means that she necessarily withdraws from macro 
problems that she does not feel she can affect. Watching Wale keep up with international 
news, for example, Deola observes: “On the front cover of the newspaper he is reading is 
a headline about soldiers who were killed in Iraq by friendly fire. Deola has not thought 
about the war in a while and all she wants is to see Wale’s face again” (217). Here, Deola 
is completely uninterested in the then-ongoing, US-led Iraq War. Her only desire is for 
Wale to stop reading about it so that he will put down the newspaper and then the two of 
them can engage as individuals—or, perhaps she does not even desire that much 
interaction, since she only “wants to see Wale’s face.” Without condoning or condemning 
Deola’s complaint about the newspaper, this moment raises questions as to whether 
Deola’s disengagement from international concerns is ethical or not.  
Elsewhere, however, a more disturbing image seems more overtly critical of 
Deola’s focus on more immediate networks, as she reflects on the complexities 
underlying humanitarian crises throughout the continent, especially the fact that many of 
LINK’s resources go to programs in countries with poor human rights records, including 
“Somalia, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Congo, Angola and Rwanda” (159). One of the most 
prominent critiques of international aid is that funds often wind up supporting corrupt 
governments, rather than those who need it most—a difficult situation to resolve, since 
distribution to those most in need can be difficult without government involvement. The 
narrator describes the conclusion of her thought process: “Whose fault is that? she thinks, 
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shrugging off the amputated sleeves of her summer jacket while imagining it as a one-
armed child” (159). Her “shrugging” motion suggests a dismissal of responsibility, but 
more notable here is the deeply disturbing accompanying image of the “one-armed 
child.” The phrase clearly references the atrocities committed by the Revolutionary 
United Front (RUF) during its eleven-year war in Sierra Leone. The conflict, centered on 
the diamond mining industry, was notorious for its use of child soldiers and for the 
RUF’s practice of chopping off opponents’ arms (Packer). RUF soldiers notoriously used 
the term “sleeve” to characterize their crude amputations—“long sleeve” or “short 
sleeve” would describe the length of the amputation—which ties Deola’s gesture even 
more closely to the atrocities (Vargas). The image of Deola “shrugging off” her jacket as 
if it were one of the war’s victims, then, seems highly critical of her seemingly easy 
detachment from international matters. The image may also recall similarly horrific 
atrocities in the Belgian Congo around the turn of the last century, when colonial officials 
would cut off the hands of Africans who would not gather “enough” rubber for the 
regime, often murdering their “subjects” and keeping the hands as records or trophies 
(Hochschild 165). The connection of Deola’s jacket to the British Congo may be a bit 
more tenuous, but it nonetheless calls to mind the entangled histories behind crises 
throughout Africa that have led to the types of complexities that Deola “shrugs off.” It is 
partly a feeling of resignation—Deola cannot parse the complex situation by herself 
anyway—not unlike the resignation she feels about endemic racism at LINK. While the 
Iraq War may be too distant for A Bit of Difference to condemn Deola’s detachment, 
events on the continent of Africa are perhaps not too far for her be obligated to take some 
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interest, from the novel’s perspective. In this way, A Bit of Difference takes an 
ambivalent stance toward Deola’s shift toward a narrower national commitment.  
Deola’s embrace of this narrower network is legible as a nationalism not only 
because the people she decides to help are Nigerians, as noted, but also because of her 
insistence that Nigerian national identity matters much more than ethnic identity. The 
novel imbues strong ethnic identifications with a negative connotation by making 
characters who frequently discuss ethnic differences decidedly unlikeable in all respects, 
from Deola’s snobby in-laws to the corrupt CEO of WIN (106-107, 90). Conversely, 
likeable characters, like Deola and her love interest Wale, are unconcerned about ethnic 
differences. Well into their relationship, for instance, Deola learns that Wale’s 
grandfather was Hausa (216). The couple already know they are both of partially Yoruba 
descent, but they have not asked further questions because it is not of interest to them, 
even though they have gotten to know one another quite well. When Wale mentions his 
partly Hausa heritage, Deola’s only response is to joke that Wale must be a “Muslim 
terrorist,” a reaction that mocks concern about ethnic differences, and then the scene 
ends, never to raise the topic again (216). By making Wale the Nigerian with the “shared 
history” to whom Deola commits, the novel emphasizes that, for Deola, ethnic 
differences do not preclude a “shared history” among Nigerians, even where 
socioeconomic disparities do.  
As Deola resigns herself to the inequalities dramatized by LINK and instead 
pursues a much narrower community, so Ifemelu decides that she has done what she can 
with Raceteenth and moves to Lagos, creating a new blog to contribute to the production 
of ideas there. Though Ifemelu had some level of success with Raceteenth, as evidenced 
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by her readers who implore her to return to blogging “soon,” she decides to make the 
move back to Nigeria, “because she want[s] to” (5, 13). The almost immediate success of 
her new blog, The Small Redemptions of Lagos, show the novel’s approval for Ifemelu’s 
decision in returning—and in embracing, in some ways like Deola, a narrow nationalism 
(16).  
Her discontent in the US, however, is not the only reason for Ifemelu’s return. To 
the contrary, her visits to “Nigerian websites, Nigerian profiles on Facebook, Nigerian 
blogs” from her home in New Jersey contribute greatly to her decision (6). Witnessing 
her old friends’ and acquaintances’ digital representations of their lives in Nigeria makes 
Ifemelu feel envious, as if others “were living her life. Nigeria became where she was 
supposed to be” (6). While she is far from needing to risk “dying for the nation” as earlier 
Nigerian characters might have, her geopolitical location still matters a great deal in this 
formulation. Though Ifemelu is most likely following and picturing her friends 
specifically in Lagos, where she grew up, she consistently says “Nigeria” when 
describing her home, revealing that she at least imagines herself to be missing the nation 
as a whole. Further, where anthropologist Thomas Hylland Eriksen notes how online 
connections can build communities across and despite geographic distance, in this 
fictional case Ifemelu’s engagement with social media drives her to travel the physical 
distance to participate in person and locally in Nigeria (11). As such, the novel makes the 
case that not only can digital connections build digital communities based on shared 
experiences, like Raceteenth, but can also catalyze a turn shift to the geographically 
specific, in turn indicating limitations of digital networks—because seeing these friends 
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represent Nigeria on Facebook is, for Ifemelu, no substitute for being physically present 
in Nigeria.  
Upon her return to Lagos, Ifemelu works briefly as a features editor for the 
fictional Zoe Magazine (401), but frustrated with the magazine’s superficiality, she soon 
leaves to start a new blog, The Small Redemptions of Lagos (418). The words “Small” 
and “Lagos” in the title highlight the blog’s local focus: both its individual topics and its 
geographical scope are narrow. “Redemptions” brings to mind connotations of “saving, 
delivering, or restoring” (“redemption, n.”). Both Ifemelu and Lagos seem to be 
undergoing “restoration” here: Ifemelu is recovering from the discontent from her years 
in the US, and her blog aimed at engaging, challenging, and informing her fellow 
Lagosians is an effort at shaping twenty-first-century Lagos, in contrast with 
Raceteenth’s emphasis on more removed “observations.” The Small Redemptions covers 
a greater breadth of topics than did Raceteenth, but it does so at a localized level—that is, 
rather than discussing the experiences of a vast and geographically diverse group like 
Raceteenth’s target audience of “Non-American Blacks,” The Small Redemptions 
examines a range of experiences shared by Ifemelu and those in her immediate social 
network. With posts by Ifemelu and some her friends, the blog covers topics from the 
personal to the social to the overtly political: discussions of the view from Ifemelu’s 
bedroom window in Ikoyi, the logistics of wedding planning, and the government’s 
demolitions of hawkers’ shacks all feature on the blog (475, 421, 474). With these types 
of posts, Ifemelu addresses national questions at a very local level, writing based on her 
own in-person observations (even the shack demolition post was based on a scene 
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Ifemelu witnessed near her friend Ranyinudo’s office) and soliciting guest posts that 
convey other first-hand experiences (474-475).  
Also in contrast with Raceteenth, The Small Redemptions appears consistently 
under Ifemelu’s control. Although commenters can participate just as fully as they do on 
Raceteenth, Ifemelu does not feel under siege by them. The narrator describes her process 
working on the new blog: “Ifemelu moderated the comments, deleting anything obscene, 
reveling in the liveliness of it all, in the sense of herself at the surging forefront of 
something vibrant” (422). Unlike with Raceteenth, Ifemelu is the subject of the sentence 
and the clear director of the blog’s activity. The verbs “moderated” and “deleting” 
indicate her authority, and “reveling” indicates a positive and consistent emotional 
response that stands in contrast to the emotional roller coaster that accompanies her 
experience producing Raceteenth, which had variously “surprised her, pleased her, left 
her,” “frightened her,” and “exhilarated her” (305). What was emotionally volatile about 
Raceteenth becomes merely “lively” in The Small Redemptions. In addition, the idea that 
Ifemelu’s new blog brings her to “the surging forefront of something vibrant” suggests 
that her new project, which embraces and advances this narrow nationalism, is 
“something vibrant” and on the rise. In other words, the novel implies that such narrow 
nationalisms, perhaps especially those bolstered by digital networks, may be a growing 
trend.  
Further, where Raceteenth takes away from Ifemelu’s sense of identity, The Small 
Redemptions helps Ifemelu to build her sense of self and belonging, completing the 
Bildungsroman where Raceteenth could not, despite its appearance of success. As if she 
were incomplete before authoring The Small Redemptions, the text says of Ifemelu that, 
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upon developing her new blog, “She had, finally, spun herself fully into being” (475). 
Once again, Ifemelu is the subject of the sentence, clearly in charge of these processes. 
The verb “spun” evokes simultaneously a very physical idea, like that of working 
carefully to draw out threads from a larger material (creating a narrative about herself and 
a smaller one about Lagos), as well as an image of circular movement (perhaps calling to 
mind her circular journey that culminates with her return to Nigeria) (“spin, v.”). In these 
ways, Ifemelu’s journey from the overwhelming, broad Raceteenth to the uplifting 
specificity of The Small Redemptions of Lagos reads as a trajectory from the broadly 
transnational to the highly local.  
 Showing how Ifemelu’s local focus is part of a nationalist commitment, Adichie 
has more recently elaborated on the blog’s scope through a less-publicized sequel in the 
form of a website, also called The Small Redemptions of Lagos. Blurring boundaries of 
text and genre, the site features twenty-seven posts, authored by Ifemelu and other 
characters from Americanah, and dated from August 27, 2014 to November 2, 2014. 
Based on the dates of links to the posts on Adichie’s Facebook page, the website’s posts 
appear to have been posted in real time (rather than all at once and backdated). The 
additional posts are similar in tone to those in Americanah, but they reflect an expansion 
in focus; instead of centering around life in Lagos, they expand to include reflections on 
Ifemelu and Obinze’s time in Enugu, concerns about the Nigerian government’s handling 
of the then-ongoing Ebola crisis, and critiques of the New York Times’s representations of 
African languages and the work of the late Kenyan scholar Ali Mazrui. As a result, the 
digital Small Redemptions demonstrates engagement with other Nigerian places, with the 
country’s federal government, and in a style reminiscent of the blog Africa is a Country, 
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non-African media representations of the continent. Ifemelu imagines Lagos as a 
microcosm of the Nigerian nation and its place in the world. The widening of the scope 
of The Small Redemptions through this sequel makes the case that a focus on the local 
may only be a starting point for building broader alliances and engagements.  
  
CAVEATS AND CONSEQUENCES 
Americanah’s and A Bit of Difference’s optimism about local or narrow 
nationalisms has its limitations. Their protagonists’ socioeconomic privilege, for one, 
offers them opportunities not available to most people. As African literary scholar 
Katherine Hallemeier has noted, the fact that the US economic downturn in 2008 does 
not seem to affect Ifemelu’s earnings off her critical race blog seems unusual and 
arguably—though Hallemeier does not go this far—implausible, much like the ease with 
which Ifemelu begins to earn income from The Small Redemptions (235). Deola’s 
profession in the UK is more believable, but her return to Lagos is facilitated by the fact 
that the family business is a major bank; she will have no difficulty getting a job upon her 
return. While their analyses of global racial inequalities are convincing, they seem to 
suffer from blind spots with regard to class and socioeconomic issues.  
Even beyond basic financial constraints, numerous other factors might preclude 
an easy transition back to Nigeria, such as political stability, access to family and other 
support networks, and concerns about homophobia. The texts stop short of being 
prescriptive about return migration or national identification, though, as each includes 
sympathetic Nigerian-born characters who remain overseas. A Bit of Difference note that 
Bandele would face substantial discrimination in Nigeria because of his sexuality, and the 
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novel is also sympathetic to Subu, who is unwilling to deal with infrastructural 
inconveniences in Nigeria. In Americanah, Ifemelu’s beloved Aunty Uju who first left 
Nigeria when her life was endangered under the Abacha regime, remains in the US with 
her son Dike, whom she has brought up there. The inclusion of such characters seems to 
leave some room for Afropolitanism as an alternative or complementary identity—
perhaps especially for the isolated young Dike—but the semi-autobiographical 
protagonists are clearly distanced from the label, perhaps indicating that the authors do 
not want to dismiss the concept outright, but they also do not want to viewed as 
Afropolitans themselves, given the obvious connections between the protagonists and the 
authors. Even though Atta and Adichie remain in the US at least part-time, they tie their 
public personas to these characters who are “checkin’ in” and thereby assert their 
positions as Nigerian, not Afropolitan, writers.  
Afropolitans, “Nigerian expatriates,” or otherwise, A Bit of Difference’s and 
Americanah’s resignation to racism overseas and systematic global inequality is, clearly, 
deeply pessimistic. From constant microaggressions, to Deola’s resignation to the deep 
flaws of international aid, to Ifemelu’s apparent inability to direct a conversation about 
life for Non-American Blacks living in the US, the novels convey little to no hope for 
change on a large scale. Part of this attitude may be rooted in pragmatism; they at least 
provide a counter to problematically “utopian” narratives about life for Africans overseas, 
for instance (Ojaruega 22). At the same time, however, the texts seem to suggest 
abandonment of broader alliances, especially in their gradual dismissal of immigrant 
networks overseas. Do these texts leave room for, to take just one example, the digital 
pan-Africanism that young African writer Siyanda Mohutsiwa has recently described in 
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her TED Talk “Is Africa’s Future Online?”? In what ways might Deola’s and Ifemelu’s 
narrative conclusions constitute a form of Afropessimism revised for the twenty-first 
century?  
In any case, and despite their characters’ pessimism about Nigeria’s—and 
Africa’s—positions in global dynamics, both A Bit of Difference and Americanah are 
hopeful about improving the lives in others in Nigeria, at least from their narrow, local 
perspectives. In contrast with the panic of their friends who first learn about their plans to 
return to Nigeria, the success of Ifemelu’s Lagos-specific blog, and Deola’s decision to 
bring up her soon-to-be-born child in Nigeria, are both forward-looking and optimistic, as 
the characters shift their gaze from the general (Africa Beat, race in America) to the 
specific (“the people she loves,” Lagos). While the novels offer a glimpse into the 
limitations of the often embraced transnational literary shift among members of their 
generation, they instead articulate a hope for the possibilities of narrow nationalisms as 
their protagonists “check in” to Nigeria for good.  
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Conclusion  
 
I think it’s an aggregation of all of the small acts that are really 
transformative. I think a group of small acts transform the  
individual. And maybe when the individual transforms, we  
transform. The big acts will only sustain us for a little while. 
 
    —Chris Abani  
 
  
Whether due to a governmental failure to defend the rights of Niger Delta 
peoples, institutional corruption that rewards political connections over merit, 
international aid programs intent on maintaining economic dependencies, or social media 
platforms that are less democratic than they proclaim, some system has failed the 
characters of the five novels on which the dissertation has focused. That so many young 
Nigerian writers are preoccupied with systemic failures reveals a serious pessimism about 
the ability of states and other large organizations to effect change, in contrast with many 
nationalists’ hopes in decades past. With first- and second-generation nationalisms 
deemed obsolete, the five novels’ characters retreat into smaller communities that they 
can make sense of amidst crisis and from which they at least attempt to catalyze bottom-
up, grassroots change. In a 2010 interview, Chris Abani summed up this attitude: with 
little faith in the impact of “big acts,” he believes that “an aggregation of all the small 
acts” holds greater potential for “transformation.” To be sure, he does not guarantee that 
they will necessarily lead to transformation—he leaves the possibility as a “maybe”—but 
they are nonetheless the best source of hope, just as Habila’s character Rufus identifies 
the only possibility for hope in the worshippers’ community on Irikefe Island; they might 
remain in “uncertain water,” but they still leave him with a sense of “optimism” (Oil on 
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Water 239). Whether they are more about sovereignty, ideology, or belonging, the narrow 
nationalisms of the dissertation’s primary texts all operate in contrast to longstanding 
wisdom that nationalism is about imposing ideology from the top-down. Revising, for 
example, Eric Hobsbawm’s claims, this cluster of third generation Nigerian texts show 
that nationalism in the twenty-first century is neither “constructed essentially from 
above” nor on its way out (10). In contrast with Habila’s “post-nationalist” aspirations for 
his generation, then, nationalism—in its revised and varied forms—remains relevant to 
Nigerian and other African literary and cultural production.  
These writers’ pessimism about the “big acts” is a recent development, arising 
within the last decade’s international disillusionment about the possibilities of 
globalization, as well as domestic disappointment with the lack of change that the post-
Abacha era brought for most Nigerians. That is, much as first-generation African 
nationalisms of the 1950s and 1960s gave way to postcolonial pessimism, 1990s-era 
optimism about globalization gave way to this most recent moment of post-globalization 
pessimism. A product of this pessimism, narrow nationalisms therefore counter optimistic 
narratives of Afropolitanism because of the latter’s function as a literature of 
globalization. Indeed, Afropolitanism reflects excitement about how globalization might 
break down barriers; the shared sovereignties within the African Union and the European 
Union are two examples of how globalization and the corresponding deprivileging of 
national boundaries initially seemed to foster international mobility and thus 
educationally and culturally diverse experiences (InterAfrica Group and Justice Africa; 
Wells and Wells 30). In conjunction with the freedoms that Nigerians imagined would 
accompany their country’s burgeoning political democracy, these possibilities seemed 
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imminent in the early years of third-generation Nigerian writing, around the turn of the 
millennium.  
 Yet, as the 1999-2007 tenure of Abacha’s first elected successor, Olusegun 
Obasanjo, wore on, observers realized that his administration had more in common with 
those of his predecessors than they had envisioned. In fact, Obasanjo’s government 
essentially continued the process that the military leadership initiated in decreasing the 
state’s role in social welfare programming, itself an effect of the Reagan-Thatcher 
neoliberal push of the 1980s (Ekanade 23). In the name of combating corruption and 
improving efficiency, the newly democratic Nigerian leadership declared that the private 
sector could handle much-needed social welfare services and embarked on a significant 
privatization effort within the first year (Ekanade 14, 15). Major industries including 
electricity, gas, and petroleum were all subject to privatization schemes, culminating in 
2007 with the federal government’s sale of two major oil refineries at low prices to 
companies with whose leadership Obasanjo enjoyed personal connections (Ekanade 18). 
In such ways, the state continued to partner with corporations and thereby furthered 
Nigerians’ distrust in its motives and effectiveness. Indeed, at the helm of state economic 
policies throughout Obasanjo’s presidency were prominent and powerful neoliberals—
most notably Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, who worked for the World Bank for twenty-one 
years before becoming Nigeria’s Minister of Finance in 2003, and who has since moved 
back and forth between roles at the World Bank and prominent financial decision-making 
positions in Nigeria (MIT News Office). For such reasons, democracy in Nigeria—as in 
many other countries—turned out to mean not a greater engagement with social issues 
like poverty and inequality, but rather purely “market efficiency,” as economic power 
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continued and continues to be increasingly concentrated in the hands of a few private 
interests (Ekanade 2, Watts “Imperial Oil” 33).  
Consequently, the “distrust” that Paul Tiyambe Zeleza observes in third 
generation writing is not just of first- and second-generation nationalism but also of the 
promises of globalization. In response to the failures of globalization and democracy, and 
beginning with 2006’s Yellow-Yellow, Nigerian narrow nationalist literature has begun to 
turn away from the optimism of the earliest third generation writers and toward a new 
and more pessimistic, post-globalization phase. Where Afropolitanism moved the 
conversation’s focus away from the nation-state, narrow nationalism steps in to recenter 
it on the local and the national—a move that Deola and Ifemelu physically enact with 
their return migrations in A Bit of Difference and Americanah. The narrow nationalist 
texts of the last decade, then, come to form a critical subgenre; where the term “narrow 
nationalisms” reflects strategies they come to embrace, another way to frame them might 
be as “literature of neoliberal austerity”—a framing that would define the texts by what 
they aim to contest.  
The ways that neoliberal economic policies affect communities are not the same 
across the board; as global capital enters and operates differently within different 
contexts, so each affected community responds differently. The diversity of narrow 
nationalist responses, then, reflects the myriad ways in which these economic policies 
function. Big Oil’s destruction in the Niger Delta, for example, relies on gender- and 
environmental-based exploitation, so it results in gender- and environmentally-based 
responses in Yellow-Yellow and Oil on Water. Similarly, lack of access to white-collar 
jobs engenders a criminal response in I Do Not Come to You by Chance, and inequalities 
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in intellectual discourse and global charity receive still distinct responses in A Bit of 
Difference and Americanah, as the protagonists attempt to distance themselves from the 
international structures in which they once participated. Even within a single region or 
crisis, narrow nationalist responses can take disparate forms: Agary’s protagonist 
Zilayefa remains responsible for her mother’s well-being, so she must continue to earn a 
living—which leaves her at least temporarily dependent on the financial and emotional 
support of Sisi, whose wealth comes from cooperation with Big Oil, as she engages in 
projects like leasing trucks and selling toiletries to oil workers. Habila’s character Boma, 
on the other hand, has weaker family ties and can therefore detach more fully from the oil 
industry, subsisting and resisting on Irikefe Island without reliance on oil-related income. 
In these ways, third generation novels depict a range of narrow nationalisms that embrace 
local specificities while all engaging in the same effort to critique globalization and 
neoliberal economics.  
In addition, the historical settings of some of these novels serve as a critique of 
the Obasanjo administration’s failure to effect change. Yellow-Yellow and I Do Not Come 
to You by Chance, for instance, each begin about a decade prior to the novels’ 
publications. Yellow-Yellow, published in 2006, follows Zilayefa’s experience in the mid-
1990s, concluding with her feeling of hope at the moment of Abacha’s death—an 
ambivalent ending that suggests that, in the way that government policies changed little 
in the subsequent years, so Zilayefa’s educational and financial opportunities will 
correspondingly remain limited. I Do Not Come to You, published three years after 
Yellow-Yellow, begins immediately after Abacha’s death, but Kingsley only witnesses his 
possibilities for employment and his family’s financial situation deteriorating; tellingly, 
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the advent of democracy thus does not benefit the middle-class family at all. Further, 
when Kingsley’s 419 mentor Boniface dies a death reminiscent of Abacha’s rumored 
fate—poisoned in the company of sex workers—Kingsley faces a potential turning point, 
in which he acknowledges that could continue to pursue 419 or could use his 419 
earnings to pursue a lawful career. If we read Boniface as standing in for Abacha, and 
Kingsley as middle-class Nigerians who have turned to criminality out of desperation, 
then Kingsley’s decision to continue with 419 suggests that the new democracy’s claims 
of combating corruption and improving legitimate employment opportunities were, at 
best, exaggerated. In these ways, Yellow-Yellow and I Do Not Come to You signal that 
democracy did not alter economic and political realities for most Nigerians due to the 
continuation of neoliberal policies.  
 At the same time as they critique macroeconomic strategies, though, narrow 
nationalist texts also flag the dangers inherent in their localized responses to 
globalization. In Oil on Water, for example, the fact that Boma’s resistance takes on a 
religious form has implications for religiously based resistance throughout Nigeria. That 
is, although the eco-spiritual group on Irikefe seems like a force for productive 
nonviolent resistance, what about the mushrooming of other types of religious groups, 
from Pentecostalism and Christian evangelism in the South to radical Islam in the North? 
That Boma’s group is only given the generic name of “the worshippers” suggests that 
they should indeed be read as a type, rather than a specific fictional case. Through its 
portrayal of this group, Oil on Water suggests that even extremist religious groups—such 
as the notoriously violent Boko Haram—may emerge as much in response to 
neoliberalism as they do as a result of radical theologies. This move, in turn, redirects 
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responsibility for religious conflict to economic ills as much as religious extremism; 
radical religion, in this formulation, constitutes a response to the failures of a particular 
system, rather than an aberration within an otherwise functional system.  
 Further, although different narrow nationalist groups participate in the same anti-
neoliberalism project in a general sense, my reading of these novels indicates they are 
nonetheless at risk of clashing with one another, given their disparate sets of grievances 
and priorities. Even if the fictional Kingsley and Boma both face economic hardships 
caused by corruption and privatization, for instance, Kingsley’s response—reinforcing 
existing systems by participating in them—in turn exacerbates the financial and political 
conditions that surround Boma’s group on Irikefe. As neoliberal policies continue to 
impact communities in different ways, so the potential for increasingly varied narrow 
nationalisms to be at odds with one another will rise, advancing continuously toward 
potential chaos.  
 Perhaps no less detrimentally, the increasingly fragmented communities of narrow 
nationalisms may, rather than or in addition to clashing directly with one another, instead 
becoming increasingly isolated, as Boma’s eco-spiritual group is in a physical sense on 
the rural Niger Delta island. The potential for isolation especially raises the question as to 
whether narrow nationalisms suggest that large-scale resistance movements will become 
increasingly an event of the past, if disparate groups cannot connect to each other or find 
sufficient common ground. If available modes of protest change in this way, then perhaps 
more widely the possibilities for critiquing power will change as well—in the Niger 
Delta, throughout Nigeria and Africa, and globally. With disparate narrow nationalist 
resistance projects growing in number, the potential for collective protest of the current 
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economic regime seems only to shrink, in turn suggesting a dangerous spiral. In any case, 
the fragmentary nature of narrow nationalisms remains a far cry from independence-era 
African nationalisms, which worked to united nationalists from throughout the continent 
in a shared project of combating imperialism. The effort to resist neoliberalism may thus 
take forms too divergent to allow for broad alliances, at least in the foreseeable future.  
 Moreover, the proliferation of local resistances seems likely only to escalate, 
given the current economic climate. Experts hold that World Bank policies only 
exacerbate already uneven development, for example as the institution supports 
microfinance programs without acknowledging the exploitative interest rates that often 
accompany such initiatives and consequently leave many borrowers substantially deeper 
in debt (Bond). Institutional enthusiasm for neoliberal economics shows no sign of 
slowing down, as Euro-American—and increasingly, Chinese and Japanese—economic 
interests continue to compete amongst each other in Nigeria and throughout Africa. 
Despite globalization’s and neoliberalism’s claims of “leveling the playing field,” narrow 
nationalist literature suggests that it does just the opposite by coming to heighten 
disparities and creating increasingly localized responses and communities. Put 
differently, while the number of multinational corporations shrinks (with mergers and 
buyouts), conversely the number of narrow nationalisms appears to be multiplying. 
Rather than connecting everyone worldwide, the internet age has instead resulted in 
multitudes of often disconnected subgroups.  
 In this light, Abani’s notion that “an aggregation of all the small acts” can be 
“transformative,” then, suggests that such potential transformations can be either 
constructive or destructive—or perhaps both. The expansion and diversification of 
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Nigerian and African literature, to cover an even wider range of topics and experiences 
than ever before, is certainly a positive development. The increasing fragmentation of 
communities and nations indicated in these third generation novels, however, offers a 
pessimistic prognosis for the future of resistance and solidarity in Nigeria and Africa. The 
continuing role that literature will play amidst these tensions remains to be seen. Where 
Achebe asserted Nigerians’ histories to contest colonial ideologies, perhaps the literature 
of narrow nationalisms will similarly combat the neoliberal ideologies undergirding 
economic austerity in the twenty-first century.   
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